VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUCNDT #0563/01 0820053
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 230053Z MAR 06
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8405
INFO RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA 0300
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 0120
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 0132
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0986
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0923
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 0205

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000563 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/20/2016 
TAGS: PBTS PINR PINS PREL CM NI UN
SUBJECT: BAKASSI BORDER ISSUE:  DEMARCHE AND UPDATE 
 
REF: STATE 220745 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Jackie Sanders for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
 
 
 ¶1.  (C) Summary:  The Secretary-General's Executive Director 
for Political Affairs Carlos Lopes and Special Representative 
of the Secretary-General (SRSG) for West Africa Ahmedou 
Ould-Abdullah briefed Acting Polcouns on sensitive efforts 
underway to resolve the Bakassi border issue.  Lopes said SYG 
Annan remained engaged on the issue and still intended to 
organize a summit with Presidents Obasanjo and Biya in the 
second quarter of this year.  Lopes said planning was being 
directed from the SYG's office.  The SYG was pursuing a 
proposal which would allow Nigeria to administer a portion of 
the peninsula for less than the 20 years.  Lopes and 
Ould-Abdullah expressed hope that U.S. discussions with 
Nigeria and Cameroon would complement the SYG's mediation. 
They stressed the importance of persuading Nigeria to 
withdraw all its military forces beyond the demarcated 
international border.  They also hoped the U.S. would accept 
a role (together with the UK, France and Germany) as a 
witness or guarantor to an agreement.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) USUN Acting Polcouns and Poloff, drawing from points 
in reftel, discussed the Bakassi issue with the SYG's 
Executive Director Lopes and SRSG Ould-Abdullah on March 14. 
Lopes expressed appreciation for USG support and offer of 
assistance for SYG Annan's mediation.  Lopes gave assurances 
that the SYG had not abandoned his mediation.  Although 
distracted by other priorities in the fall, the SYG had 
refocused attention on Bakassi in January.  Lopes noted that 
the Nigerians, despite acceptance of the ICJ ruling, 
continued to delay its implementation.  There was little 
likelihood that the Nigerians would withdraw soon on their 
own.  The SYG remained committed to mediating what he hoped 
would lead to a pragmatic solution that Presidents Obasanjo 
and Biya would find acceptable and would ensure a transfer of 
sovereignty before Obasanjo left office. 
 
¶3.  (C)  Lopes emphasized the sensitivity of the mediation. 
To ensure secrecy, the SYG had directed that planning for the 
mediation be confined to a handful of officials led by Lopes 
in New York and SRSG Ould-Abduallah.  (Note:  Department of 
Political Affairs (DPA) officials confirmed that that 
information related to Bakassi was closely held, so much so 
that Under Secretary-General of Political Affairs Gambari was 
not kept fully in the loop.) 
 
¶4.  (C) Lopes and Ould-Abdullah said the plan for a phased 
withdrawal of the Nigerian military from Bakassi by July 2006 
that was agreed upon within the framework of the Mixed 
Commission was positive in that it fulfilled a pledge made by 
the two sides at the tripartite summit in Geneva.  However, 
Nigeria's implementation without some additional 
consideration had always seemed problematic because the plan 
was subject to the approval of the two presidents.  (The 
SYG's approval was also required, but this was a formality.) 
Given his prior experiences and political realities in both 
Nigeria and Cameroon, the SYG was under no illusion that an 
Obasanjo-Biya agreement was easily achievable.  Nonetheless, 
he thought it possible.  He had directed Lopes and 
Ould-Abdullah to plan for a tripartite summit, preferably in 
the second quarter of the year, ie, by the end of June.  No 
date had been set as yet.  However, Lopes said the SYG shared 
Cameroon's concern that a further delay, with his own term of 
office ending and Nigeria's presidential elections looming, 
would reduce the chances of a resolution. 
 
¶5.  (C) Lopes did not go into much detail about how he was 
proceeding with planning other than to describe the process 
as a classic conflict-resolution exercise.  He said there 
would be no attempt to resurrect what may or may not have 
been an agreement of the two presidents from their private 
discussions with the SYG last year.  Ould-Abdullah noted that 
Biya had disavowed the agreement.  Lopes also observed that 
Cameroon had made crystal  clear that it would not accept any 
payments.  Thus, he said a lease-back formula was not viable 
and was no longer under consideration. 
 
¶6.  (C) That said, Lopes said the SYG's inclination was still 
to nudge the two presidents to accept an interim arrangement 
that would accelerate the withdrawal of the Nigerian military 
from Bakassi.  Current conceptual planning was on developing 
a proposal that would allow the Nigerians to administer a 
portion of Bakassi for a limited period.  In general, he said 
 
he was focused on two issues:  a transitional arrangement and 
the status of the Bakassi population.  On the former, he said 
any transition period would have be less than twenty years (a 
period supposedly discussed by the two presidents last year) 
and  preferably less than ten years.  Lopes stated that he 
was making more headway "in narrowing the gap" on the issue 
of the status of the villagers.  Lopes and Ould-Abdullah 
noted the importance of Nigeria fully withdrawing its 
military to the international demarcated border, apparently 
prior to any transitional period. 
 
¶7.  (C) Lopes did not shed much more light on the 
transitional arrangement under consideration.  He did confirm 
that Cameroon would retain the full right to extract natural 
resources from Bakassi during any transition period. 
 
¶8.  (C) Lopes and Ould-Abdullah said that if there was a 
bilateral agreement, it was important to Cameroon that 
certain "friendly nations"--notably the U.S., UK, France and 
Germany--would be associated with this Bakassi agreement. 
Cameroon preferred international "guarantors."  If this was 
not feasible, Lopes said the countries would be asked to 
serve as "witnesses."  He wondered, however, whether the U.S. 
(and other countries) might consider some kind of a "witness 
plus" role, though this was left undefined.  Lopes and 
Ould-Abdullah said they had briefed the UK and France on the 
current status of the mediation and planned to do so with 
Germany.  Lopes said that Nigeria did not seemed concerned 
about international involvement.  He added that Cameroon had 
made clear that it would object to any role for the African 
Union or another African state or regional entity in an 
agreement. 
 
¶9.  (C) Finally, Lopes and Ould-Abdullah welcomed U.S. advice 
and promised to stay in touch.  They also expressed hope that 
U.S. discussions with the parties on Bakassi would complement 
the Secretary-General's endeavors.  On specifics, Lopes said 
only that it would be especially helpful if the U.S. would 
impress upon President Obasanjo and his aides that the 
Nigerians must withdraw their military completely from 
Bakassi. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BOLTON