VZCZCXRO6576
PP RUEHCHI
DE RUEHVN #0298/01 0890653
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 300653Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9745
INFO RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 6442
RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI 2600
RUEHGO/AMEMBASSY RANGOON 2049
RUEHPF/AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH 1722
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0844
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0169
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 0663
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 0647
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI 0308
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0531
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0073

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 VIENTIANE 000298 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/MLA, DRL, PRM, S 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL KCRM TH LA
SUBJECT: DEPUTY HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES' LAO VISIT 
-- SOME HOPE FOR HMONG CHILDREN 
 
REF: VIENTIANE 234 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Kristen Bauer, reason 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
Summary 
------- 
¶1. (C) UN Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees Wendy 
Chamberlin's March 28-30 visit offered some promise of a 
positive resolution to Laos' continued detention of 27 Hmong 
deportees.   Chamberlin met with Politburo member Pany 
Yathoteu, and ethnic Hmong, and with Deputy Foreign Minister 
Phongsavath. Both relayed that the GoL cannot search for the 
missing group of Hmong until the Thai provide an 
"explanation" for their deportation to Laos in December. 
Chamberlin told both that she would relay this requirement to 
the RTG. She suggested that a Thai verbal explanation to the 
Lao Ambassador to Bangkok would satisfy the Lao demand. 
Chamberlin concluded from her meetings that the Lao would not 
require a third party to broker the handover of the children, 
but could make the arrangements directly with the Thai.  She 
suggested that should the Thai deliver and the Lao then fail 
to uphold their end of the bargain, the international 
community, including ASEAN countries, should get much tougher 
with the GoL.  End summary. 
 
Background of the visit 
----------------------- 
¶2. (C) The UNDP handled all arrangements for Deputy High 
Commissioner (and former U.S. Ambassador to Laos, 1996-1999) 
Wendy Chamberlin's visit, designed to find a resolution to 
the Lao government's continued detention of the 27 Hmong 
following their deportation from Thailand as illegal 
immigrants.  Although UNDP presented the visit as a "courtesy 
call," GoL approval was only given the day before her 
arrival.  (Comment: we believe her trip to Vientiane was 
approved only following deliberation at the highest levels of 
the government, with the Lao no doubt well aware of her real 
mission.) 
 
¶3. (C) In its diplomatic note requesting the visit, UNDP had 
asked for meetings with "appropriate officials," but had 
verbally relayed to MFA its desire for Chamberlin to meet 
with the Foreign Minister, with Minister to the President's 
Office Soubanh Srithirath, and with National Assembly Vice 
President Pany Yathoteu, a member of the Politburo.  In its 
approval, however, MFA notified UNDP that the Deputy High 
Commissioner would meet with Deputy FM Phongsavath Boupha, a 
much lower level interlocutor than UNDP had sought. Only 
after Chamberlin's arrival did the GoL grant her a second 
meeting, with Pany; UNDP felt Pany agreed to the meeting as a 
personal favor to UNDP, an organization that had supported 
her activities in the Assembly and was in part responsible 
for her recent promotion to the Politburo. 
 
Meetings with the GoL 
--------------------- 
¶4. (C) In a meeting with select diplomats and heads of UN 
agencies the afternoon of March 29, Chamberlin discussed the 
results of the two meetings.  She said she told the two Lao 
officials that the purpose of her visit was "friendly," 
since she had many friends in Laos from her days as U.S. 
Ambassador. She loved the Lao people, and wished to help 
resolve the problem of the missing children. She conveyed to 
Phongsavath and Pany that, while she was in Bangkok, she had 
met with Thai NSC Director General Winai Phattiyakhul and MFA 
PermSec Krit Garnchana-Goonchorn, who had given her a 
consistent message: the Thai had "made a mistake" in 
deporting the group of Hmong to Laos; the RTG would allow the 
children to return to Thailand on a one-time basis, with NSC 
arranging with Thai immigration for their smooth transfer 
from Laos; the Thai wanted to see the children in the group 
reunited with their families; and there would be no publicity 
surrounding the return. 
 
¶5. (C) Chamberlin told the diplomats and UN officials that 
both Pany and Phongsavath had complained that their 
government had begun looking for the children, but that they 
had not yet received a formal explanation of the deportation 
 
VIENTIANE 00000298  002 OF 003 
 
 
from the Thai. Without that information, they could not 
complete their search. Chamberlin emphasized that neither 
Phongsavath nor Pany said the explanation needed to be in 
written form, and she felt strongly that a verbal explanation 
would be sufficient. (At a reception for Chamberlin later 
that evening, the UNDP ResRep told DCM that he had checked 
with contacts in the GoL who had confirmed that they did not 
require a written explanation from the Thai.)  Her impression 
from the two conversations was the Lao saw the Thai 
unwillingness to provide them with an explanation as a 
diplomatic slight, and deeply offensive to Lao pride. 
 
The plan -- call in the Lao Ambassador to Thailand 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
¶6. (C) Chamberlin said she told both Lao officials that she 
would be meeting with Winai and Krit in Bangkok on her return 
there, and would convey to both the Lao demand that they 
explain the children's deportation. She mentioned to them 
that she would suggest to the Thai that they call in Lao 
Ambassador to Thailand Hiem Phommachanh and give him the same 
four-point explanation they had given her.  The Deputy HC 
later told DCM privately that, if possible, this should be 
done concurrently with a call by the Thai Ambassador to 
Vientiane on the Lao MFA, to deliver the same message. 
(Comment: The gathered diplomats welcomed the idea of calling 
in the Lao Ambassador. Hiem has apparently been tapped to 
become a Deputy FM and will be returning to Vientiane within 
months to take up his new post. His promotion is viewed 
positively among the diplomatic community here, who see him 
as a realist rather than an ideologue.) 
 
¶7. (C) Chamberlin said at the briefing that neither 
Phongsavath nor Pany responded directly to her suggestion, 
but Phongsavath did say after her proposal that his 
government had been preoccupied with the recent Party 
Congress, and had not had time to look for the children. Now 
that the Congress was over, the government would continue the 
search. Phongsavath also told Chamberlin he did not 
understand why Laos, and not Thailand, was getting blamed for 
the children's situation. She responded that she was blaming 
no one, but was merely looking for a solution that would 
return the children to their families. 
 
¶8. (C) The Deputy HC had no way to assess the chances of 
success of her proposal, but felt it merited an effort to get 
Thai agreement to talk to Ambassador Hiem in Bangkok. She saw 
her visit as a "last chance" to resolve the issue quietly. If 
the Lao failed to deliver the children after the Thai had 
talked with Hiem, the pressure on the GoL should be ratcheted 
up significantly. She also felt that ASEAN countries needed 
to weigh in much more strongly; at a reception the evening of 
March 29 Chamberlin told several ASEAN Ambassadors that their 
countries had an obligation to speak out on the missing 
children, an issue that was non-political, to demonstrate 
that ASEAN could take on substantive issues. 
 
Comment 
------- 
¶9. (C) Chamberlin's visit elicited the first signs of 
flexibility on the missing children we have seen from the Lao 
side in over a month. Lao statements about the missing 
children since late February have generally been much more 
categorical that the children were not here, leading us to 
believe that they had closed the book on the case and had no 
intention of releasing them. But Phongsavath's and Pany's 
comments to Chamberlin indicate that there is still a chance 
the Lao will release the group, providing their demand for a 
Thai explanation can be met. They have thrown the ball 
squarely back into the Thai court.  Chamberlin's intention is 
to press the Thai to give the Lao what they are looking for, 
pointing out that the Thai would have to tell the Lao no more 
than they told her. 
 
¶10. (C) If Chamberlin's read of the Lao is correct, they are 
looking for a way out of the corner they have boxed 
themselves into by detaining the children for so long, but 
need to be confident they will not be blamed for what has 
happened.  As a result of that requirement, one critical 
 
VIENTIANE 00000298  003 OF 003 
 
 
element to securing the release of the children will be 
convincing the Lao that the handover will be without 
publicity and without recrimination.  To assure a discreet 
handover, Deputy HC Chamberlin felt the matter should ideally 
be handled directly between the Lao and Thai, without the 
involvement of the international community. End comment. 
BAUER