VZCZCXRO5474
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHDS #0941/01 0970915
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 070915Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
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RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 000941 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF DAS YAMAMOTO AND AF/E 
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2016 
TAGS: PREL PBTS MOPS KPKO ET ER
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIAN FOREIGN MINISTER REAFFIRMS DESIRE FOR 
NORMALIZATION TALKS WITH ERITREA 
 
REF: ADDIS ABABA 897 
 
Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES VICKI HUDDLESTON.  REASON: 1.4 (D). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY.  Foreign Minister Seyoum Mesfin hailed the 
importance of U.S. engagement in addressing Ethiopia-Eritrea 
tensions, but voiced continued concern about Eritrean 
intentions and the presence of Eritrean troops in the 
Temporary Security Zone, where UNMEE had become "a hostage." 
FM Seyoum reaffirmed Ethiopian desire for normalization talks 
with Eritrea, underscoring that demarcation should be a means 
toward achieving sustainable peace, not an end in itself.  In 
viewing a computer simulation of the demarcation of the 
border, Seyoum noted that the western portion of the border 
with Eritrea was not in accordance with the decision of the 
EEBC, and should be shifted even further west.  Seyoum's 
comments are consistent with those of Prime Minister Meles, 
but more strident those of senior Ethiopian military 
officials.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (U) On March 30, visiting AF DAS Amb. Donald Yamamoto, 
AF/E desk advisor William Schofield, and INR/GGI analyst 
Raymond Milefsky, accompanied by Charge and poloff, met with 
Ethiopian Foreign Minister Seyoum Mesfin, acting Director 
General for the MFA's Europe and America Directorate Almaz 
Amha, and MFA Counsellor for Legal Affairs Minelik Alemu. 
 
¶3. (C) Ethiopia's attendance at the March 10 meeting of the 
Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission (EEBC) in London 
reflected Ethiopia's appreciation for USG engagement on the 
border issue, FM Seyoum said.  "We went to London with 
limited objectives, as reflected by our delegation," he said. 
 (NOTE: Amcit attorney Don Picard and MFA Counsellor Minelik 
represented the GOE.  END NOTE.)  "They were told... not to 
agree to anything, but to facilitate for our friend the 
United States and to show the commitment of Ethiopia," Seyoum 
added. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
"COLD PEACE" UNDERSCORES CONTINUED SUSPICION OF ERITREA 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶4. (C) FM Seyoum expressed concern about Ethiopia conforming 
with the EEBC's instructions while "Eritrean guns are pointed 
at our head," observing, "We are (wary of) stepping into that 
minefield, or getting into that trap."  Following the EEBC 
meeting, "decisions were imposed on us; we are now instructed 
to name our liaison officers, name our security plan," he 
said.  (NOTE: According to UNMEE DSRSG Ennifar, Eritrea had 
identified liaison officers to work with the EEBC, and 
submitted a security plan for demarcators, in 2004, which the 
GSE maintained was still in effect.  As of April 1, Ethiopia 
had taken neither step, despite being expected to do so by 
March 24.  END NOTE.)  Ethiopia doubted Eritrea's commitment 
to restoring the "dignity" of the Temporary Security Zone 
(TSZ), where 18 posts abandoned by UNMEE were "now occupied 
by regular army troops."  The Eritrean military now 
controlled the movement of UNMEE, rather than the reverse. 
"UNMEE is just a hostage; whether they remain in the TSZ or 
not, they have become part of the problem," he said.  There 
was now "a cold peace," he said, but "we don't know how long 
it will remain there."  Complaining that "the attitude of the 
other side has not changed," Seyoum indicated that Ethiopia 
may nominally respond to the EEBC without taking any concrete 
follow-up action:  "we may respond, but not move." 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
NORMALIZATION TALKS MUST ACCOMPANY DEMARCATION 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶5. (C) Seyoum explained that public statements affirming 
Ethopia's commitment to its previously announced five-point 
peace plan were necessitated by the erroneous announcement by 
UN SYG Annan's spokesman that the parties had agreed on 
demarcation without restrictions.  "We will go to London, and 
we will continue to go to London, only if it is consistent 
with our five-point peace plan," Seyoum declared.  He noted 
that demarcation should not be an end in itself, but rather a 
means toward achieving normalization of relations between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea: "We have said 'no demarcation' without 
normalization; (the 2000) Algiers (Accord) is for demarcation 
that will achieve a sustainable, durable peace."  If the 
United States could guarantee that normalization talks would 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00000941  002 OF 003 
 
 
be held, "we will enter into talks on disputed areas," Seyoum 
said. 
 
¶6. (C) DAS Yamamoto responded that the USG was committed to 
resolving the border issue to achieve sustainable peace, and 
sought to avoid "extra harm" or planting the seeds for future 
conflict.  The March 10 EEBC meeting was successful, he said; 
the GOE's attendance had highlighted that Ethiopia did not 
wish to be an obstacle to demarcation.  Yamamoto noted that 
the USG had held consultations with other UNSC members, to 
obtain financial commitments to support the peace process. 
While delimitation of the border was "over and finished," the 
United States hoped that the parties could work together on 
solutions that addressed potential problems arising from 
demarcation, such as the division of towns (highlighted by 
the simulated "flyover" presented by INR/GGI), and the 
anticipated displacement of an additional 58,000 border 
residents, adding to those already displaced and living in 
camps.  Neither the United States nor other Witnesses to the 
2000 Algiers Accords would spend funds unnecessarily for 
repatriation of additional displaced persons, if the issue 
could be avoided.  Land and water rights also needed to be 
addressed as core issues, Yamamoto said.  "Technical 
discussions" with General Carlton Fulford in the lead, who 
had been named by the EEBC, were needed to achieve 
sustainable peace.  General Fulford would help both parties 
address these challenges of divided towns and displaced 
persons.  Normalization talks would support the overall 
efforts to resolve the tensions between both parties and 
ensure a durable peace.  The United States was willing to 
host normalization talks.  Yamamoto cautioned, however, that 
the "goodwill of the United States is not limitless;" 
progress on demarcation was needed. 
 
--------------------------------- 
DEMARCATION WOULD DIVIDE VILLAGES 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Schofield noted that EEBC commissioners had viewed the 
virtual "flyover" of the Ethiopia-Eritrea border, which was 
the first time they had seen the impact of their 2002 
decision.  Gen. Fulford could play a useful role in helping 
the parties address the impact of demarcation, he added. 
 
¶8. (C) INR/GGI Milefsky then presented the virtual "flyover" 
to FM Seyoum and other MFA officials, which included such 
areas as the Zela Ambesa-Altena road, the Ragali 
Delta/Danakil Depression, Tsorena, and the Badme Plain. 
(NOTE: The flyover indicates that Badme lies 1.8 km from the 
line of demarcation, on the Eritrean side.  END NOTE.) 
Milesky highlighted that delimitation was a legal decision; 
whereas demarcation referred to the human implementation of 
that decision.  In response, FM Seyoum expressed concern 
about "Point 9," indicating that the point of origin for the 
straight, western portion of the border needed to be moved 
even further west, to the confluence of two rivers, in 
accordance with the EEBC's decision.  FM Seyoum also noted 
that some border villages that would be divided by 
demarcation (such as Sembel) were 400-500 years old. 
 
¶9. (C) COMMENT:  Foreign Minister Seyoum is a hardliner 
within the Ethiopian Government.  He opposed Ethiopia's 
attendance at the March 10 London meeting, but relented to 
respond positively to U.S. engagement efforts.  Seyoum has no 
trust in Eritrea, and fears that even with demarcation it is 
not clear that Eritrea will disarm, demobilize, and 
rehabilitate its larged armed forces.  Technical talks would 
address challenges from demarcation, but having normalization 
talks is the bottom line condition for Ethiopia's continued 
support for the demarcation process.  Seyoum feels strongly 
that unless the causes of the conflict are addressed, there 
will never be any peace.  Prime Minister Meles (reftel) 
shares many of these view.  On the role of the United Nations 
Mission for Ethiopia-Eritrea (UNMEE), however, FM Seyoum is 
more outspoken that Ethiopian military leaders:  in separate 
meetings (septel), Chief of General Staff Samora Yonus had 
praised UNMEE for helping defuse tensions, prevent minor 
misunderstandings from leading to larger conflict, and 
preserving the peace. 
 
¶10. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED:  We have a long way to go before 
the demarcation process is completed, but for the first time 
the EEBC and the Witnesses see positive movement and want 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00000941  003 OF 003 
 
 
pressure maintained on both sides to ensure there is 
cooperation in implementing the EEBC decision.  The road 
ahead for both parties and the facilitator, the United 
States, will be long and arduous.  END COMMENT. 
 
¶11. (U) DAS Yamamoto cleared this cable. 
HUDDLESTON