VZCZCXRO6741
PP RUEHCHI
DE RUEHVN #0302/01 0890928
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 300928Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9752
INFO RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 6445
RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI 2603
RUEHGO/AMEMBASSY RANGOON 2052
RUEHPF/AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH 1725
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1925
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI 0312
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 VIENTIANE 000302 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/MLS, INR 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2016 
TAGS: PINR PGOV SOCI LA
SUBJECT: THE LAO COMMUNIST PARTY'S GAME PLAN 
 
REF: VIENTIANE 275 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Kristen Bauer, reason 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: The Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP) 
-- the ruling Communist Party -- has absolute confidence in 
its ability to govern Laos well into the future. The Party 
believes that it is responsible for economic gains over the 
past decade, not comprehending that much of that progress was 
the inevitable result of Laos' geographic position among 
economic powerhouses like China and Thailand.  With positive 
economic gains and a pliant population, the Party has set a 
course to further consolidate and strengthen its control. 
Communist rhetoric reminiscent of the Cold War is in vogue; 
the LPRP is also convinced that the U.S. is actively trying 
to undermine its rule, putting an additional strain on our 
already shaky relationship.  Far from moving toward a more 
pluralistic government, Laos is heading toward deepening 
authoritarianism and entrenched dynastic oligarchy. End 
summary. 
 
¶2. (C) The overarching message from the March 18-21 8th Party 
Congress was the Party's conviction that it alone was 
responsible for Laos' economic achievements of the past 
half-decade.  The Political Report, which formed the basis of 
Congress discussions, and the Party Resolution, issued at the 
end of the Congress, made some mention of shortcomings, 
especially in the area of implementation of Party doctrine. 
But those shortcomings were not failures of the system so 
much as of individuals within it.  On overall strategy, the 
Congress had no criticism of its handling of the country. 
Its assessment of Laos' economic performance since the last 
Party Congress in 2001, and more broadly since the country 
adopted a "renovation policy" in the 1980's, was glowing: the 
Party took credit for increases in foreign investment, trade 
and foreign assistance. It also claimed success in raising 
living standards, signaled by increases in per capita income, 
life expectancy, literacy rates and other basic quality of 
life measures. 
 
¶3. (C) The Party's attribution of its economic success to its 
"renovation policy," the economic liberalization set up in 
1986 in tandem with "doi moi" in Vietnam, was disingenuous. 
Much of what has happened in Laos in the economic sphere has 
been an inevitable result of Laos' position in the midst of 
economic giants like China, Thailand and increasingly 
Vietnam. These are countries that are in need of new markets, 
sources of energy and raw materials, and places to put their 
investment money. Laos has played that role well, not so much 
because of the government's open-armed welcome of foreign 
investment (Laos remains a difficult place to do business 
because of a lack of rule of law, corruption, and overall 
inefficiency), but because it is exploitable. Any government 
running Laos probably would have done as well. 
 
¶4. (C) By taking credit for economic progress, however, the 
LPRP has concluded that it alone has the foresight to direct 
Laos' development.  Having convinced itself of the truth of 
its own rhetoric, the Party believes it has a mandate not 
only to direct the current program for removing Laos from the 
ranks of Least Developed Countries by 2020, but to continue 
to run the country well beyond that time.  The political 
signals from the Congress, and from other political 
activities of the past several months,  point to a shift by 
the Party toward greater conservatism and less willingness to 
eventually concede power.  Far from seeing economic 
development as an opportunity for political liberalization, 
the LDRP is trying to consolidate and strengthen its grip. 
 
¶5. (C) The new initiatives are comprehensive.  New Politburo 
member Somsavat Lengsavad said at a post-Congress press 
briefing that the Party would work to woo new members, to 
expand Party membership far beyond its current level of 
148,000.  The Party's ranks have grown significantly in the 
last decade, in large part because membership provides the 
only realistic hope of advancement for anyone in the GoL, 
including the country's teachers and doctors. The new 
initiative will increase the pressure on those outside the 
Party to join. 
 
¶6. (C) The LPRP has also consolidated its grip on the 
political process.  Earlier this year the National Assembly 
announced that Assembly elections originally scheduled for 
2007 would be held in April this year, to make its five-year 
 
VIENTIANE 00000302  002 OF 002 
 
 
tenure concurrent with that of the new Central Committee. 
That change, in turn, would assure that Party policy could be 
more effectively translated into legislative action, 
according to National Assembly spokesman Viseth Svengsuksa. 
Finally, the LPRP is committed to weeding out its 
non-performers.  Among other measures, the Party announced at 
the conclusion of the Congress that it had strengthened the 
authority of the Party Secretariat, the Party institution 
charged with enforcing discipline.  The change would promote 
"correct" behavior of Party members, thereby preventing the 
bad actions of a handful from impacting on the population's 
confidence in the LPRP's infallibility. 
 
¶7. (C) The shift to the right also spells a more troubled 
relationship with the U.S.  According to Singapore Embassy 
contacts, reporting information they in turn had picked up 
from the Russians, in the course of the Congress the senior 
leadership discussed the bilateral relationship, and 
determined that the U.S. was actively working to undermine 
the Party. As evidence, the leadership noted that the U.S. 
Embassy was frequently aware of the GoL's internal activities 
(possibly referring to our knowledge of the detention of 27 
Hmong children by Lao authorities since December).  The 
leadership felt certain there were "spies" working for the 
USG within the GoL, and that contact with both the U.S. 
Embassy and with our allies (including the Singaporeans) was 
dangerous. 
 
¶8. (C) The Party billed the new Central Committee lineup as 
an injection of youth into the leadership.  It was that: the 
average age of the new members is 51, versus 60 for the 
Central Committee veterans.  The purpose of the shift to a 
more youthful Committee was not to introduce new ideas, 
however, but to guarantee the Party's long-term survival: the 
19 new members all possess unquestionable credentials as 
Communist faithfuls, and they are unlikely candidates for 
change.  For example, four of the new members came from the 
military's political department or from the Party's political 
school, and are experts on Marxism-Leninism. Several others 
came from within the Party administration. The new CC may be 
younger, but it is no less Communist. 
 
¶9. (C) The new appointments also reveal a desire to establish 
political dynasties.  Three new appointments to the Central 
Committee are children of the senior leaders: Nam Vignaket 
(son of Politburo member Samane Vignaket), Sonesay Siphandone 
(son of retiring Party Secretary Khamtai) and Sanyahak 
Phomvihane (son of LPDR founder Kaysone Phomvihane and the 
second of Kaysone's sons on the CC).  Insiders tell us the 
leadership has struck a bargain to promote each other's 
children to the Central Committee, providing for their 
political futures and thereby their economic futures as well. 
 
 
¶10. (C) Comment: Although "reform" was a major theme of the 
8th Party Congress, that term applied only to changes within 
the system designed to improve Party efficiency and give the 
Lao population even less room to complain.  Nowhere in the 
platform was there discussion of any long-term opening of the 
political system. The message from the Party Congress was not 
one of gradual change, but of maintaining the status quo as 
far into the future as possible. End comment. 
BAUER