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DE RUCNDT #0400/01 0612319
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 022319Z MAR 06
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8151
INFO RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 1956

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000400 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO SECRETARY'S PARTY FROM AMB. BOLTON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2016 
TAGS: KUNR UNGA UNCHR
SUBJECT: GA PRESIDENT AND UNSYG CHEF DE CABINET CONSIDER 
HRC TEXT FINAL; PALAU BACKING DOUBLES OUR SUPPORT 
 
REF: A. USUN 00398 
     ¶B. STATE 32805 
 
Classified By: AMB. JOHN BOLTON FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) (D) 
 
 ¶1. (C) Summary:  In our continuing consultations with other 
delegations, we unfortunately find no appetite to reopen the 
HRC text to accommodate U.S. requirements (reftels).  General 
Assembly President Eliasson's office has sent a letter to the 
ACABQ (the committee considering resource needs to establish 
the HRC) stating that his HRC draft "should be considered as 
the final text."  The EU has endorsed Eliasson's text, 
although they remain divided (with the UK as the principal 
holdout) on the desirability of a vote.  Meanwhile, efforts 
continue to muster as large a majority as possible in support 
of the current text, with some considering modest gestures 
"outside the text" that they hope would lead the U.S. to 
join, or at least not to block consensus.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) EU Position: Following lengthy discussions over the 
previous two days, the EU agreed late March 1 to support 
Eliasson's HRC text.  As shared by an EU member with USUN, 
the EU position states: "The EU considers that the PGA's 
draft resolution meets the basic requirements for the 
establishment of the Human Rights Council.  The EU could 
therefore accept this text as a compromise.  The EU fully 
supports the PGA's efforts to secure the broadest possible 
backing for the early establishment of the Human Rights 
Council."   USUN understands there were two EU members that 
disagreed with the text itself in the EU discussions, but in 
the end all joined EU consensus.  We also understand that EU 
members had nuanced disagreements, particularly at the 
tactical level, and were particularly concerned about a split 
with the U.S., expressing regret that strong democracies 
would not stand together on this issue.  They felt it was 
Eliasson's task to address Washington's concerns and to 
approach Washington. 
 
¶3. (C) UK View: In return for joining consensus, the UK has 
issued a supplementary national statement agreed within the 
EU that states:  "The United Kingdom could accept the 
compromise draft resolution text, although we would have 
preferred stronger language in a number of areas.  The UK 
believes that the priority should now be to establish the 
conditions for the resolution to be put to the General 
Assembly to receive the broadest possible backing.  In 
particular, the UK believes that for the Human Rights 
Council, and this new approach to the promotion and 
protection of human rights, to be effective, it will need the 
support of the United States.  It therefore encourages 
discussion with the U.S. Administration in order to identify 
a basis for the widest possible support." 
 
¶4. (C) In private discussions with individual EU and WEOG 
members, the greatest concerns seem to be that re-opening the 
text would lead to numerous other amendments by "the other 
side" that would weaken the text and the HRC.  Some have 
cautioned that with any changes to the resolution, it could 
be a situation of "all bets are off" and, for example, 
provisions to constrain the use of country specific 
resolutions could be re-introduced.  While we have heard the 
OIC might accept the current PP 7 language as it is currently 
formulated (addressing efforts to enhance dialogue and 
broaden understanding among cultures and religions) several 
Western countries are concerned that if the text is 
re-opened, the OIC would seek to strengthen this preambular 
language and/or move language addressing these issues into an 
operative paragraph.  Several also have stated that changes 
to the voting majority or strict criteria for membership on 
the HRC would not be achievable, and have asked what U.S. 
"bottom lines" exist for agreement to the text if other 
changes could be made.  All who have spoken to the precise 
points of exclusion for Security Council sanctions or a 
two-thirds requirement for election believe that such 
proposals would be rejected.  French Perm Rep de la Sabliere 
in a conversation with Ambassador Bolton at noon on Thursday 
was particularly emphatic on this point.  Further, they are 
concerned that a postponement of the discussion would hurt, 
rather than help, the process and the human rights machinery 
of the United Nations.  Some continue to believe that the 
atmosphere will never be better than it is now to reach 
agreement on the HRC, noting that other delegations may have 
been maneuvered into a position of accepting something they 
may not be entirely comfortable with and would reject, given 
more time. 
 
¶5. (C) At the same time, the EU continues to debate whether 
to support a vote to establish the HRC despite U.S. 
opposition.  UK PermRep Jones Parry told us today that he was 
isolated in the EU on this point (we've heard from another EU 
 
 
Perm Rep that he defended himself by stating in the EU 
meeting that this was his instruction from Foreign Secretary 
Straw).  UK DPR Thomson told us there was still hope that we 
could find a creative way of allowing the HRC to be adopted 
without U.S. opposition.  He lamented, however, that Eliasson 
is not focused on how to do this operationally, worrying more 
at this stage about solidifying support for his text to 
demonstrate to the U.S. the degree of its isolation.  (We 
understand from Ambassador Moley in Geneva that his EU 
Presidency counterpart has indicated that the Austrian 
Presidency in New York is still waiting to see if the U.S. 
will accept the current draft once the extent of the majority 
support for it is evident.)  On the other hand, the letter to 
the ACABQ quoted in paragraph one was written on behalf of 
the President of the General Assembly.  Moreover, a meeting 
of the Fifth Committee (which handles budget matters) has 
been scheduled for Monday.  Both steps suggest PGA Eliasson 
is actively and wittingly preparing the ground for an UNGA 
vote early next week. 
 
¶6. (C) As for next steps, Eliasson's Deputy Chef de Cabinet 
told Ambassador Wolff March 2 that Eliasson was pleased with 
his March 1 conversation with Ambassador Bolton (ref B) and 
wanted to remain in touch.  SecGen Annan's Chief of Staff 
Malloch Brown told Ambassador Wolff March 2 it was 
increasingly clear from their soundings that re-opening the 
text "won't work".  They also fear the negative effect of a 
delay of several months, particularly in the wake of what is 
certain to be a "disastrous" session of the Geneva Commission 
"with or without U.S. participation."  Malloch Brown noted 
that, as a result, there was growing momentum toward a vote. 
He said Annan would try to reach Secretary Rice as soon as 
she returns from her trip to see what could be done to turn 
the U.S. position into a "soft no", in order to avoid an 
ICC-type situation.  In this regard, Malloch Brown said that 
High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour was thinking 
about setting up the HRC for a "test drive" with a shortened 
review period to see how it works.  We've heard similar ideas 
from other delegations (ref B), and expect this will be the 
increased focus of the Secretary General, Eliasson and other 
delegations in the coming days. 
 
¶7. (C) On a brighter note, Palau Perm Rep Stuart Beck 
confirmed today that they fully support our position on HRC. 
They have asked for, and USUN will supply, talking points so 
that Palau can advocate our position publicly. 
 
 
BOLTON