VZCZCXRO0394
OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV
DE RUEHAK #2199/01 1110912
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 210912Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5001
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 002199 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR WILSON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV TU VISIT
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER:  YOUR APRIL VISIT TO ANKARA 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR ROSS WILSON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
 Madam Secretary, 
 
¶1. (S) Thank you for coming to Turkey.  The Mission and I 
look forward to seeing you here.  Your visit can help us 
achieve three things. 
 
-- First, we need to restore lost confidence --on both sides 
-- about intent and capacity for genuine collaboration. 
Announcing the start of a strategic dialogue will reinforce 
that effort. 
 
-- Second, we need a clearer common understanding on Iran 
that will help us avoid Turkish wavering (or worse) and 
ensure Ankara is with us when we need it. 
 
-- Third, we need to help the Turks see a way forward on 
Cyprus and the EU that welcomes UN technical work, activates 
Turkish diplomacy and politicking in European capitals, and 
shows more momentum on domestic accession issues. 
 
You will hear, privately and publicly, a great deal of 
frustration over PKK terrorism and impatience with US 
inaction against PKK camps in northern Iraq.  You will also 
find anxiety about further regional instability that is 
fueled by fears that Iraq will fragment, Palestine will 
implode, and Iran and the West will collide militarily. 
Despite these concerns and the fact that public sentiment 
toward the US remains largely negative, this government is 
rhetorically committed to working with us to find a new 
paradigm for partnership.  The test for both of us is whether 
we can replace that rhetoric with reality. 
 
Where We Find Ourselves 
----------------------- 
 
¶2. (S) You come to Turkey at a time when our relations should 
be strong, but remain frayed.  It's not for lack of trying. 
The Turks were and are immensely grateful for your role in 
getting the EU accession talks started last October.  We have 
restored bilateral dialogue through many senior level visits 
over the past nine months.  We have shifted our dialogue on 
Iraq from one dominated by Turkish whining about the PKK and 
Kirkuk to constructive collaboration politically and 
logistically in support of our efforts there. 
 
¶3. (S) The Hamas visit set this back more seriously than 
Turkish officials are willing to admit.  You know better than 
we the bitterness toward Turkey that exists in some parts of 
Congress and especially the American Jewish community.  For 
this and a variety of reasons, we still have a Turkey 
problem.  There are tactical problems on this or that issue, 
but the fundamental problem is a continuing lack of 
confidence ) on both sides. 
 
¶4. (S) Left alone, the problems will get worse.  None of the 
regional challenges is getting any easier.  Internally, 
politicking has begun ahead of the presidential election in 
May 2007 and parliamentary elections that must occur by 
November 2007.  Infighting among secularists, AKP Islamists 
and nationalists is intensifying.  Each side regards the US 
as both a punching bag and a source of support.  Though PM 
Erdogan remains by far Turkey's most popular politician and 
AK has no serious competitor, he and FM Gul -- in the face of 
rising PKK violence, EU obstinacy on Cyprus, angst about Iraq 
and Iran, and obvious tension over US-Turkish relations -- 
are vulnerable to nationalists and to the military. 
Reverting to Turkish pugnacity, the predictable course of 
action, will likely worsen matters for us here. 
 
How We Can Use Your Visit 
------------------------- 
 
¶5. (S) Your visit can give public profile to the positives in 
our relations and our collaboration on key global issues.  It 
is a step toward restoring confidence, Gul's reported theme 
for your visit.  Really restoring confidence requires action, 
of course, and your talks here can help us better organize 
Turkey for progress on those issues that can improve the 
atmosphere and move away from the problems that are 
undermining our ties.  You will be investing in relationships 
with Erdogan and Gul -- both of whom look set to be in 
leadership for a while, share our goals in many areas, and 
have influence and credibility in the region.  The fact that 
they want and need US support internationally and as they 
look toward a crucial 18 months of domestic transition gives 
us leverage. 
 
Key Issues 
---------- 
 
ANKARA 00002199  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶6. (S) Iran:  Greg Schulte came here in February to share our 
intelligence on Iran's nuclear efforts and consult on the way 
forward.  Gul told visiting Congressional staff last week 
that Iran's nuclear weapons aspirations are the single most 
important problem facing Europe and the Middle East, and he 
emphasized the need for a united and decisive international 
approach.   In public and apparently in private, Ankara has 
called on Tehran to cooperate with the IAEA, adopt full 
transparency on its nuclear programs, and resume negotiations 
with the EU-3.  Gul should hear where you want to take the 
Iran debate and how Turkey must be with us on this critical 
threat to it and to our alliance -- through diplomacy now 
and/or through any protective, preventive or other military 
efforts that may be required in the future.  You should also 
tell him that Turkey must not break ranks and de-isolate 
Tehran -- Ahmadinejad and Larijani visits here have been 
mooted and shot down recently, but probably not killed. 
 
7 (S) Cyprus/EU:  Ankara feels cornered by the EU's 
insistence that Turkey open its ports to Cypriot goods, its 
incessant reform demands -- including on issues that seem 
impossible to them (Cyprus, the Greek Patriarchate, Kurdish 
rights), and the anti-Islamic/anti-Turkish sentiment in many 
EU capitals.  Erdogan and Gul need both support and tough 
love.  You should compliment Gul's Cyprus proposals of last 
January and his EU-related reform package of several days 
ago, and tell him the US will continue to push the EU to keep 
the accession process on track.  But the Turks should also be 
told to respond positively to the UN-brokered technical talks 
on Cyprus and to stop complaining about Kofi Annan and his 
Cyprus representative, which only undermines their interest 
in getting a UN process restarted.  You should tell them that 
senior Turkish officials need to spend a lot more time 
courting European allies in the EU process ) they have only 
the UK now.  The appearance and reality of steady progress on 
reform is also essential for keeping the EU bicycle aright. 
The Halki Seminary and other Greek Patriarchate issues are 
hard for Turkey, but progress would do wonders for Turkey's 
image in Europe and the US and put beef in the "Dialogue of 
Civilizations" bun. 
 
¶8. (S) HAMAS:  Erdogan and Gul are deeply defensive about the 
HAMAS visit.  They see a rejected and rejectionist HAMAS as 
something that will aggravate instability, worsen the 'clash 
of civilizations,' and bolster Iran's influence, which they 
do not want.  But Gul understands the need not to dig a 
deeper hole for Turkey:  with some prompting, he criticized 
HAMAS' failure to condemn the Tel Aviv bombing.  Gul will 
probe for ways Turkey can be helpful and will want to 
describe Abu Mazen's April 24-25 talks here.  Consulting with 
the Turks on how we see the Middle East developing in coming 
months will be helpful.  You should also restate your 
disappointment that HAMAS came here, suggest that Turkey find 
ways to call publicly for HAMAS to change, and urge that 
there be no more surprises. 
 
¶9. (S) Iraq and the PKK:  The government and public here are 
unnerved by recent developments in Iraq, signs of civil war 
and fears of Iraq's breakup.  Rising PKK violence aggravates 
this.  Gul wants a fresh sense of our Iraq game plan and what 
we expect of Turkey.  Besides this, you should reiterate our 
commitment to helping with the PKK problem, note that we have 
limits, and urge the government to stop painting itself in a 
corner by incessantly calling for more that it knows we can 
deliver.  You should also encourage Erdogan and Gul to flesh 
out a political vision on Turkey's Kurdish issue and draw 
moderate Kurdish leaders into the system. 
 
¶10. (S) Armenia:  I understand that Gul has sent you a letter 
on the annual Armenian genocide resolution.  The Turks 
realize that this always difficult issue is now harder 
because of HAMAS.  Erdogan hopes you will reaffirm the 
Administration,s determination to pull out all stops to 
prevent passage of genocide language.  In addition, you 
should commend Turkey's efforts to establish a 
mutually-acceptable Turkish-Armenian mechanism to review the 
history and begin laying the groundwork for reconciliation. 
Opening the Armenian border, especially in the context of an 
Armenian-Azeri peace deal, would be a huge step forward. 
 
¶11. (S) Strategic Dialogue:  As we complete this message, we 
are still awaiting a response to the 'strategic partnership 
framework' document that EUR presented to the Turks several 
weeks ago.  We are pressing the MFA to agree on a text that 
can be part of your visit.  Announcement by you and Gul that 
we intend to set up a formal and regular senior-level 
strategic dialogue consultative mechanism will signal 
progress toward restoring confidence and strengthen our 
ability to work the Turks in ways helpful to our goals in the 
region and in Turkey itself. 
 
ANKARA 00002199  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ 
 
WILSON