VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUCNDT #0422/01 0630021
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 040021Z MAR 06
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8182
INFO RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 1960

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000422 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS SECRETARY'S PARTY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2016 
TAGS: PHUM KUNR UNGA PREL UNHRC
SUBJECT: HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL:  MOVING TOWARDS A VOTE ON 
PGA TEXT 
 
REF: A. (A) USUN 400 
 
     ¶B. (B) USUN 295 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Alejandro Wolff, Deputy Permanent Representat 
ive to the United Nations, for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  SUMMARY AND COMMENT: On March 3, the Swiss and 
Liechtenstein PermReps reiterated to Ambassador Wolff that 
re-opening of the text of the draft Human Rights Council 
(HRC) resolution to accommodate core U.S. requirements is not 
a realistic option.  They remain eager to identify whether 
there is anything "outside the text" that could help to 
address U.S. concerns.  UNGA President Eliasson, who 
reportedly still hopes to bring the U.S. on board by 
"dissociating" itself from the text rather than breaking 
consensus, continues to rally support for his draft and to 
prevent efforts by others to open the text.  Our 
interlocutors also indicate eagerness to explore mechanisms 
that might allow for U.S. participation in the HRC after its 
creation.  Meanwhile, the Russian Mission Counselor told USUN 
that Cuba will call for a re-opening of the text when the 
draft resolution is presented and advocate for amendments. 
Action on the budget for the HRC took place March 3 in the 
ACABQ and is expected March 6 in the Fifth Committee -- where 
we intend to call for a vote and vote "no," consistent with 
our policy approach on the HRC draft -- this sets the stage 
for possible UNGA plenary action on the draft as early as 
next week.  END SUMMARY AND COMMENT. 
 
SWISS AND LIECHTENSTEIN SEEK TO AVOID A VOTE, BUT DON'T SEE 
RE-OPENING OF TEXT 
 
¶2.  (C) On March 3, Ambassador Wolff met with Swiss PermRep 
Ambassador Maurer and Liechtenstein PermRep Ambassador 
Wenaweser to discuss UNGA President Eliasson's resolution 
text on the Human Rights Council.  (Maurer and Wenaweser 
collaborate closely with Eliasson and have been used as 
sounding boards with us in the past.)  They reiterated that 
it is not a realistic option to re-open the HRC draft, and 
questioned whether there is anything "outside the text" that 
could help to address U.S. concerns.  They said Eliasson 
still hoped to bring the U.S. on board, and had not yet made 
a final decision on how he will move forward.  Given clear 
U.S. statements regarding the PGA's draft resolution, they 
did not expect that the U.S. would support an unchanged text, 
but asked -- if the text is brought forward for action -- 
whether it would be possible for the U.S. to "dissociate" 
from the text rather than to break a consensus by calling for 
a vote; or if that was not possible, to somehow present a 
"soft" no vote. 
 
¶3. (C) Ambassador Wolff reviewed the U.S. position and key 
issues that would need to be addressed for the U.S. to 
support the text (State 32895).  He reiterated U.S. 
preference for a "cooling off" period if the improvements 
sought in the text were unattainable.   He stressed that 
other delegations should not view bringing the resolution 
forward quickly for action as a means to pressure the United 
States to support an unchanged text.  This was a mistaken 
tactic that would backfire.  Maurer and Wenaweser suggested 
that perhaps the quality of membership issue could be 
addressed through other channels, such as a Community of 
Democracies (CD) decision for its members not to support the 
HRC candidacies of any state subject to Security Council 
sanctions for human rights violations.  They suggested that 
if such agreement were reached, democracies could in effect 
block the membership of an unsuitable candidate.  Ambassador 
Wolff noted that the CD was untested and members would have 
competing loyalties to their regional groups.  Even if such a 
mechanism could be established, it would be a hollow exercise 
without a provision for election to the HRC by a 2/3 majority 
GA vote.  Maurer and Wenaweser agreed that, in any case, 
there would need to be a change in the UN culture for 
elections and how delegations consider the candidacies of 
other Member States. 
 
¶4. (C) Maurer and Wenaweser stressed the desirability of 
avoiding a U.S. call for a vote on the HRC resolution, 
wondering if it would be possible for the United States to 
dissociate from the resolution rather than break a consensus 
by calling for a vote.   They also expressed concern about a 
possible "no" vote by the United States in the Fifth 
Committee, with Maurer in particular worrying about setting a 
precedent for voting in this Committee, particularly in 
advance of the management reform and budget negotiations. 
Ambassador Wolff recalled U.S. statements saying that, if 
there is an attempt to adopt the current text, the U.S. would 
call for a vote and vote "no".  This logic also applied to 
the Fifth Committee vote.  We were not seeking any linkage of 
our HRC position to other reform issues, and would not be 
 
 
intimidated by this point.  If others chose to do so, there 
was little we could do. 
 
¶5. (C) Maurer and Wenaweser then questioned what impact a 
U.S. "no" vote would have on U.S. participation in the Human 
Rights Council (and at the upcoming CHR).  Ambassador Wolff 
advised that we have not made any decisions on what, if any, 
relationship we would maintain with a body we would vote 
against.  Maurer and Wenaweser indicated a willingness to 
continue to explore mechanisms to improve the package if 
doing so might help facilitate U.S. participation in the HRC 
after its creation.  While they indicated they would need to 
consider measures "outside" the resolution text, Maurer did 
question whether "as the only possible change to the text 
itself" a shortening and strengthening of the review period 
for the HRC from five to three years would be helpful. 
 
¶6. (C) At a March 3 lunch hosted by the Australian PR for a 
dozen PermReps from all regions to discuss the HRC, each 
expressed a desire for some arrangement that would allow the 
U.S. to participate in the new HRC (albeit not to a 
sufficient degree to agree to support opening the text to 
accommodate U.S. needs).  They thought bringing this to a 
vote would be bad for the U.S., bad for the HRC, and bad for 
the UN.  In particular, they feared the effect of an isolated 
U.S., the spillover onto the management reform debate, and 
the effect on the UN's human rights "machinery." They urged 
that we convey to Washington the depth of their concern and 
the hope that reconsideration would result in a decision not 
to block consensus by voting "no."  Amb. Wolff said the U.S. 
understood the situation well, and others should not 
underestimate the seriousness of our position.  The HRC 
debate was taking place against a backdrop of broader UN 
reform, and the inability to redress effectively the problems 
of the Geneva Commission would not reflect well on the 
institution. 
 
RUSSIA PRESENTS A SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT VIEW 
 
¶7. (C) Also on March 3, the Russian Mission Counselor told 
USUN/ECOSOC Minister Counsellor that Russia will not call for 
a reopening of text, though he indicated provisions with 
which they are not entirely happy. If the United States or 
another Member State calls for an up-or-down vote, he said 
Russia is not yet sure how it will vote; Moscow instructions 
remain pending.  However, Russia noted that Cuba has 
presented Eliasson with several amendments to the draft text, 
and claimed that when the draft resolution is presented, Cuba 
will call for a re-opening of the text and advocate for its 
amendments.  (We are e-mailing to IO a copy of the Cuban 
proposals, which relate to the handling of country-specific 
resolutions, right to development, the number of HRC 
sessions, and OPs 7 and 8 of the Eliasson text.)  He noted 
that Russia supports some of Cuba's proposals, but declined 
to offer specifics.  Russia also claimed that many 
delegations now feel confused and they are wavering in their 
positions, mentioning Japan and Canada in particular. 
 
¶8. (C) Russia concurs with the U.S. view that the process has 
been flawed.  Russia recalled that from the beginning (during 
Outcome Document negotiations), Russia had called for an 
intergovernmental working group to conduct line-by-line 
negotiations on the Human Rights Council.  However, he said 
some seven months have passed and Russia believes it is too 
late to try to commence such a process at this point. 
 
¶9. (C) On the specific provisions of the text, he said, 
surprisingly, that Russia supports the U.S. position on the 
SC sanctions criterion (although the Russian delegation never 
voiced such support at any point before).  Russia prefers a 
simple majority election process for HRC members, but he said 
Russia is prepared to compromise and accept the absolute 
majority provision in the current draft.  Russia also opposes 
the provision for holding special sessions of the HRC. 
Finally, he voiced adamant opposition to any term limits for 
HRC members, which he described as a matter of principle. 
 
MORE ON ACABQ AND FIFTH COMMITTEE ACTION ON THE HRC PBI 
 
¶10. (C) On March 3 the ACABQ approved its report on the 
Program Budget Implications (PBI).  The Fifth Committee is 
scheduled to consider the PBI on Monday, March 6.  In a 
conversation with Ambassador Wolff, UK DPR Adam Thompson 
echoed concerns of Switzerland and Liechtenstein about a vote 
in the Fifth Committee on the PBI, saying that calling for a 
vote in the Fifth Committee would be "explosive" and would be 
seen as a provocation by the G-77 that would lead hardliners 
to argue more persuasively for voting on any management 
reform matters.  (Comment:  The G-77 has already set a 
precedent for voting in the Fifth Committee when they called 
 
 
for a vote on conference servicing in December.  This was the 
first vote in nearly 20 years in this Committee.  End 
Comment.)  Amb. Wolff said a "no" vote on the HRC budget 
followed logically our decision to vote no on the HRC. 
 
BOLTON