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OO RUEHWEB

DE RUCNDT #0455/01 0682343
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 092343Z MAR 06
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8235
INFO RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 1968

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000455 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FROM AMBASSADOR BOLTON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/09/2015 
TAGS: AORC KUNR UNGA PHUM PREL UNGA
SUBJECT: CONSIDERATION OF HRC POSTPONED TO MARCH 15; 
ELIASSON WILLING TO CONSIDER MODIFICATIONS "OUTSIDE OF THE 
TEXT" ONLY 
 
REF: USUN 443 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN BOLTON FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  In response to a U.S. request, the UN Fifth 
Committee agreed March 9 to postpone decision scheduled that 
day on the budget to establish a Human Rights Council. 
General Assembly President (PGA) Eliasson also put off the GA 
plenary session scheduled for March 10.  Both meetings are 
now likely to take place Wednesday, March 15.  Eliasson wants 
to use the next days to discuss informally with the U.S. -- 
either directly or indirectly -- possible fixes outside the 
text only.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) In response to a U.S. request to postpone any decision 
March 9 by the Fifth Committee regarding the budget for the 
proposed Human Rights Council (HRC) and a March 10 meeting to 
adopt the resolution establishing the HRC, both meetings are 
likely to be scheduled by the PGA for March 15.  The decision 
to postpone was choreographed with Eliasson's Chief of Staff 
(Amb. Wide), South African Ambassador Kumalo (current G-77 
Chair) and others.   Ambassador Wolff made a statement in the 
formal Fifth Committee plenary session that further time was 
needed for consultations, as also requested by Ambassador 
Wide on behalf of the PGA, and that the U.S. would continue 
to be in touch with the Office of the PGA and other 
delegations as consultations continued.  By postponing these 
meetings, the U.S. avoids the need this week to confront -- 
and to vote against -- an effort to adopt the HRC or its 
budgetary implications.  While supporting the request, the 
G-77, EU and Mexico, who were the only others to speak, 
announced t 
heir support for the proposed HRC budget, and by extension, 
Eliasson's draft of HRC itself. 
 
¶3. (C) In a subsequent conversation, Amb. Wide told Amb. 
Wolff that Eliasson would reschedule both the Fifth Committee 
and the GA Plenary on the HRC for Wednesday, March 15.  In 
the meantime, according to Wide, Eliasson was prepared to 
"look at things only outside the text" with the U.S. 
directly, or indirectly through a small group comprising 
close collaborators with Eliasson on the HRC project (he 
specifically cited the PR's of Liechtenstein, Switzerland and 
Singapore).  Asked whether there were any changes that 
Eliasson would consider inside the text, Wide responded that 
the PGA was "not willing to open up even small technical 
changes".  Wide added that we could look informally at what 
could be done outside the text to help the U.S.  He cited as 
examples an interpretative statement by the PGA on the review 
clause as well as specific commitments, like the EU's, by 
other states or groups of states undertaking not to vote for 
countries under Security Council sanctions in part for human 
rights reasons. 
 
¶4. (C) In separate conversations with Amb. Wolff, other 
delegations, including the Swiss, Portuguese, French, 
Israeli, and British continue to argue also that changes in 
the text either on the voting threshold or exclusionary 
criteria would not be attainable.  Some believe, however that 
small, technical changes, while still a long shot, might be 
feasible.  They, too, are focusing on "outside" changes. 
 
¶5. (C)  Ambassador Bolton had an extended conversation with 
UK Ambassador Jones Parry, in which the latter said that 
there was no chance for the United States to reopen the text 
and get either of our two bottom lines:  the two-thirds 
majority requirement for election to the proposed Council or 
the exclusion for countries under Security Council sanctions. 
He said that the United States could not simply "insist" on 
its bottom line, but had to find substitutes that would give 
us "at least some of what we want."  He proposed, for 
example, that statements by the EU and others about not 
voting for countries under UNSC sanctions, combined with 
changes to OP 8 that would reinforce language requiring 
compliance with human rights standards, might suffice on our 
second point.  He admitted, however, he had no ready 
substitute for the two-thirds point. 
 
¶6.  (C) Ambassador Bolton asked if there were any sentiment 
within the EU for reopening the draft text, since we had not 
uncovered any.  Jones Parry replied, "It depends on how 
little you ask for. If you simply ask for your two points, no 
one will rally to it. If you ask for something less, then 
there's a chance EU governments would consider reopening the 
text."  Ambassador Bolton pointed out that all EU Perm Reps 
with whom he had spoken, including those from France, Greece, 
Italy, Poland, and Slovakia, 
not to mention others very involved in the issue such as 
Switzerland and New Zealand, were afraid that opening the 
 
 
text for any point, no matter how slight, would open 
Pandora's Box.  Ambassador Bolton then asked if Jones Parry 
had detected any sentiment for reopening the text among the 
G-77, and Jones Parry said that he had not.  Ambassador 
Bolton then asked if PGA President Eliasson was not also 
telling HMG, as he was telling the USG, that opening the text 
was not possible, and Jones Parry acknowledged that Eliasson 
was making the same point with them.  Jones Parry also said 
that he believed that PGA Eliasson was under increasing 
pressure from G-77 countries, who were becoming increasingly 
impatient that the draft text had not been put to a vote. 
 
¶7. (C) Comment:  The above conversations suggest that 
Eliasson remains convinced opening the text to changes would 
lead to the unraveling of his HRC resolution.  We continue to 
hear that others have threatened introducing deal-busting 
provisions for the rest of the membership.  Eliasson's desire 
to get the HRC concluded as quickly as possible, and in a 
manner that does not put at risk his compromise package, 
underpin his disinclination to come in our direction even 
with minor changes in the text.  Direct efforts with other 
delegations and groups would be required to achieve this. 
What we have been hearing consistently from the rest of the 
membership over the past two weeks is that they, too, don't 
want to risk losing the HRC as currently envisaged, even if 
it means the U.S. can't sign on. 
BOLTON