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DE RUCNDT #0457/01 0690017
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 100017Z MAR 06
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8240
INFO RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 8185
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0970
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0707
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 8751
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0782
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO 0568
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0909
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 0461
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0722

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000457 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/09/2011 
TAGS: PREL EAID KPKO KUNR UNSC UNGA
SUBJECT: UN REFORM/PEACEBUILDING COMMISSION: FINANCIAL 
CONTRIBUTORS AGREE, BUT PBC REMAINS STUCK ON MEMBERSHIP 
ISSUES 
 
REF: USUN 326 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Alex Wolff, Deputy Permanent Representative, 
for reasons 1.4 b,d. 
 
¶1. (U) Summary.  The selection of the thirty-one members of 
the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) Organizational Committee 
remains stalled over the regional breakdown of the ECOSOC 
seats (reftel).  USUN, however, has managed to facilitate a 
rotational agreement among the top ten financial contributors 
regarding their representation on the PBC over the first 
two-terms, which allows for participation by each of the top 
contributors.  The agreement will allow the financial 
contributors to name their representatives as soon as ECOSOC 
acts, in accordance with the process spelled out in the 
resolutions. 
 
¶2. (C) The donors' discussions were not without controversy 
as Germany, in particular, demanded a longer-term rotational 
scheme to ensure that Japan would not become a de facto 
permanent member of the PBC (a proposal the Japanese termed 
"insulting").  In the end, the leading contributors were able 
to agree on a rotation for the first four years while 
agreeing that the German proposal would serve as "an 
indicative template" beyond that.  As is common in New York, 
the agreed language masks an underlying unresolved difference 
of opinion.  End Summary. 
 
Identifying the big donors 
-------------------------- 
 
¶3. (U) The UNGA and UNSC resolutions to operationalize the 
PBC determined that five top providers of assessed and 
voluntary contributions to the UN system "selected by and 
among the ten top providers" shall be members of the PBC 
Organizational Committee.  The UN Secretariat was asked to 
produce the list of top contributors, based on a rolling 
three-year average of contributions to all UN funds, programs 
and agencies.  The list was immediately controversial.  A/SYG 
Bob Orr, in presenting the first draft to member states, 
noted that there was no agreed upon UN system-wide financial 
reporting that allowed for the easy collection of data. 
Countries lower on the initial list (e.g., Italy) complained 
that important UN agencies had been omitted.  EU countries 
complained that their share of contributions made to the UN 
system through Brussels were not reflected. 
 
¶4. (U) The final list included a more complete accounting of 
UN contributions and was accepted as definitive for the 
purposes of this year's PBC selection process.  It also 
illustrated the disparity in UN contributions.  Over three 
years, the U.S. provided a total of nearly 11.5 billion 
dollars to the UN system; Japan nearly 5.5 billion dollars; 
and the UK nearly 3.5 billion.  The Germans were next on the 
list at 2.4 billion dollars over three years.  Netherlands, 
Italy, Norway, France, Sweden and Canada (at 1.6 billion) 
rounded out the top ten.  Though not listed, we understand 
that Denmark is in the eleventh position, but with a 
substantial gap between its contributions and those of Canada. 
 
Arguing among friends 
--------------------- 
 
¶5. (U) Already on the PBC via the Security Council (along 
with the UK and France), USUN agreed to facilitate the 
decision among the ten donors on the process of selecting the 
five representatives.  There was quick agreement within the 
group that the top five donors not already on the PBC would 
serve for the first two-year term.  With five seats to divide 
among seven countries, there was also agreement that each of 
the top contributors should be given an opportunity to serve 
on the PBC within the first two terms (four years).  The 
difficulty came in determining whether or not - and then how 
- to address rotation beyond those four years. 
 
¶6. (C) Among the Europeans, particularly the Italians and 
Dutch, there was a desire to prevent Germany from setting 
itself apart from the rest of the Europeans.  The Germans, in 
turn, would not agree to a rotation scheme that included them 
but not the Japanese (rumored to reflect German unhappiness 
with Japan's failure to remain with the G-4 on Security 
Council expansion).  The Japanese, seeing their contribution 
 
 
 
as significantly higher than any of the other seven, took 
offense at the suggestion that they should agree now to come 
off the PBC in 2011.  (Japanese DPR Ozawa told the assembled 
group of ten that Japan considered it an "insulting" 
proposal.)  Canada and Norway were unhappy that the EU 
countries had quickly sought to establish a group negotiation 
position. 
 
¶7. (U) Ambassador Wolff, over a period of weeks, emphasized 
the importance of avoiding a protracted negotiation among the 
leading donors that could cause a delay in the establishment 
of the PBC.  He successfully secured agreement from the ten 
on the immediate issue of representation (the top five for 
2006-2007, with Sweden and Canada to join the top three for 
2008-2009).  The contributors also agreed that the 
German-proposed longer-term rotation would serve as "an 
indicative template" for future years, but would be reviewed 
by the group prior to the third term. 
 
Reassuring the Japanese 
----------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) In practice, the vague language relating to the German 
scheme will have little effect four years from now, when the 
issue will be re-opened by the donors.  We should expect 
another political negotiation, reflecting the rivalries of 
that time.  The Japanese delegation in New York appears to 
understand this, but remains deeply upset that the Europeans 
"ganged up" on the one Asian country among the top 
contributors.  Our Japanese contacts also report serious 
concern in Tokyo that the language of the agreement might be 
used to force them off the PBC in the future.  We do not 
believe that to be the case.  As long as Japan's 
contributions remain so significantly higher than all the 
others campaigning for a seat, we believe they should have 
the political capital here in New York to maintain their 
participation in the PBC for as long as they like. 
BOLTON