VZCZCXRO1434
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHDS #0897/01 0940958
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 040958Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9820
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 6850

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 000897 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AF FOR A/S FRAZER, AF/E 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2016 
TAGS: ER ET PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: PM MELES TO DAS YAMAMOTO:  STAY ENGAGED ON THE 
BORDER 
 
 
Classified By: Charge Vicki Huddleston for reason 1.4 (b,d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY. DAS Yamamoto and party met with Prime 
Minister Meles for over two hours on March 30.  Meles asked 
the U.S. to stay engaged on the border "for the long term;" 
reiterated that dialogue is needed for lasting peace; and 
said that Ethiopia is "uncomfortable" with the 
Ethiopian-Eritrean Boundary Commission (EEBC) as there is no 
roadmap for demarcation. Ethiopia has not yet decided if it 
will participate in April 29 EEBC meeting but remains engaged 
in looking forward to a durable solution. END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C) DAS Yamamoto, accompanied by AF/E advisor Bill 
Schofield, INR geographer Ray Milesky, Charge Huddleston and 
DCM (notetaker) spent over two hours with Prime Minister 
Meles Zenawi on March 30, primarily focusing on the 
Ethiopian-Eritrean border. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Acting 
Director of Europe and America Almaz Amha also attended.  DAS 
Yamamoto commended Ethiopia for its participation in the 
March 10 EEBC meeting, saying that it changed people's minds 
about Ethiopia's commitment to resolve the border, energized 
the EEBC commissioners and will help to leverage additional 
resources for the EEBC to complete its work.  The U.S. 
recognizes that technical negotiations are part of the 
process and that coherent, logical discussions are needed to 
resolve issues of demarcation, to include such issues as 
displaced persons.  DAS Yamamoto said that demarcation must 
result in durable peace and not plant the seeds of future 
conflict.  The U.S. wants to bring both sides together to 
work on both the technical and human aspects of demarcation. 
Gen. Fulford's role as a technical expert is to assist the 
parties and to held them address specific land, water and 
property rights issues as the border is demarcated. DAS 
Yamamoto described U.S. engagement as a final chance to reach 
durable peace along the border. 
 
¶3.  (C)  INR geographer Milesky projected the flyover video 
for PM Meles who pointed out some of the areas where the EEBC 
made mistakes, such as at the confluence of two rivers or in 
the location of a mountain, which led to further mistakes as 
the delimitation line was drawn.  The PM also commented on 
villages that were Eritrean but had been given to Ethiopia 
and vice versa, and stated that some areas were militarily 
rather than socially significant for Ethiopia.  According to 
the PM, the EEBC decision exacerbated problems that already 
existed and then seemed to blame Ethiopia for some of its 
mistakes.  The EEBC in making its delimitation decision 
wanted both sides to win, the PM said, and so some land was 
given to each party; however, they chose the wrong land in 
some cases.  The result was an "uninformed" decision that 
mixed technical and political aspects, according to the PM. 
Nevertheless, he said, any logical person could solve this in 
24 hours; but a logical person is needed (referring to lack 
of Eritrean engagement.) 
 
¶4.  (C) The PM said that the Ethiopian objective is to keep 
the U.S. in play on the border issue, and this is why 
Ethiopia participated in the March 10 EEBC meeting.  However, 
its silence at the meeting should not have been construed as 
concurrence; rather, Ethiopia preferred to keep silent and 
speak up only when useful to advance the process.  Ethiopia 
is not comfortable with the EEBC.  According to Meles, the 
"big hole" is Eritrea which is not present at the table and 
is not likely to be present soon.  What is the point of EEBC 
meetings if there is no interlocutor, Meles asked.  Political 
will is needed to move forward, he said, as both parties have 
the technical knowledge and know the terrain.  But there are 
risks for Ethiopia in moving forward, he added.  We can't 
trust the EEBC process without a roadmap and without a 
commitment from the Eritrean side for dialogue. If Ethiopia 
participates in the EEBC meeting at end of April, it will 
make clear that demarcation is not possible without 
commitment to dialogue, Meles said. 
 
¶5.  (C) Nevertheless, Meles said, no one can force the 
parties to agree; even U.S. engagement does not guarantee 
success. However, only the U.S. can provide Isaias with "a 
ladder to climb down."  Isaias can change, eventually, but he 
can't be forced to do so.  Thus, there is no short term fix, 
Meles said, and we will go along with anything that might 
lead to peace.  We want the U.S. commitment to be engaged for 
long term; and we want U.S. the commitment on dialogue for 
normalization, Meles stated. 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00000897  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶6.  (C) DAS Yamamoto underlined that the April 29 EEBC 
meeting would be a political meeting and needs political 
representation from both sides.  This meeting is essential 
before the team of surveyors begin their work, he said.  Both 
sides will need to discuss and resolve problem areas; 
aircraft and especially helicopters must be allowed to fly 
over the area in order to do the work; and the neutral zone 
must be respected, with no military build up. 
 
¶7.  (C) PM Meles asked if, assuming that Gen. Fulford were to 
facilitate a meaningful discussion, and the survey took 
place based on the basis of a roadmap, would technical 
discussions be deferred until the survey work is completed or 
would issues be resolved as the work progressed?  DAS 
Yamamoto responded that at the April meeting the parties 
themselves could decide on a common mechanism to use to 
resolve such issues.  Gen. Fulford assists by bringing the 
weight of the U.S. and the international community to bear, 
and the EEBC can provide adjudication.  Schofield added that 
Fulford can expand technical talks in order to resolve 
issues.  The challenge, Meles asserted, is to have technical 
discussions that lead to the ultimate prize:  lasting peace. 
This cannot be imposed from the outside, he added; we (the 
parties) have to want it.  Technical decisions may be 
perfect, he said, but may not lead to peace. The starting 
point is political will.  For Ethiopia there are risks:  it 
can't trust the EEBC as it has made mistakes in the past; the 
entire process lacks a roadmap; and there is no commitment on 
the Eritrean side for dialogue.  It would seem that we will 
"stumble into" talks.  Meles said that Ethiopia would not go 
into talks where the EEBC makes the ultimate decisions.  If 
there is no commitment to dialogue at the London talks, Meles 
said, there is no point in doing a survey or discussing 
technical issues.  Ethiopia will have to say "no," and in 
that case it is preferable to say so early on so as not to 
raise unrealistic expectations, Meles said. 
 
¶8.  (C) DAS Yamamoto again stressed that demarcation must 
lead to lasting peace.  Neither the U.N. nor the 
international community want another war.  There must be a 
permanent solution; fundamental causes must be addressed. 
There is a commitment to find that sustainable peace by the 
U.S., the EEBC, and the international community.  It must 
include discussions on technical issues and normalization. 
 
¶9.  (C) PM Meles stated that should Ethiopia go to London it 
will make clear to the EEBC and to Eritrea that it is not 
possible to go forward without a commitment to dialogue. 
Ethiopia is committed to demarcation; it accepts delimitation 
despite its problems; the way forward is based on dialogue. 
This is the only reason to go to London, Meles said. 
Otherwise the meeting will be "a blind alley" in which "we're 
going to pay more." 
 
¶10. (C) DAS Yamamoto assured PM Meles that the U.S. is 
committed to assisting the parties to address the problems of 
demarcation.  It may be possible to define a clear roadmap 
through private Ethiopia-Eritrea-U.S. talks.  Meles responded 
that the road map to peace is a "red line:"  no one can force 
us; real commitment is needed from both sides.  Playing 
chicken with Isaias doesn't work; don't anger or appease him. 
 He can't be punished or bribed. Don't use all your guns now; 
sooner or later Isaias will make up his mind and then 
everything can be done.  Eritreans are not our enemies.  We 
are not out to get Isaias as we have no energy to spare on 
this.  The U.S. should not take his antagonisms personally; 
he has nothing against the U.S. but wants to irritate you. 
He has no influence on Ethiopia now; we will not respond in 
kind to his game.  When he gets down to his last card he will 
come to his senses. 
 
¶11.  (C) Comment.  Although Meles remains wary of the EEBC 
process, he is engaged in looking forward to resolution of 
the border. Meles indicated his willingness for Ethiopia to 
attend the April 29 London meeting. The clear "roadmap" for 
Ethiopia is "technical discussions" to resolve displaced 
person issues and property/water rights, and "mornalization 
talks" by the witnesses to resolve the causes of war and 
build trust, the former led by General Fulford and the latter 
by the U.S.  Meles is still wary of the process and fears 
that Ethiopia may lose more in an undefined process. 
Nevertheless he will stay engaged with the U.S. as an 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00000897  003 OF 003 
 
 
interlocutor, at least for the time being. 
 
¶12.  (U) DAS Yamamoto cleared this cable. 
 
 
 
HUDDLESTON