VZCZCXRO0790
OO RUEHPA
DE RUEHAB #0409/01 1111419
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 211419Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1218
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 1338
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0299

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABIDJAN 000409 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
KINSHASA PASS TO BRAZZAVILLE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV EAID ASEC IV
SUBJECT: COTE D'IVOIRE: PRIME MINISTER'S UPCOMING VISIT TO 
WASHINGTON 
 
REF: ABIDJAN 384 
 
Classified By: POL/ECON Jim Wojtasiewicz, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  Prime Minister Banny told the Ambassador 
that the primary objective for his upcoming visit to 
Washington is to request assistance for Cote d'Ivoire's peace 
process from the World Bank and the IMF.  The Ambassador 
underscored the urgency of moving forward with identification 
and disarmament now, but Banny's response was cagey and 
evasive.  Banny is learning that it is relatively easy to get 
Cote d'Ivoire's political leaders to reach broad agreements 
but so far has proved nearly impossible to get them to carry 
out their commitments.  Senior U.S. officials should remind 
him that in order to return to the good graces of the 
international economic community, Cote d'Ivoire must not only 
clear its arrears with the World Bank, it must make real 
progress in the peace process, close the Cora investment 
dispute, and clean up corruption in the cocoa and petroleum 
sectors.  Banny will probably also raise bilateral 
assistance, and may put in a plug for more UN peacekeeping 
troops.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) The Ambassador met with Prime Minister Banny April 20 
to preview the Prime Minister's upcoming April 23-29 visit to 
Washington. 
 
¶3. (C) Banny said his main objective for the visit would be 
to persuade the World Bank and the IMF to resume assistance 
programs for Cote d'Ivoire once his government clears the 
country's arrears with the World Bank.  He asked for U.S. 
support in these institutions. 
 
¶4. (C) The Ambassador reminded Banny that the Cora de Comstar 
investment dispute remains a major irritant in our bilateral 
relationship.  He urged the Prime Minister to be prepared not 
just to discuss a deal but to finalize it, when he meets with 
Cora's stockholders in Washington.  Banny indicated he was 
aware of this issue but did not know all the details. 
 
¶5. (C) Banny asked for a readout of that day's meeting of the 
International Working Group (IWG), which the Ambassador had 
just come from (septel).  The Ambassador said the heads of 
Cote d'Ivoire's disarmament commission, electoral commission, 
and commission on identification had all told the IWG that 
unless real progress starts to be made on disarmament and 
identification urgently, by next week, it will not be 
possible to hold elections by the end of October.  Banny's 
response was cagey and evasive, as his presentation to the 
IWG had been.  He indicated without going into any detail 
that these things would start moving "soon," but he also 
talked about President Gbagbo's "parallel diplomacy:" 
agreeing on the broader political level to move forward with 
the peace process but in private throwing up any obstacle he 
can.  As an example he cited the recent incident at Tiebissou 
(reftel), when government security forces blocked the rebel 
New Forces (FN) chief of staff, escorted by UN peacekeeping 
troops, from traveling to Yamoussoukro for scheduled 
disarmament talks with the chief of staff of the government 
armed forces.  Banny said he was sure though he could not 
prove it that this was a "provocation" instigated by the 
presidency. 
 
¶6. (C) Comment.  Banny is learning the same lesson that many 
have learned before him.  It has been relatively easy to 
persuade the parties to Cote d'Ivoire's political crisis to 
reach broad agreements: Linas-Marcoussis, Accra I, II and 
III, Pretoria I and II, and now, under Banny, Yamoussoukro I 
and II.  Where the rubber needs to hit the road, and never 
seems to do so, is in the implementation of these agreements, 
because the Ivoirians never seem truly willing to carry out 
their commitments.   And when each successive agreement 
fails, the Ivoiorians turn back to the international 
community for help. 
 
¶7. (C) Banny is coming to Washington in search of assistance 
not only from the World Bank and the IMF but in all 
likelihood from the United States as well.  His Washington 
visit comes right between a visit last week to Paris, where 
President Chirac gave him a head-of-state welcome and 
reportedly promised substantial additional assistance, and a 
visit to Brussels on his way back from Washington, where he 
will make a similar request.  Senior U.S. officials should 
remind him that clearing the arrears with the World Bank is 
only one of the things that Cote d'Ivoire needs to do to 
return to the good graces of the international economic 
community.  Real progress must be made in the peace process, 
and this means disarmament and identification must start now. 
 
ABIDJAN 00000409  002 OF 002 
 
 
 Cote d'Ivoire must also commit to take concrete actions to 
clean up corruption in its cocoa sector and to prevent it 
from creeping in to the growing petroleum sector.  Cote 
d'Ivoire cannot expect substantial amounts of assistance from 
the international community when it lets so much of its own 
money go to waste. 
 
¶8. (C) If Banny raises bilateral assistance explicitly, 
senior officials should remind him that Cote d'Ivoire must 
meet these same conditions plus a final resolution of the 
Cora dispute in order to regain eligibility for AGOA 
benefits, and that Cote d'Ivoire will remain ineligible for 
most other forms of U.S. assistance until free and fair 
presidential elections are held.  Senior U.S. officials 
should also be prepared for Banny to put in a plug for the 
Secretary General's request to the Security Council for a 
 
SIPDIS 
large increase in UN peacekeeping troop levels in Cote 
d'Ivoire.  End Comment. 
 
Hooks