This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 001724 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARPI, S/CT, INR/NESA 
NSC FOR FTOWNSEND, MMALVESTI 
COMMERCE FOR U/S DMCCORMICK 
STATE PASS USTR FOR SDONNELLY, DBELL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/29/2016 
TAGS: PTER PINS EPET ETTC MCAP IR AE IQ
SUBJECT: TOWNSEND DISCUSSES REGIONAL STABILITY, 
COUNTERTERRORISM WITH ABU DHABI CROWN PRINCE 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison, for reasons 1.4 b and d. 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  During an April 22 lunch meeting with 
Frances Fragos Townsend, Assistant to the President for 
Homeland Security and Counterterrorism (APHSCT), and Abu 
Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (MbZ), 
Townsend and MbZ discussed counterterrorism cooperation. 
Townsend stressed the importance of investigating 
counterterror cases fully, and not simply deporting suspects. 
 When asked by Townsend, MbZ stated that he is concerned 
about UAE oil infrastructure vulnerability.  He also noted 
his concern about the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in 
the UAE, particularly after the Hamas electoral victory in 
the Palestinian territories.  MbZ claimed that if elections 
were held in Dubai "tomorrow" he thought the Muslim 
Brotherhood would win.  Townsend discussed the USG's concern 
with the low number of favorable post shipment verification 
checks, and Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed (AbZ -- who 
was also at the meeting) assured Townsend that the UAEG would 
soon issue an export control law.  MbZ stated that he is not 
optimistic about the political process in Iraq, and that he 
is not confident in the Prime-Minister designate Jawad Al 
Maliki.  He also stated that he worries that Iran continues 
to meddle in the Iraqi's affairs.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (U) On April 22, APHSCT Townsend and Ambassador had lunch 
in a local restaurant with MbZ, AbZ, Director Military 
Intelligence Brigadier General Essa Al Mazrouei, and MbZ's 
International Affairs Director Yousef Al Otaiba.  Townsend 
was accompanied by NSC Senior Director for Combating 
Terrorism Michele Malvesti and APHSCT Aide Michael Taylor. 
 
Dubai Ports World Aftermath 
--------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) APHSCT Townsend thanked MbZ and AbZ for the UAEG's 
patience and understanding during the Dubai Ports World 
scandal.  She said that the "friendship and strength" of the 
bilateral relationship during the furor over the ports deal 
"spoke volumes" to President Bush.  MbZ appreciated 
Townsend's words and told her that the UAE has learned some 
lessons from the episode.  He said that the UAE's consultants 
are partly to blame for letting the controversy get so out of 
hand.  He also said that it reinforced in his mind the 
importance of focusing on the long-term U.S.-UAE cooperation. 
 As an aside, MbZ observed that the DPW scandal has made the 
Saudis nervous, because the extent of their U.S.-based 
investments. 
 
Oil Infrastructure Security, CT Efforts 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) APHSCT Townsend asked MbZ if the UAE was worried about 
its oil infrastructure.  MbZ responded emphatically, 
"absolutely."  He told Townsend that there are three 
international companies currently conducting risk assessments 
of the UAE oil infrastructure and maritime security for the 
UAEG.  Townsend offered U.S. assistance in helping the UAE to 
reduce its vulnerability.  MbZ asked the USG to notify him of 
any concerns about specific locations.  "We are learning now 
(about how to address our vulnerabilities), but we have to be 
one step ahead.  We worry that right now the terrorists are 
one step ahead." 
 
¶5. (C) Townsend and Ambassador discussed with MbZ the 
proposed U.S.-UAE Cash Courier operation that Ambassador and 
Embassy's DHS ICE attache proposed on April 19 to Sultan Bin 
Sulayem, Executive Chairman of Dubai Ports, Customs, and Free 
Zone Corporation.  MbZ nodded his approval of the concept. 
Ambassador also mentioned Treasury Under Secretary Stuart 
Levey's upcoming visit on April 29-May 1.  She thanked MbZ 
for the UAE's engagement and participation in the Joint 
Terrorist Finance Coordinating Committee, which she noted 
would be meeting on April 30.  MbZ agreed that the committee 
is important, and he noted that Central Bank Governor Sultan 
Nasser Al Suweidi was in Washington that week and had met 
with U/S Levey the previous day. 
 
¶6. (C) In a private discussion between Townsend and MbZ, 
Townsend told MbZ that the USG was concerned about the UAEG's 
tendency to simply deport extremists and suspected terrorists 
-- instead of fully investigating them.  Townsend stressed 
the importance of conducting full investigations and of 
sharing the results of those investigations with the USG. 
(Note: MbZ and Townsend discussed other counterterrorism 
cooperation issues that will be reported via separate 
channels.  End note.) 
 
Countering the Muslim Brotherhood 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Turning to a discussion of the recent Hamas electoral 
victory in the Palestinian territories, MbZ said that the UAE 
"felt the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) rally behind Hamas after 
the election."  He said that the Hamas victory should be a 
lesson to the West.  "The West is telling us to open up and 
have elections, but if we were to have an election in Dubai 
tomorrow, the Muslim Brotherhood would take over."  Al Otaiba 
agreed, noting that the MB is the "most organized."  "We have 
to take time to make democracy so we are sure we do not have 
a democracy with someone like Iranian president Ahmadinejad." 
 MbZ opined that the challenge is to find a way to "take them 
(the MB) down in a way that they never come back," and he 
said that a key component to this involves reforming the 
education system (which he said was penetrated by the MB in 
the late 1960's). 
 
¶8. (C) AbZ mentioned that the local Al Arabiyya television 
station had aired a Saudi show on the history of the MB and 
extremism the previous evening.  In an interesting 
interaction between the two brothers, MbZ "quizzed" AbZ on 
the reason for the show.  AbZ and MbZ discussed that the show 
had been produced to show that the problem of extremism was 
not indigenous to Saudi Arabia, but rather that it stemmed 
from Egypt's Nasserism.  MbZ smiled and said that he looks to 
AbZ to handle the UAE's relationship with the Saudis. 
 
MbZ: Glum Outlook on Iraq, Iranian Meddling 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) During a discussion of the Iraqi political process, 
MbZ stated that he has "no confidence" in the new Iraqi Prime 
Minister-designate, Jawad Al Maliki.  "We worry about the new 
government.  We have to live with it for the next four years, 
and if we do not start out on the right foot, then we have to 
start over."  Although he is "not optimistic" about the 
future of Iraq's political process right now, he said he will 
refrain from judging until the entire government is formed. 
He told Townsend, "the Iraqis need someone who understands 
the Iraqi's interests" and that if Maliki is "on the 
Iranian's side there will be problems."  MbZ also said he 
thinks the British made a mistake in the south of Iraq by 
advocating for Sistani, because he does not believe Iraq will 
be able to have a successful political system with "someone 
like Sistani." 
 
¶10. (C) MbZ stated his belief that the Iranians will try to 
gain from the electoral process in Iraq.  "Iranians know how 
to play the game.  They are smart and very patient.  They 
have a strategy in Iraq."  He anticipates that Iran will 
never let Iraq out of its influence, and he said that that 
the Iranians are "betting" that the U.S. will not do anything 
about their meddling in Iraq. 
 
Iran and Export Controls 
------------------------ 
 
¶11. (C) Turning to a discussion of Iran's nuclear ambitions, 
MbZ noted that the Iranians think that the U.S. will also not 
do anything about their recent declaration that they have 
successfully enriched uranium.  "I think they are wrong.  I 
think I know that if your President sees danger, he will take 
action."  Stating that Iran has been trying to acquire a 
nuclear capability for years, he observed "we see the real 
face of the regime in Ahmadinejad."  MbZ also observed that 
the Iranians are "playing a dirty game" with Russia and 
China. 
 
¶12. (C) APHSCT Townsend told MbZ that the USG is concerned 
about the low percentage of "favorable" Department of 
Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security post shipment 
verifications.  Informing him that the international average 
is 90% favorable, she said that the UAE only has a 55% 
favorable rating (with 20% unfavorable and 25% unverifiable). 
 AbZ assured Townsend that the UAEG does not want Iran to 
take advantage of the UAE's open trading environment.  He 
said the UAE was in the final stages of ratifying its export 
control law and that it would be announced "soon."  He also 
mentioned that the UAE had just endorsed the Proliferation 
Security Initiative's Statement of Interdiction Principles 
(PSI SOPs).  (Note: In a sidebar discussion, AbZ told 
Ambassador that the USG could tell the other Gulf adherent to 
the PSI SOPs that the UAE had submitted a "silent 
endorsement" (septel).  End note.) 
 
FTA: Problems with Investment Chapter, Business Opposition 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
¶13. (C) At MbZ's request, AbZ briefed Townsend on the status 
of the U.S./UAE Free Trade Negotiations (FTA).  AbZ told 
Townsend that there have been a "few bottlenecks" in the 
talks, "especially on oil and gas."  He said "if we end up 
with no FTA, oil and gas will be the main reason....The UAE 
has been as cooperative and as creative as possible, but this 
issue is very serious for our national security."  AbZ noted 
that the U.S./UAE negotiations are the first between the U.S. 
and a major OPEC exporter, and he said that he anticipates 
this problem will be an issue in other countries.  (Note: Abz 
told the Ambassador in an aside, "if the U.S. cannot sign an 
FTA with the UAE, you will never get one with Qatar, Kuwait, 
or Saudi Arabia." End note.) 
 
¶14. (C) AbZ also said that as a result of the Dubai Ports 
World episode, the private sector is now "trying to push the 
FTA away."  Recounting a recent meeting between UAE Minister 
of Economy Sheikha Lubna al-Qasimi and all of the UAE 
Chambers of Commerce, AbZ said that the UAE business 
community was "trying to make use of the DPW fiasco as the 
basis for claiming that a U.S./UAE Free Trade Agreement (FTA) 
will hurt the UAE business community."  In response to 
Townsend's question about how to move past this, Al Otaiba 
said that they need to be able to show the average UAE 
citizen some tangible benefits from the agreement.  Turning 
to a discussion of the Arab League Primary Boycott, AbZ told 
Townsend that the general public does not understand why 
trade with Israel has anything to do with an FTA, but he 
noted his personal belief that the FTA process could be a 
good way for the UAE to lift its ban against trade with 
Israel. 
 
¶15. (U) This cable was cleared by APHSCT Townsend. 
SISON