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courage is contagious

Viewing cable 06USUNNEWYORK427, P5 MEETING WITH SECRETARY-GENERAL ON IRAN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06USUNNEWYORK427 2006-03-06 23:37 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL USUN New York
VZCZCXYZ0002
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUCNDT #0427 0652337
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 062337Z MAR 06
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8192
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE 0551
C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000427 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2011 
TAGS: KNNP IAEA AORC IR
SUBJECT: P5 MEETING WITH SECRETARY-GENERAL ON IRAN 
 
 
(U)  Classified by USUN Minister-Counselor William J. 
Brencick for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C)  Ambassador Sanders and Pol MinCouns and the other P5 
Ambassadors met with the SYG and former Chief of Staff and 
new Deputy SYG Designate Malloch Brown early in the evening 
of March 3.  SYG called the meeting to offer a briefing on 
his meetings with former Iranian President Khatami in Doha. 
SYG offered this readout with the observation that he hoped 
it could contribute to the Council's discussion of Iran. 
Annan reported that Khatami complained that Iran's intentions 
and policies toward nuclear issues and more generally had not 
changed (although he admitted some of the controversial 
public statements of the new President obscured this fact). 
However, according to Khatami the attitude of the outside 
world had hardened.  Iran had a right to develop nuclear 
technology under the NPT, but the Europeans were seeking to 
impose new conditions that would force Iran to forego these 
rights, going beyond the guarantees that had been negotiated. 
 Iran had accepted an EU deal to fully implement the 
Additional Protocol, to put a 3.5% limit on enrichment, and 
to offer full cooperation to the IAEA.  Now, following 
Iranian elections, this was not enough.  Khatami told the SYG 
that if the EU was willing to allow research on enrichment 
and a "pilot program," Iran would sign on to this agreement. 
 
2.  (C)  Khatami insisted that referring this matter to the 
UNSC was not in Iran or anyone else's interest.  Iranian 
public opinion was firm in demanding development of nuclear 
technology.  Western countries offered nuclear fuel but no 
technological know-how, the very thing that Iranians 
demanded.  All of Iran's enrichment activities would be 
carried on under close IAEA supervision.  SYG commented that 
Khatami was one of Iran's "moderate voices" and might be 
worth listening to at least to compare his message with that 
of other sources.  Khatami insisted that the SYG had a role 
to play in helping to overcome the current impasse, although 
Annan presented this claim neutrally and said he did not 
encourage him on this point. 
 
3.  (C)  UK's Jones Parry gave a forceful presentation 
emphasizing that to say Iran's intentions had not changed was 
quite worrisome in itself, given their history of persistent 
deception and clandestine nuclear activity, and that Iran has 
gone back on its assurances.  Carrying on "research" was not 
a minor point or a trivial concession -- a fully developed 
"pilot program" could jump into industrial production and 
making highly enriched uranium very quickly.  Any such 
activity was flatly unacceptable for the capability it 
potentially offered Iran in weapons production.  Jones Parry 
reported that the Larajani meetings with the EU3 in Vienna 
earlier in the day had been "constructive" but indicated no 
"move on substance" nor willingness on Iran's part to agree 
to the February BOG's demand that all enrichment activity 
again be suspended in order to begin to restore confidence in 
Iran's intentions, even though this was not a permanent ban. 
Meanwhile, Iran is clearly buying time.  At March 6 BOG, the 
decision will be how to respond, but time is clearly running 
out. 
 
4.  (C)  SYG asked if Iran was still in touch with the 
Russians and if there was a chance of progress before the 
March 6 BOG.  Ambassador Denisov simply referred to Lavrov's 
statement earlier today to the effect that the Russian offer 
of a joint venture for uranium enrichment remained on the 
table as did, he quickly added, a demand for a full 
moratorium of all enrichment activities in Iran.  There may 
still be time, but there was no agreement as yet.  Chinese 
Ambassador Wang then reported on his Deputy Foreign 
Minister's visit to Tehran, where he delivered the clear 
message that Iran had lost and needed to restore the 
confidence of the international community -- the only means 
to do this at present was to reinstitute the moratorium on 
enrichment.  Time was indeed limited but a diplomatic 
solution was still "hoped for" by the Chinese.  French 
PermRep de la Sabliere simply added that Iran said nothing 
new to the EU3 in Vienna today.  He noted that the SYG should 
take note of the unity of the P5 in making basic demands of 
the Iranians.  As for the argument that the Iranians had 
boxed themselves into a corner, de la Sabliere was 
dismissive.  Iran had insisted once before that they could 
not suspend enrichment and then agreed to do so -- they would 
simply have to reverse themselves again.  Ambassador Sanders, 
noting that the U.S. was the only party in the room not 
talking to the Iranians, thanked the others for their 
readouts. 
 
BOLTON