VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUCNDT #0467/01 0700027
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 110027Z MAR 06
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8262
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000467 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PASS TO UNVIE, BERLIN PARIS LONDON BEIJING AND MOSCOW 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/09/2016 
TAGS: AORC IAEA KNNP EU IR AA
SUBJECT: UNSC/IRAN: P3/P5 MEETINGS CONTINUED 
 
REF: USUN 0456 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John R. Bolton for reasons 1.4(b,d) 
 
¶1. (C)  Summary:  The Perm Five Permanent Representatives met 
at 5:00 pm Friday, March 10 at USUN to discuss the 
British-French draft elements on Iran.  Discussion went round 
and round, as the Russians and Chinese had no specific 
instructions on the text, speaking instead in general terms 
about how to proceed.  Both urged a much shorter text; the 
EU-2 agreed to provide a shortened,  edited text by 5:00 pm 
Saturday, March 11.  The next P-5 meeting will be held 
Monday, March 13 at 8:00 am at the U.S. Mission.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (C)  Ambassador Bolton opened the meeting asking for 
reactions to the British-French text.  Russian Ambassador 
Denisov said he could only provide general comments, and 
initially asked whether the point of this exercise is to 
maintain the non-proliferation regime and keep the Iranian 
issue under the control of the IAEA, or to punish Iran.  He 
hoped it was the former, and suggested the elements provided 
for a text were placing formal requirements on Iran, rather 
than simply supporting IAEA efforts.  He considered these 
elements more technical, not the parameters of the Security 
Council, and said that the specificity with this text was an 
ultimatum which would not allow for further negotiations if 
Iran changes course.  The refocusing from the IAEA to the 
Council &we don't like.8 
 
¶3. (C)  On timing, Denisov suggested that the 14 day 
reporting period would not allow time for Iran to reverse 
course.  He then raised the possibility of the rumored March 
20 meeting of political directors in Vienna or New York which 
he said would be for one purpose:  to discuss and reach 
agreement on the way ahead.  This would not mean that the 
Council could not work on a text meanwhile but in doing so, 
the P-5 should keep in mind these general reactions from 
Russia.  If we need to do something in the Council next week, 
perhaps a text could be considered as food for thought, or 
elements of a future statement. 
 
¶4. (C)  China Amb. Wang said he had no reply as yet from 
Beijing but as a general comment, &the Iran nuclear issue is 
at a crucial moment.8  Iran has a right to peaceful use but 
also has obligations under the NPT.  We need balance.  It is 
best to address this issue in the IAEA.  The Security Council 
complicates the situation.  But if colleagues think we need 
SC action, we should not replace the IAEA role, but reinforce 
and support it.  He finished by reminding the group that 
there is still time for diplomatic action. 
 
¶5. (C)  Ambassador Bolton said the U.S. understanding after 
the London statement by our Foreign Ministers was that all 
five agreed that Iran,s weapons program should be reported 
to the SC, as was then reflected in the February 4 Board of 
Governors resolution.  The FMs further agreed that none of 
the P-5 would take any action until after the March 6 IAEA 
meeting, in order to let things play out and to watch for any 
action by the Iranians that would change our views. 
Negotiations did not make progress during that period due to 
Iran; there was nothing new at the March 6 Board meeting, and 
the IAEA report was conveyed to the SC by the Director 
General.  From the U.S. perspective, it is entirely 
appropriate to now consider next steps, and this draft before 
us was consistent with what the FMs agreed in London.  The 
preamble supports the IAEA and the Board, and the elements 
fairly reflect the views as stated by Amb. Denisov.  Amb. 
Bolton offered to work through the weekend or early Monday to 
move this process ahead, mentioning the leak to the press of 
the elements as making it difficult for the P-5 not to 
circulate something to the P-10 Monday or Tuesday of next 
week.  It would be appropriate to do so in any event, and a 
plus if the P-5 could agree on a text first, though either 
way we should distribute to the others early in the week. 
 
¶6. (C)  British Ambassador Jones-Parry assured the Russians 
that the text was meant to support the NPT and the IAEA,  and 
to reinforce very clearly the facts in order to minimize the 
chance of Iran going nuclear.   He said it would be perverse 
if the Council did not repeat what we have said in the IAEA, 
including specifying the end of enrichment, the end of R & D, 
the moratorium, and return to the Additional Protocol.  As to 
the 14 day deadline, he said Iran could easily reverse its 
concealment in that time frame by making tangible, 
demonstrable efforts to show its intent.  We have given Iran 
a lot of time and don't have much to show for it. 
Jones-Parry said we do not need to wait for a political 
directors strategy session in order to move forward, with the 
existing Ministers, understanding that we will support the 
IAEA, and urge Iran to comply with the Board decisions, 
 
calibrated to be reversible by Iranian positive actions.  He 
agreed with Amb. Bolton that we need to get a draft to the 
other Council members early next week. 
 
¶7. (C)  French Amb. de la Sabliere said he thought in 
principle we were all in agreement ) to support the IAEA, 
and to put pressure on Iran.  Time is running out with 
developments on the ground in Iran.  The main question is how 
the Council can use its weight to strengthen the IAEA 
requests and have Iran respond positively.  The elements 
include Board language expressing what Iran has done and the 
concerns of the international community.  We cannot use 
general language, as it will not pressure Iran and will not 
reinforce the IAEA.  Iran will think we are weakening what 
came out of Vienna.  On timing, de la Sabliere said we need 
to reflect reality but also the emergency situation at hand. 
It could be 14, 18 or 20 days, but part of our discussion 
should include keeping in mind at each step, there will be 
more action if Iran does not respond.  He suggested going 
paragraph by paragraph through the text to see where general 
problems exist. 
 
¶8. (C)  Russia said it was not ready to react to specific 
language.  Denisov said the problem is not the 14 days 
indicated, but what would happen on &day 15.8  He suggested 
we might start with a &milder8 text which could be 
strengthened, rather than a strong text which would be 
weakened and appear &non-constructive.8 
 
¶9. (C)  China further complained about the length of the 
text, arguing that it was longer than the Board resolutions. 
He suggested a short text, supporting the IAEA, and one or 
two elements calling on Iran to comply with the IAEA. 
Ambassador Bolton explained that it might look long, but was 
reflecting three years of Iranian activity.  This was not a 
technical issue ) Iran was violating the NPT and seeking to 
acquire nuclear weapons, despite very generous offers that 
had not persuaded them to change course.  If we do not 
incorporate the past three years, Iran will think we are 
going to start over again, a big mistake for Iran and for the 
Security Council.  The key rests with Iran ) if it is 
willing to give up its pursuit, this can be easily dealt 
with. 
 
¶10. (C)  After a back and forth about how to proceed, the 
group agreed that the UK and France would edit and shorten 
the text in an effort to reflect the various P-5 comments, 
and would redistribute to the Five by 5:00 pm Saturday 
evening.  It was also agreed that the P-5 would meet again 
Monday morning, March 13 at 8:00 at the U.S. Mission to 
continue discussion on the new text.  All agreed that any 
statement to the press would simply be:  &Good meeting, 
consultations continue.8 
 
¶11. (C)  Following the meeting, Ambassador Bolton phoned 
German Ambassador Plueger to give him a readout of the 
meeting, and offered to debrief him on future discussions. 
BOLTON