VZCZCXYZ0013
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUCNDT #0468/01 0721325
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 131325Z MAR 06
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8264
INFO RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 1970

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000468 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2016 
TAGS: KUNR PHUM PREL UNGA
SUBJECT: ELIASSON AND OTHERS CONSIDER HRC TEXT FINAL; 
EFFORT CONTINUES WITH U.S. TO SALVAGE CONSENSUS 
 
REF: A. USUN 455 AND PREVIOUS 
 
     ¶B. ZACK-LAGON ET AL E-MAIL OF MARCH 8 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN R. BOLTON FOR 
REASONS 1.4 (b) AND (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  We continue to encounter strong opposition 
to making any changes in the text of the draft Human Rights 
Council (HRC) resolution.  Key PermReps are urging the U.S. 
to seek satisfaction outside the text, even if they 
acknowledge that core U.S. positions are not likely 
achievable that way.  General Assembly President (PGA) 
Eliasson, who also opposes re-opening the text and is under 
pressure from others to move quickly to adopt the resolution, 
now argues that even a U.S. call for a vote on the HRC could 
lead others to unravel the project, and is hoping to get the 
U.S. to let the resolution be adopted by consensus. 
Secretary General Annan told Ambassador Bolton that the 
 
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longer this decision is delayed, the more harm will be done. 
In his public remarks after his monthly lunch with the 
Security Council, Annan said the time has come for a decision 
on the HRC.  Eliasson continues to prepare to adopt the HRC 
on March 15.  End Summary. 
 
Meeting with Eliasson 
 
¶2. (C) Ambassadors Bolton and Wolff met March 10 with PGA 
Eliasson (following SecGen Annan's conversation with the 
Secretary) to assess the situation surrounding the HRC and to 
 
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determine whether there is room for further action.  Amb. 
Bolton said he understood Eliasson was moving to adopt his 
HRC resolution March 15.  Eliasson said voting was not part 
of his plan.  He had agreed to postpone adoption of the HRC 
March 10 when he learned the U.S. needed more time.  "Neither 
of us wants a vote," he stated, arguing this would cause 
great damage to the HRC and for the UN.  Eliasson said he 
hoped the U.S. would look again at what is at stake. 
 
¶3. (C) Amb. Bolton noted that our instructions remained to 
open the text in order to get the amendments we required.  He 
quoted Secretary Rice's comment in her House Appropriations 
Subcommittee hearings this week that without changes, we 
would vote "no".  Our reading was that other member states 
oppose opening the text, except possibly the UK.  Eliasson 
agreed, saying that others had been telling the UK PermRep to 
stop saying so. 
 
¶4. (C) Eliasson said his strong impression is that those who 
oppose the HRC because they fear a strong human rights 
mechanism are hiding behind the U.S.  "They are waiting for 
the U.S. to request a vote, and then they'll act."  Amb. 
Bolton said personally he was prepared to support the U.S. 
stating we were calling for a vote on the entire resolution 
and would not ask for amendments.  We were not trying to be 
disruptive in this process.  If Eliasson thought it helpful, 
we could seek instructions on this point.  Eliasson welcomed 
this approach, saying this would avoid the worst scenario. 
 
¶5. (C) Eliasson noted he had heard earlier in the day that if 
the U.S. asked for a vote, Cuba would table several 
amendments.  Yemen's PermRep told Eliasson if any other 
government introduces an amendment, he was under instructions 
by the OIC (which he currently chairs at the UN) to present 
their amendments.  Eliasson said that Saudi Arabia would also 
introduce amendments, and, according to the Chinese, so would 
Russia.  He was convinced that simply requesting a vote would 
have this domino effect.  All these delegations were waiting 
for the U.S. to take the heat, Eliasson concluded.  Asked 
whether he could muster a majority to defeat these 
amendments, Eliasson thought he could block them all except 
adding the "right to development" as an operative paragraph. 
Nonetheless, he feared that the balance he had tried to 
strike in his draft could still disappear and the whole thing 
would unravel. 
 
¶6. (C) Eliasson said that if he were in the U.S. shoes trying 
to address the need for a 2/3 election threshold he would 
look to the review clause in the text providing for an 
eventual 2/3 vote requirement once the HRC is upgraded to a 
principal organ.  Amb. Bolton countered that there was no 
guarantee that the HRC could obtain this new status (which 
would necessitate a change to the Charter that requires 
ratification by member states, including all the P-5). 
 
¶7. (C) As for the exclusion of members under SC sanctions, 
Eliasson said it was absurd that any democracy would vote for 
such a country.  The reason this was not possible in the 
text, he continued, was because of resistance to the Security 
Council itself.  The EU and 13-14 other states would formally 
state they would not vote for such a country.  We already had 
about 40 such commitments and many more would be prepared to 
say this, bringing the total to 80-100.  Chile was hoping to 
mobilize more support by working with the Community of 
 
 
Democracies.  Eliasson summed up that many were trying to 
meet the two key U.S. demands, albeit through a different 
method. 
 
¶8. (C)  Eliasson said, "not having the U.S. on board would be 
horrible."  Still, he was under great pressure to move to a 
decision, with some members asking him if the U.S. also had a 
veto in the GA.  He said that having the U.S. push for its 
ideas was helpful in getting others to commit not to vote for 
countries under sanctions for human rights mattes, noting 
that he personally thought this would strengthen the HRC. 
 
¶9. (C) Amb. Bolton undertook to report back Eliasson's point, 
adding that our reaction to such arguments when we reported 
them in the past was that the fixes we needed had to be in 
the text in order to work, and our instructions were 
unchanged.  Eliasson said he shared the view that delays in 
adopting the HRC draft have built up resentment among many. 
He said Amb. Bolton's advice on this issue would be crucial. 
He hoped there would be no vote necessary, that the U.S. 
could dissociate from the consensus, and that our views could 
be outlined in our explanation of position.  Amb. Bolton 
summed up that he did not want to hold out false hopes, 
recalling that the Secretary had stated our position.  He 
said that if we were in any position to support the draft, we 
would.  There would be little understanding in Congress if we 
dissociated to allow a consensus on this HRC.   Eliasson said 
he hoped the U.S. would be in a position to be supportive. 
Amb. Bolton closed the meeting noting our willingness to 
continue to listen to ideas. 
 
SecGen Annan, Security Council Members, and others 
 
¶10. (C) Amb. Bolton and SecGen Annan discussed the HRC March 
10 on the margins of the SecGen's monthly lunch with the 
Security Council.  Annan described his conversation with 
Secretary Rice earlier that day, and Amb. Bolton briefed on 
 
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his meeting with Eliasson.  Annan expressed concern that the 
longer it takes to decide on the HRC, the worse the situation 
becomes.  Annan reiterated this point to the press after the 
lunch, adding, "the time has come for a decision."   Amb. 
Bolton also raised the HRC with SC PermReps from Peru, 
Tanzania, Qatar, Greece and Argentina.  All opposed opening 
the text to address U.S. concerns. 
 
¶11. (C) In separate consultations March 10 with Amb. Wolff 
(before the meeting with Eliasson), UK DPR Thomson said the 
UK had "equipped Eliasson with everything he could be 
equipped with for the meeting."  Asked what was the best we 
could expect from the Eliasson meeting, Thomson said Eliasson 
would say there was nothing realistically possible to fix in 
the text without it falling apart.  The question would be 
what could be done to make it possible for the U.S. to 
dissociate from the decision without blocking consensus. 
While Thomson said he personally did not exclude the 
possibility of re-opening the review provision, "things were 
getting more difficult with each passing day."  He said we 
should expect a message that people needed to know if there 
is anything they could do outside the text that will make a 
difference for the U.S. 
 
¶12. (C) Amb. Wolff also discussed the situation March 10 with 
Liechtenstein PermRep Wenaweser (one of Eliasson's agents 
throughout this process).  Asked whether there was any 
prospect for adjusting the text, Wenaweser said, "no, you 
can't".  He and Eliasson were hearing from everyone that if 
we open the text, the HRC is dead.  He said his honest 
assessment of Eliasson's thinking was that the text was in 
jeopardy and he would lose his credibility with the majority 
of the membership even if he introduced a technical 
adjustment on the review period.  New Zealand PermRep Banks 
(also an Eliasson confidante) concurred in this assessment, 
adding that her government was spearheading an effort to 
garner commitments from member states outside the text to 
oppose election of countries sanctioned by the Security 
Council for human rights reasons. 
 
¶13. (C) Amb. Bolton's meeting March 9 with Japanese PermRep 
Oshima covered similar ground.  Oshima noted that Japanese 
DPR Ozawa had met with Ambassador Wolff on March 8 regarding 
HRC (Ref A) to share updated Japanese talking points (Ref B), 
but that Oshima had wanted to personally convey the Japanese 
position to Ambassador Bolton.  Oshima emphasized that Japan 
sought to find a way to satisfy the U.S. while also ensuring 
both consensus agreement among Member States on a draft 
resolution and effective functioning of a new body.  Oshima 
suggested that the U.S. reserve its position on the draft 
resolution if action were taken next week in a General 
Assembly plenary, and that the U.S. instead negotiate 
"outside the text" in the HRC Rules of Procedure and other 
areas that would be decided during the initial stages of a 
new HRC.  Oshima noted concern that if the GA failed to take 
 
 
action this week or next on the draft resolution, the 
atmosphere would be so "poisoned" that it would affect the 
many "pressing issues" facing Member States.  Oshima reported 
a "pervasive feeling" of ill will against the U.S. for not 
supporting the draft resolution, and noted the situation was 
"painful" for Japan. 
 
¶14. (C) Ambassador Bolton responded with appreciation for 
Oshima's sentiment but stated that the U.S. position on the 
inadequacy of the draft resolution had not changed.  Bolton 
noted Eliasson had not wavered from his firm stand against 
re-opening the text. 
 
¶15. (C) With respect to fixes outside of the text, Bolton 
argued that the text of the draft resolution would be the 
fundamental and unalterable basis for the functioning of the 
new HRC, and that anything less than changes to the text 
would not assuage U.S. concerns.  Bolton noted that any 
action by the Community of Democracies to raise confidence in 
the selection of HRC members could not be done until after 
adoption of the draft resolution (Ref A).  Bolton agreed with 
Oshima that repeatedly delaying GA plenary action would not 
"create a good mood" and could potentially complicate other 
UN reform matters. 
 
¶16. (C) Oshima understood that the U.S. would not support any 
"half measures," and moved on to inquire about U.S. 
participation in a newly established HRC.  Bolton noted the 
U.S. had been working to change the text and had not yet 
focused on potential participation in a new body.  In 
response to Oshima's suggestion that Bolton meet with PGA 
Eliasson and HRC Co-Chair South African PermRep Kumalo, 
Bolton stated he would meet with anyone. 
 
BOLTON