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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 000459 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/2014 
TAGS: PREL UNSC PGOV UNMOVIC IZ
SUBJECT: UN/IRAQ: PERRICOS PRESSES SECURITY COUNCIL TO 
CLOSE UNMOVIC 
 
REF: STATE 34758 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John R. Bolton, Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C) Begin Summary.  In his briefing to the UNSC, Acting 
UNMOVIC Chairman Demitrius Perricos urged the UNSC to address 
UNMOVIC's mandate and discussed in detail his concerns about 
the chemical weapons (CW) site at Muthanna.  He also 
highlighted Iraq's failure to engage thus far on this file. 
Almost all UNSC members said it is time to review UNMOVIC's 
mandate three years after the overthrow of Saddam's regime 
and to close the organization, although there was varying 
interest in retaining some of the mission's expertise and 
functions.  There was some frustration, especially among the 
newly elected members, that the UNSC had not acted on the 
issue.  Council members were generally enthusiastic about 
UNMOVIC's plans for a training manual for weapons inspectors, 
the organization of its archives, and the possible 
publication of the Compendium summary as a UNSC document. 
China, France and the UK spoke only briefly.  It appears that 
they want the P5 to agree to next steps on UNMOVIC before the 
full Council substantively addresses the issue.  In contrast, 
Russian PR Denisov, referring to recent talks between 
Perricos and FM Lavrov, proposed UNMOVIC submission to the 
UNSC of a complete report on Iraqi disarmament, based upon 
the classified ISG report, ISG-UNMOVIC meetings, and 
inspection of Iraqi sites.  He also urged a transitional 
period during which UNMOVIC would help the Iraqis create a 
national import/export regime, and called for new inspections 
of the WMD sites in Iraq.  Ambassador Sanders, noting the 
primary focus in Iraq has properly been the electoral process 
and government formation, provided an update on efforts to 
safeguard Muthanna and said we are not yet ready to publish 
the compendium summary as a UNSC document.  End Summary. 
 
Perricos Statement 
------------------ 
 
¶2. (C) Reporting Period - Key Events: Perricos introduced to 
the UNSC the SYG's quarterly report on UNMOVIC (S/2006/133), 
which covers activities December 1 - February 28.  Perricos 
said he met with Russian FM Lavrov and DFM Yakovenko in 
Moscow in February and Lavrov had reiterated to him that the 
Iraq WMD file should be closed with a UNSCR and with Iraqi 
involvement.  Perricos said that he had told Lavrov UNMOVIC 
stands prepared to assist at UNSC invitation and had asked 
the UNSC to review UNMOVIC's mandate as soon as possible. 
Perricos said the Iraqi authorities have not responded to his 
September 2005 letter requesting a dialogue between UNMOVIC 
and the Iraqi National Monitoring Directorate (NMD). 
 
¶3.  (C) Compendium Summary: Noting that the summary of the 
Compendium was completed and is intended to be a broad view 
of lessons learned, and that it carefully avoids the 
inclusion of sensitive information, Perricos said the College 
of Commissioners wants the summary published as a UNSC 
document and asked the UNSC to agree this request. 
 
¶4.  (C) Archives:  Perricos said the College had an initial 
discussion of archiving UNMOVIC's sensitive materials and 
thanked the U.S., UK and France for briefing in capitals on 
national archive procedures.  He said the archives must 
balance the competing needs for access of historians and 
protection of sensitive information. 
 
¶5.  (C) Training:  Perricos reported that training continued 
during the reporting period.  Brazil is currently training 
experts in biological weapons (BW) inspection regimes, France 
will soon host a training on inspection of ballistic 
missiles, and Argentina hosted a training in inspections of 
solid propellant production sites in November.  Perricos said 
UNMOVIC would produce a training manual for weapons 
inspectors based on its experiences. 
 
¶6.  (C) Dual-Use Goods: Perricos said UNMOVIC staff continue 
to look for the import into Iraq of dual-use goods that are 
subject to monitoring, under UNSCR 1051 (1996), and rely on 
open source material.  He pointed to the recent report to the 
1540 Committee from Iraq that included a commitment to accede 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000459  002 OF 004 
 
 
to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).  He welcomed this 
commitment, but questioned whether Iraq has the information 
or framework necessary to provide the initial declaration 
that the CWC would require.  He said UNMOVIC would assist 
Iraq to prepare this declaration, if requested. 
 
¶7.  (C) Muthanna:  Noting prior efforts to draw UNSC 
attention to previously monitored sites in Iraq, Perricos 
said he has particular concerns about the CW Muthanna site 
and nearby agricultural activities.  He discussed in detail 
concerns that two bunkers at Muthanna - the contents of which 
were not fully determined by UNSCOM and which were sealed in 
1994 - pose a threat to human health and farming activities 
in the area.  He said UNMOVIC last inspected the site in 
March 2003, and the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) had reported that 
the bunkers were breached and scheduled to be re-sealed. 
(NB:  In 1994, the bunkers were sealed, and Iraq agreed to a 
protocol for their management.)  Perricos said he understood 
from media reports that the Iraqi government was aware of the 
situation at Muthanna, but did not have the resources to 
address the problem. 
 
¶8.  (C) UNMOVIC Mandate:  Perricos urged the UNSC to consider 
UNMOVIC's mandate as soon as possible and to consider in its 
deliberations: criteria for declaring Iraq disarmed, the 
value of independent verification, the ISG report, remaining 
uncertainty about Iraqi disarmament, and the need for a 
transition to include import/export controls. 
 
P-5 Views 
--------- 
 
¶9.  (C) Russian PR Denisov echoed Perricos' interest in 
clarifying Iraq's disarmament formally.  He asserted that 
UNMOVIC inspectors in the pre-war period and the subsequent 
ISG report had shown there were no WMD components; no means 
of WMD production; and no WMD program in Iraq.  He proposed 
that UNMOVIC submit to the UNSC a complete report on the 
subject and said preparation of the report might require 
UNMOVIC to receive the classified version of the ISG report, 
to meet with the ISG and to inspect sites in Iraq.  He said 
the UNSC must be the body to decide on Iraq's disarmament; 
the UNSC assumed responsibility for the issue in the early 
1990's and must conclude it.  He said the UNSC must consider 
the unresolved disarmament issues and ensure that Iraq no 
longer poses threat.  Denisov also supported Perricos' call 
for a transitional period that would include the creation of 
a national export/import regime, and he welcomed UNMOVIC's 
initiative to help Iraq acceded to international 
non-proliferation regimes.  He said such cooperation from 
Baghdad would inspire greater international confidence in the 
new Iraqi authorities. 
 
¶10. (C) Chinese DPR Yishan stayed close to China's previous 
points on UNMOVIC.  He acknowledged the significant changes 
in Iraq since UNMOVIC was established and said China is ready 
to participate in a UNSC discussion of UNMOVIC's mandate.  He 
urged early publication of the compendium to reap the full 
benefits of UNMOVIC's efforts. 
 
¶11.  (C) In a very brief statement, UK Political-Counselor 
Johnson said the UK hopes for early, substantive discussions 
of UNMOVIC, and supports publication of the Compendium. 
 
¶12.  (C) French Political-Counselor de Riviere said the 
compendium should be a useful document, but dissemination 
must be controlled, given the information's sensitivity.  He 
said France is interested in continued training of UNMOVIC 
experts, which will be useful for long-term expertise. 
Consistent with previous French statements, he expressed 
concern about previously monitored sites in Iraq and the 
threat posed to local populations.  He said France is ready 
to discuss the UNMOVIC/IAEA mandates, but like China and the 
UK, did not push the issue. 
 
¶13.  (C) Per reftel, Ambassador Sanders explained that the 
focus in Iraq has been on the electoral process and 
government formation.  She said the UNMOVIC/IAEA mandates no 
longer make a useful contribution and should be reconsidered 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000459  003 OF 004 
 
 
at an appropriate time, per UNSCR 1546.  She acknowledged the 
request to publish the compendium summary as a document of 
the UNSC, but said the U.S. is not yet prepared to agree to 
this request.  Also drawing on reftel, Ambassador Sanders 
updated the UNSC on efforts to secure the CW sites at 
Muthanna, including U.S. Corps of Engineers plans to 
reinforce the two bunkers and to work with the relevant Iraqi 
authorities. 
 
E-10 Views 
---------- 
 
¶14.  (C) Peru: PR de Rivero supported UNSC publication of the 
compendium summary and expressed bewilderment that the UNSC 
had still not addressed UNMOVIC.  He said if there is a 
raison d'etre for the organization, its mandate should be 
revised; otherwise, it should be closed.  He expressed 
concern about the UNSC's "culture of non-action" and said the 
UNSC must revise the mandate or close UNMOVIC; the status quo 
is unacceptable. 
 
¶15.  (C) Tanzanian PR Mahiga said the bulk of UNMOVIC's work 
is completed with only a few exceptions.  He also welcomed 
plans to develop a training manual for weapons inspectors, 
which could be used by the UN and other organizations, and 
the compendium's near-completion.  He queried the 
proliferation risk posed by Iraqi scientists and the value of 
training UNMOVIC staff, if the organization will soon close. 
(Note: Perricos subsequently answered that the U.S. and EU 
are funding programs to re-tool Iraqi scientists.  He said he 
had no details about these programs, but that he would 
welcome such information.  Perricos said UNMOVIC would 
continue to train its experts, until the UNSC revises or ends 
its mandate.  He said the training would be useful, if the 
UNSC asks UNMOVIC to continue or if UNMOVIC experts become 
part of a UN roster, as many UNSC members have previously 
suggested would be useful.  End Note.) 
 
¶16.  (C) Congolese Minister-Counselor Okio said the UNSC 
should review UNMOVIC's mandate, since the work it was 
mandated to do had been completed, and should decide if there 
are additional tasks for UNMOVIC.  He echoed Perricos' 
concerns about Muthanna and questioned whether the Iraqis 
created a national monitoring system or were otherwise 
cooperating with UNMOVIC.  (Note: Perricos said he had no 
additional information about the NMD and reiterated that he 
had received no Iraqi response to his September 2005 letter. 
End Note.) 
 
¶17.  (C) Greek Minister Counselor Papadopoulou said Athens 
looks forward to the compendium and UNMOVIC's training 
manual.  She also welcomed UNMOVIC's work on its archives. 
She said she expects the UNSC to discuss UNMOVIC's mandate 
sooner rather than later and that retention of lessons 
learned should be part of this discussion. 
 
¶18.  (C) Ghanaian PR Effah-Apenteng expressed concern about 
UNMOVIC's "legal limbo" since March 2003 and repeated UNSC 
commitments to address the issue.  He said the UNSC must 
decide on Iraq's disarmament and UNMOVIC's mandate.  He urged 
a transition period when UNMOVIC could help the new Iraqi 
government and expressed support for UNSC publication of the 
compendium summary.  He welcomed UNMOVIC willingness to help 
Iraq accede to the CWC and urged the UNSC to consider how 
best to use UNMOVIC expertise.  He suggested the organization 
could be retained as a standby, permanent inspection unit. 
He expressed concern about the Muthanna site and the need for 
the Iraqi authorities to implement the appropriate protocols. 
 
¶19.  (C) Japanese DPR Kitaoka said UNSC discussion of 
UNMOVIC's mandate is long overdue, and his government stands 
ready to participate in the discussion.  He welcomed UNMOVIC 
efforts on its archives and the compendium. 
 
¶20.  (C) Slovak PR Burian welcomed UNMOVIC efforts to close 
the Iraq WMD file and U.S. efforts to address concerns about 
Muthanna; he urged the Iraqis also to take the necessary 
steps.  As Chair of the 1540 Committee, he urged Iraq to 
accede to the CWC and all other non-proliferation instruments 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000459  004 OF 004 
 
 
and advised the UNSC to draw lessons from UNMOVIC for other 
UN bodies, including his own committee. 
 
¶21.  (C) Danish DPR Faaborg-Andersen said, given the current 
circumstances, a review of the UNMOVIC mandate is long 
overdue, and consultations should begin, with an eye to 
closing UNMOVIC in consultation with Iraqi authorities.  He 
also said the UNSC should consider what UNMOVIC expertise 
might be retained. 
 
¶22.  (C) Qatari Minister-Counselor Al-Bader supported closure 
of UNMOVIC, given the lack of Iraqi threat, and said Iraq 
needs rebuilding more than anything else.  He asked how 
UNMOVIC's training is funded.  (Note.  Perricos subsequently 
recalled that all UNMOVIC activities, including training, are 
funded by the OFF escrow account.  End Note.) 
 
¶23.  (C) Argentine PR Mayoral agreed that the UNMOVIC/IAEA 
mandates should be reviewed, since the issue has been 
outstanding for some time, and with the new constitutionally 
elected government, it is time to move ahead. 
 
BOLTON