VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUCNDT #0531/01 0761700
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 171700Z MAR 06
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8358

UNCLAS USUN NEW YORK 000531 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AORC KUNR UNGA KPKO
SUBJECT: UN SECRETARY-GENERAL FAILS TO CREATE PEACEBUILDING 
SUPPORT OFFICE FROM WITHIN EXISTING RESOURCES 
 
This cable contains an action request. See paragraph 11. 
 
¶1. (U) Summary.  Following long and divisive deliberations in 
the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary 
Questions (ACABQ), the U.S. remains isolated in its 
commitment to establish a small Peacebuilding Support Office 
(PBSO) "from within existing resources," as mandated by the 
World Summit Outcome Document and the GA and SC resolutions 
that established the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC).  A 
proposal by the Secretary-General (SG) to structure a more 
weighty and costly PBSO reflects a significant failure by the 
Secretariat to fulfill the mandate provided by Member States. 
 
SIPDIS 
 It also demonstrates a failure of the Secretariat to 
implement management reform through the reprioritization of 
resources.  While there is some sympathy for our position to 
adhere to the use of existing resources, Member States, 
including our traditional budget allies, are overwhelmingly 
willing to provide seven new posts requested by the SG, 
including a position at the high level of an 
Assistant-Secretary-General (ASG), in order to avoid losing 
more time in the complicated effort to launch the PBC. The 
Fifth Committee began consideration of the resourcing 
proposal on March 15 and has gone through two rounds of 
extensive questions and answers with the Secretariat. 
Outside the Committee, USUN has initiated a round of 
consultations, including with the Secretariat, to seek 
acceptable solutions.  In the end, should U.S. efforts to 
further redeploy resources be blocked, USUN plans to 
disassociate from consensus on a resolution in the Fifth 
Committee to finance the PBSO. End Summary. 
 
------------------- 
Battle in the ACABQ 
------------------- 
 
¶2. (U) Following nearly two weeks of questioning and debate 
in the ACABQ, the U.S. remains isolated in its position to 
establish the PBSO from within existing resources, as 
mandated by the World Summit Outcome Document and the 
Security Council (SC) and General Assembly (GA) resolutions 
that established the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) on 
December 20.  As a follow-up to implement these resolutions, 
the Secretary-General issued a report on February 23 for the 
creation of the PBSO.  The SG's proposal identified eight 
existing posts for the office through redeployment and 
secondment.  However, a further seven new posts (at an 
overall cost of $2,805,400 for post and non-post 
requirements) are proposed to be financed from the Special 
Political Missions account.  While this budgetary maneuver 
might technically meet the terms of "within existing 
resources," it is apparent to all that given the level of 
funding of the SPM account, further resources will indeed be 
required to meet the current requirements of all SPMs in 
¶2006.  Furthermore, the SG has proposed that the PBSO be led 
by an Assistant Secretary-General, thus implying a 
"policy-creation" role inconsistent with the mandated 
"support" role.  The U.S. has advocated for a Director-level 
position to initially lead this new office. 
 
¶3. (U)  The U.S. member of the ACABQ has repeatedly stressed 
the following main points: 
 
-  Member states intended the PBSO to be a small support 
office, that must be staffed out of existing resources; 
 
-  It will not have an operational function but, rather, the 
PBSO should provide support servicing for the PBC, including 
to:  collate and analyze information related to strategies 
and financing for peacebuilding; prepare analytical reports 
on cross-cutting peacebuilding issues; record notes on the 
PBC's discussion for distribution; 
 
-  The PBSO will not undertake policy analysis, formulation 
of strategies for UN system activities, or formulation of 
policy guidelines or recommendations to finance peacebuilding 
activities; 
 
-  Regarding the proposed Peacebuilding Support Fund, that 
account should be managed by UNDP, rather than by the PBSO, 
which lacks auditors and accountants. 
 
-  The PBSO can be effectively led at the Director level and 
should not be staffed at a level higher than D-2.  Both the 
level and size of the PBSO, as proposed by the SG, 
potentially infringe upon the prerogatives of the prospective 
responsibilities of members of the PBC themselves. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Within the ACABQ, efforts to appeal to our 
traditional allies -- namely, Canada, the Netherlands, and 
Japan -- have failed to elicit support and, in some cases, 
even widened the gap. Although Japan agrees with the mandate 
to establish the PBSO from within existing resources, the 
Japanese ACABQ member strongly advocated for an ASG position 
 
 
to lead the office, thus compromising his country's position. 
 Canada and the Netherlands joined most all the other members 
of the Committee to fiercely defend the SG's proposal. They 
cited the need to establish the PBSO expeditiously as a more 
pressing concern than adherence to the mandate provided by 
Member States. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Russia led the charge, and was supported by the 
U.S., in emphasizing that the PBSO "will not possess direct 
operational capacity" for peacebuilding activities. The 
report of the Committee is explicit in this regard.  The 
Committee further recommended that the proposed charge 
against the provision for SPMs of $2,805,400 be reduced by 
$1,234,100 for the cost of accommodation, travel and 
consultants, which should be absorbed.  Accordingly, the 
recommended charge against the SPM account would total 
$1,571,300. 
 
------------- 
State of Play 
------------- 
 
¶6. (U) The SG's report on financing for the PBSO was formally 
introduced in the Fifth Committee on Wednesday, March 15, and 
has since been followed by two rounds of questions and 
answers with the Secretariat.  USdel delivered a strong 
statement, drawing on points in paragraph 3 above, conveying 
our position on the PBSO and our disappointment with the SG's 
proposal.  Based on statements by the EU, G-77 and China, 
CANZ and a number of other delegations, all indications are 
that the U.S. is isolated in our position.  However, Japan, 
the Republic of Korea and Mexico have questioned the size and 
top-heaviness of the PBSO. 
 
¶7. (U) Although USUN has approached traditional allies -- 
including the UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Austria 
(on behalf of the EU) -- we have not received support for 
either pursuing further redeployments or for capping the 
leadership of the PBSO at the Director level. Only Japan and 
Mexico have quietly indicated a willingness to emphasize the 
need for further review of the office one year after its 
establishment (as recommended by ACABQ).  Outside the Fifth 
Committee, USUN has initiated consultations with France, 
other delegations and the Secretariat, which we will report 
in septel. 
 
¶8. (U) In a regrettable commentary on Member States' lack of 
commitment to their own mandates and pursuit of basic 
management reform, the vast majority of delegations in the 
Fifth Committee assert that the SG has "done all that he can 
do" to reprogram positions (Note:  only five positions are 
subject to redeployment in this plan, and the Secretariat 
recently admitted that even these five posts haven't yet been 
secured for redeployment.)  Most all members maintain that 
the establishment of the PBSO should no longer be held 
hostage to the mandate for zero sum cost, and they are 
sympathetic to the Secretariat's claim that seven more posts, 
at the levels specified, simply cannot be found within the UN 
system.  Furthermore, the G-77 is indicating their desire to 
restore cuts to non-post resources recommended by the ACABQ, 
and Norway is advocating a dedicated post for gender issues. 
 
¶9. (U)  Though there is overwhelming support for the quick 
establishment of the PBSO, some Member States are willing to 
acknowledge that the proposed budgeting for the office is not 
transparent.  With respect to the funding mechanism, the G-77 
has questioned the Secretariat's approach, reminding the 
Committee that Special Political Missions are activities of a 
limited nature and, therefore, the Secretariat should 
consider financing the PBSO as a revised appropriation.  On 
the other hand, with the exception of the G-77, there seems 
to be support for ACABQ's recommended reductions for non-post 
resources (rental of premises, consultants and travel). 
Delegations are also in general agreement that the PBSO 
should draw on existing UN-system expertise, where possible. 
 
¶10. (U) The Fifth Committee has a long-standing practice of 
operating by consensus; it does not vote on budgetary 
matters.  Absent agreement in the Fifth Committee to explore 
further redeployment of posts, to lower the ASG post to the 
D-2 level and to narrow the scope of functions planned for 
the office, USUN plans to disassociate from consensus on the 
financing resolution for the PBSO.  This unusual move would 
send an unequivocal signal of our disappointment and the SG's 
failure -- with the first new institutional product of his 
reform agenda -- to establish the PBSO in a manner consistent 
with sound practice and repeated intergovernmental mandates. 
Beyond the Fifth Committee, USUN will continue to work with 
the Secretariat and Member States to shape the mandate of 
this new support office to ensure that the PBSO can 
effectively support the valuable work of the PBC without 
creating another layer of potentially dysfunctional 
bureaucracy. 
 
 
 
¶11. Action request: USUN requests Department to approach in 
capitals at the earliest possible opportunity, reminding all 
of the mandate agreed by heads of state in the World Summit 
Outcome Document (paragraph 104 of resolution 60/1), and 
requesting that delegations in New York adhere to the mandate 
that the office be established from within existing 
resources.  Deliberation on a draft financing resolution will 
take place the week of March 20, with action to be taken by 
the GA by the end of that week or early on the week of March 
27th. 
BOLTON