VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUCNDT #0476/01 0721813
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 131813Z MAR 06
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8276
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000476 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2016 
TAGS: AORC IAEA KNNP EU IR
SUBJECT: UNSC/IRAN: P3/P5 MEETINGS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John Bolton for reasons 1.4 (b,d). 
 
P3 Meeting 
----------- 
 
¶1.  (C) Role for the Germans:  P3 Ambassadors met early in 
the afternoon of March 8 in advance of the P5 meeting later 
in the day.   French PR de la Sabliere urged German 
participation in the next meeting.  Ambassador Bolton said 
regardless of how the meeting was described -- P5-plus-1 or 
E3-plus-3 -- it would set a negative precedent if there was 
German participation in a discussion of Iran by the permanent 
members of the Security Council.  Jones Parry said the UK 
could accept the 3-plus-3 formula.  De la Sabliere agreed to 
the P5 formula for the meeting as planned, but anticipated 
real problems with the Germans.  Both Jones Parry and de la 
Sabliere, however, winked as they made their points. 
 
¶2.  (C) Discussion of E-3 Text: 
 
-- To meet Washington's concerns that the E3 draft PRST did 
not include a specific time window for Iranian compliance 
with the demands of the IAEA and UNSC, Ambassador Bolton 
proposed inclusion of "immediately" in bullet 7, line 1. 
UK/FR thought that would be acceptable.  They did not want to 
refer to a specific timeframe; i.e., fourteen days, which 
they thought would sound like an ultimatum and would recall 
the Iraq UNSCR's.  They also asserted that the fourteen-day 
reporting requirement - the last bullet point of the elements 
accomplished the same objective. 
 
-- UK/FR thought it would be acceptable to add "formal 
requirements of the" prior to "safeguards agreement" in 
bullet 7, line 11. 
 
-- Ambassador Bolton proposed to add to bullet 8, line 2, 
after the word "confidence" the following: " and that 
continued enrichment activity would add to the importance and 
urgency of further action by the Council."  UK/FR suggested 
instead an additional bullet to be injected right before the 
last bullet of the draft that would read: "Underlines that 
continued enrichment-related activity would add to the 
importance and urgency of further action by the Council." 
Subsequently, de la Sabliere reported that the Germans had 
accepted the amendments. 
 
-- UK/FR thought it would be acceptable to add to bullet, 
line 3 "exclusively" between the words "for" and "peaceful 
purposes."  They preferred "exclusively" to the U.S.-proposed 
"only," since it is used in the September 2005 IAEA BOG 
resolution. 
 
¶3.  (C) Next Steps:  P3 Ambassadors agreed to share the 
elements with the China and Russia at the P5 meeting and to 
walk them through the text in the meeting, rather than simply 
send them the text without comment or explanation after the 
meeting, as UK and French experts had earlier suggested.  P3 
Ambassadors also agreed to have a P5 meeting later in the 
week to discuss reactions from Moscow and Beijing.  They 
recognized that the text would not stay for long within the 
P5, and it would be useful to circulate it to the full 
Council sometime next week.  Jones Parry proposed an informal 
informal meeting of the UNSC next week, which would happen 
off UNSC premises and said that would be an opportunity to 
share the text with the full UNSC.  De la Sabliere emphasized 
that obtaining P5 agreement on the text before it is 
circulated would be useful; it would make bringing along the 
full Council much easier. 
 
P5 Meeting 
---------- 
 
¶4.  (C) P5 Ambassadors met on the evening of March 8 in the 
Perm Five conference room at the UN.  Russian PR Denisov 
tried to correct what he said was a misunderstanding in the 
media ascribed to Foreign Minister Lavrov during his visit to 
New York.  Denisov said Lavrov had not meant to include Iran 
in a list of possible participants in proposed talks on Iran 
involving the UN, the EU and the U.S.  Lavrov reportedly 
meant to suggest only that contact with the Iranians should 
be maintained.  Denisov also reported that the SYG had agreed 
with Lavrov at their meeting earlier in the day that it was 
vital to retain the "IAEA track" in dealing with Iran. 
 
¶5.  (C) Denisov also reported that Russian Political Director 
Kislyak had informed him that Kislyak was in touch with EU 
colleagues and specifically his German counterpart and had 
discussed the idea of a meeting of EU political directors 
with P5 counterparts either in Vienna or New York.  Denisov 
opined that IAEA DG El Baradei was reluctant to come to New 
York at present.  He also suggested that Lavrov would be 
willing to send his Vienna Ambassador to New York for such 
 
talks.  Denisov concluded that Kislyak and his German 
counterpart had agreed that the "way ahead" still needed to 
be discussed and that there was no clear strategy for dealing 
with Iran.  Denisov added that Lavrov had told him that 
President Bush had agreed with him that we must carefully 
think through all our steps on Iran. 
 
¶6.  (C) Speaking on behalf of the EU3, UKUN Perm Rep Jones 
Parry then outlined the EU's approach, reviewing the 
agreement at the London P5  1 meeting.  They had agreed to 
demand Iran completely suspend all enrichment activity but to 
give a one month period for further diplomatic activity 
before taking further action.  Unfortunately Iran had moved 
in the opposite direction since then by proceeding apace with 
centrifuge development and ignoring the IAEA and its February 
4 resolution.  The issue was Iran's failure to comply with 
IAEA demands and, worse, compounding the problem and the 
threat of its nuclear program by its actions.  Meanwhile 
Iran's unacceptable nuclear R and D continued; it was 
therefore high time for the Council to reinforce the IAEA's 
demands and exert maximum pressure for full, verified 
suspension of all enrichment activities and extend full 
cooperation to the IAEA. 
 
¶7. (C) Jones Parry added that the Council response should be 
incremental and calibrated, open always to resume 
negotiations should Iran comply with demands on the table. 
Unity of the Council should be maintained, but not at any 
price in the face of this threat.  The IAEA's demands had to 
be reinforced in a timely and sufficient fashion-- more talk 
simply allows Iran's enrichment program to proceed.  All 
Council members should be deeply concerned that within 12 
months, Iran will have the clear potential to develop 
weapons.  Jones Perry then highlighted the major elements in 
the current EU draft- without acknowledging that they reflect 
several U.S. amendments.  (Latest draft emailed to Department 
with this report).  Jones Parry concluded that the Council 
must respond appropriately and urgently because the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means 
of delivery was an absolutely clear threat to international 
peace and security. 
 
¶8. (C) French PR de la Sabliere added that the text of a 
Council response must be crafted carefully to support the 
IAEA; there is a problem with time as the time given in 
London has run out and the Council must now act.  It was the 
EU hope that a Council Presidential Statement could be 
adopted by next week.  P5 consensus was very important-- 
there were no surprises in the text.  He asked that the three 
other P5 seek reaction of their capitals without delay and 
agree to meet again on Friday March 10.  De la Sabliere noted 
that the PRST text called on the IAEA DG to report to the 
Council within 14 days of its adoption.  This was essential 
to put a stop to the illicit activity on the ground in Iran, 
which continued. 
 
¶9. (C) UK and France then circulated the PRST elements. 
Chinese PR Wang said simply that they would need time to 
study the results from Vienna and this text and he was not 
ready to engage in particulars.  He noted that there was no 
final agreement on strategy in the Council and that 
diplomatic efforts elsewhere were still underway.  Ambassador 
Bolton intervened to express support for the EU's points 
without fully endorsing the PRST text.  Bolton noted that for 
four years the U.S. had been deeply concerned about Iran's 
drive to master centrifuge technology and now Iran was 
apparently on the threshold of overcoming the last technical 
hurdles and the capability to produce fissile materials.  If 
Iran masters these processes, it will forever be beyond the 
reach of the IAEA or any other verification regime.  The time 
for action is now; we should proceed deliberately to prevent 
Iran from crossing the technological threshold to nuclear 
weapons capability. 
 
¶10. (C) Bolton agreed that the first step of the Council must 
be to strengthen the IAEA's demands, but we are at a critical 
juncture that demanded action.  Ambassador Bolton also 
briefly reviewed a possible amendment to the PRST text, which 
tactic had been suggested by the UK and France at the earlier 
P3 meeting, saying that Iran should  be called on to engage 
in "active cooperation", and to stop denial and deception 
activities, as noted by the IAEA's report itself.  The issue 
of trust and confidence should be met head on. Bolton 
supported the call for another P5 meeting to consider the 
draft PRST the next day or at the latest on Friday. 
 
¶11. (C) Russian PR Denisov noted that his Minister was 
traveling for the next few days and he could not guarantee 
such a quick response from Moscow.  UK PR Jones Parry replied 
that delaying P5 action would not be well received by other 
Council members who were well aware that the P5 had begun its 
discussions.  Denisov agreed to meet "if only for further 
 
discussion" but pleaded for confidentiality of discussions, 
asking that only the Germans be made aware of P5 discussions. 
 All ambassadors agreed that nothing specific should be given 
to the press as yet.  Unprompted, PR Wang laid down a marker, 
saying that he hoped those sponsoring action would not resort 
to "intimidation" by making public comments suggesting that 
Council unity is important, but not at any price.  The P-5 
agreed to meet again on March 10th in the afternoon after 
consultation with capitals, and would decide further steps at 
that point. 
BOLTON