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Viewing cable 06USUNNEWYORK413, UNSC: UNSCO DE SOTO DISCUSSES CONUNDRUM OF

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06USUNNEWYORK413 2006-03-03 19:15 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL USUN New York
VZCZCXYZ0016
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUCNDT #0413/01 0621915
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 031915Z MAR 06
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8168
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000413 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC KPAL
SUBJECT: UNSC: UNSCO DE SOTO DISCUSSES CONUNDRUM OF 
PALESTINIAN ASSISTANCE 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Jackie W. Sanders. E.O. 12958. 
Reasons 1.4 (b/d) 
 
1. (C) Begin Summary: During his monthly briefing February 28 
to the Security Council, the UN Special Coordinator on the 
Middle East Alvaro de Soto discussed the determinants of the 
current Palestinian assistance conundrum and the consequences 
of international inaction.  Reporting that it is too soon to 
discern the shape or substance of a Hamas government -- and 
highlighting indications that Hamas itself has not yet 
decided these questions -- de Soto argued that the 
international community must ensure the financial stability 
of the Palestinian Authority (PA) caretaker government, 
asserting 700,000 Palestinians depend on PA wage earners. 
Urging the international community to help the parties to 
make wise choices during this "unscripted moment," de Soto 
argued that actions which ensure the PA does not collapse 
will protect the investment in Palestinian institutions 
dating to Oslo, and assure Palestinians that they are not 
being punished for exercising their democratic rights. 
 
2. (C) De Soto also previewed the "agonizing" dilemmas for 
international donors following the formation of the new 
Palestinian government.  He noted that some "very important 
donors" might be compelled to cut off assistance entirely due 
to legal restrictions.  He explored the difficulty of 
defining what we mean by assistance to a "terrorist 
organization."  If the assistance benefits the Palestinian 
people, not Hamas, would it be acceptable?  How do we create 
mechanisms that channel assistance to the people through the 
PA while preventing such assistance from falling into the 
"wrong hands"?  How do we work with ministries headed by 
Hamas ministers?  De Soto also called the Council's attention 
to the fact that even if the international community 
identified ways of sidestepping Hamas officials to work with 
PA institutions; a Hamas-led government may not choose to 
relinquish its control over the civil service.  While raising 
more questions than he answered, De Soto reported that the UN 
is reviewing its programs of assistance and trying to 
identify possible options. 
 
3. (C) Most Council members acknowledged the importance and 
timeliness of the assistance issue.  France referenced the 
recent "courageous" EU decision to provide assistance to the 
PA and challenged others to carry out their assistance 
commitments.  Russia said Moscow would closely follow the 
"Quartet guidelines" in its upcoming meeting with Hamas, and 
argued the purpose of the meeting is to encourage Hamas to 
abandon violence and engage fully in the political process. 
Japan said that its FM had counseled patience to his Israeli 
counterpart.  Ambassador Bolton commended de Soto for his 
candid briefing, which helpfully identified for the Council 
issues of concern.  End Summary. 
 
4. (C) During his regular monthly briefing to the Security 
Council February 28, UN Special Coordinator (UNSCO) for the 
Middle East Peace Process and Personal Envoy of the 
Secretary-General to the Palestine Liberation Organization 
 
SIPDIS 
and the Palestinian Authority Alvaro de Soto characterized 
the current situation in Israel-Palestine as an "unscripted 
moment." He outlined the key events leading to the current 
situation: the democratic election of a Palestinian 
organization still formally committed to the destruction of 
Israel; the unfinished process of forming a new Palestinian 
government; and decisions by Israel which, engaged in an 
"extremely delicate" election campaign where future 
Palestinian policy is a central issue, has halted the 
transfer of revenues to the Palestinian Authority and 
tightened its closure regime.  In the public Security Council 
session (faxed to IO/UNP and NEA/IPA) and in the subsequent 
closed and frank consultations with Security Council members, 
de Soto focused on the consequences of those events: the 
conundrum of ensuring financial support for the Palestinian 
Authority as a caretaker government, and for the Palestinian 
people, who could soon be led by a government possibly 
unacceptable to the international community. 
 
Determinants of Palestinian Assistance 
-------------------------------------- 
 
5. (C) Making the wait-and-see case for Hamas, De Soto said 
that Hamas is still digesting the election results.  He said 
that internal debates are taking place on how to structure a 
government Hamas never expected it would have to run.  De 
Soto noted that while Hamas has neither renounced terrorism 
nor its covenant to destroy Israel, it has participated in 
elections for the first time -- breaking its vow not to 
participate in an Oslo-related institution -- and it has 
generally respected the cease-fire.  Thus, while we do not 
know whether the trend will continue, Hamas is behaving like 
a political party.  As a political party, de Soto observed, 
 
Hamas is keenly aware that a majority of the Palestinian 
people do not/not support Hamas' charter and do/do support a 
two-state solution.  Moreover, de Soto continued, 
conditioning its participation in a Hamas-led government on 
adherence to Mahmoud Abbas' program, provides Fatah with the 
leverage to positively influence on the shape of the new 
government.  De Soto also noted that Hamas leader Khalid 
Mishal's recent travels in the region have been opportunities 
for him to hear the Quartet message.  De Soto said that the 
choices Hamas will make are the single most important 
variable that will shape the future of the conflict and it 
will take time for clarity to emerge as to what those choices 
will be. 
 
6. (C) De Soto urged the international community to continue 
to support the caretaker Palestinian Authority while Hamas is 
making its decisions and forming its government.  He recalled 
that the Quartet has stressed the importance of stabilizing 
the finances of the PA during the caretaker period.  He noted 
that the Palestinian Authority itself provides much 
assistance -- some 700,000 Palestinians are dependent upon 
the salaries of health, educational and security PA personnel 
-- and withdrawal of assistance would impact negatively on 
the ability of the PA to function and likely cause social 
unrest.  De Soto also cautioned that funneling money through 
NGOs would result in the degradation of Palestinian 
institutions the international community has worked so hard 
since Oslo to develop.  He noted that what is turned off 
cannot easily be turned back on again. 
 
7. (C) Finally, de Soto argued, during the current internal 
Hamas debate, we need to strengthen the position of the 
moderates by ensuring that the Palestinian Authority not be 
allowed to collapse.  Moreover, as we await the formation of 
the new government and its programs to assess its commitments 
to principles so that we may determine our willingness to 
provide assistance, we should be alert to the danger that 
cutting off assistance before then might be interpreted by 
Palestinians and Arab world as punishment of Palestinian 
people for the way they voted on January 25. 
 
8. (C) Commenting on facts on the ground impacting the 
current situation, de Soto said Council members needed to be 
aware of the deep frustrations verging on despondency that 
the Israeli closure regime and harsh security measures have 
created.  However, he noted his satisfaction at having read 
for the first time in many years that that an Israeli 
official -- Prime Minister Ohlmert -- had expressed the hope 
of a attaining a "final settlement" agreement. 
 
9. (C) During closed consultations, de Soto -- while 
emphasizing the imperative to "maintain clarity" and send a 
consistent and clear message to Hamas that it must abide by 
the three principles outlined in the Quartet statement -- 
explored the "agonizing" dilemmas that may well await the 
international community once the new Palestinian government 
is formed.  Raising more questions then he answered, de Soto 
talked of the difficulty of sustaining the investment in and 
performance of PA ministries that may be headed by Hamas 
leaders.  Noting that some "very important donors" may be 
legally required to cut off assistance to a Hamas-led 
government, de Soto wondered if the international community 
could create effective firewalls so as to continue to assist 
the Palestinian people through the PA without inadvertently 
supporting the "wrong hands."  While reporting that the UN is 
undergoing an internal review of its assistance in light of 
this prospective dilemma, de Soto also cautioned that a 
Hamas-led government might not accept actions that undermine 
its authority over the PA civil service. 
 
Council Members Comment: Qatar, France, Russia 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
10. (C) Only Qatar, France and Russia offered extended 
remarks on the presentation.  Qatar Minister Jamal Al-Bader 
underscored the importance of financial assistance for the 
Palestinian Authority.  He said that Israel's decision to 
withhold customs revenues threatened the collapse of the 
Palestinian Authority and noted that there cannot be a 
Palestinian state living side-by-side with an Israeli state 
if the Palestinian Authority is not provided with the funds 
it needs.  He also argued that the Palestinian people should 
not be punished for exercising their rights and that measures 
cannot be taken against a government that has not yet been 
formed. 
 
 
 
11. (C) French Deputy Permanent Representative Michel Duclos 
made three points.  First, the formation of a Palestinian 
government is what is important and that we have to wait for 
that to happen.  But in the interim, the international 
community must work to influence the outcome by providing 
support for the government responsible for day-to-day 
affairs.  The EU has taken a courageous position by deciding 
to fund the PA and all countries in a position to do so must 
abide by the commitments they made.  Secondly, the Council 
must publicize for Hamas the Quartet's clear message on the 
fundamental principles that must be respected -- the 
renunciation of violence, the recognition of Israel's right 
to exist and commitment to the Roadmap and other obligations. 
 Finally, the international community must support the role 
of Mahmoud Abbas and his bold reaffirmation of principles. 
 
12. (C) Russian Permanent Representative Andrey Denisov said 
that Mahmoud Abbas would remain a key figure on the 
Palestinian scene and deserved the support of the 
international community.  He said that continued assistance 
is important, that the interests of the Palestinian people 
are foremost.  Commenting on the imminent visit of Hamas 
leaders to Russia, he said that Russia would tell Hamas it 
must abide by Quartet principles.  In a subsequent 
conversation with deputy polcouns, Denisov said Russia 
recognized that, unlike the USG and the EU, Moscow has the 
"legal flexibility" to meet with Hamas and is seeking to 
employ this advantage to urge Hamas to abandon violence and 
fully engage in the political process.  While speaking in the 
Council, he also said that Russia is concerned about the 
stagnation of the Syrian track and argued that Damascus 
should not be isolated. 
 
Other Comments 
-------------- 
 
13. (C) Most other Security Council representatives welcomed 
the frank discussion of the problem of Palestinian 
assistance, and noted the need to continue to support the 
Palestinian people.  Greek PR Adam Vassilakis said we should 
judge the new Palestinian government not by its rhetoric but 
by actions.  Argentinean PR Cesar Mayoral said that the 
Security Council needed to send a message to the Palestinians 
that they were not being punished, but that Hamas must commit 
itself to non-violence.  He noted Special Envoy James 
Wolfensohn's warnings on the fragility of Palestinian 
Authority finances.  The Japanese, Slovakian, Ghanaian, 
Danish and Tanzanian representatives all said that Hamas 
should be given time to act before being accepted or rejected 
as a partner. 
 
14. (C) Several countries, notably Japan, Qatar, France and 
Argentina, regretted the impact of recent Israeli 
restrictions on movement and extrajudicial killings. 
Japanese PR Kenzo Oshima said his Foreign Minister had used a 
recent visit to urge Israeli FM Livni to respond with 
patience and restraint. 
BOLTON