VZCZCXRO6255
PP RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHLH RUEHMOS RUEHPW
DE RUEHTU #0646/01 0800922
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 210922Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0153
INFO RUCNISL/ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TUNIS 000646 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NEA/MAG FOR LAWRENCE 
NEA/FO FOR DONICK, CUTRONA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/15/2013 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KMPI PHUM TS
SUBJECT: A/S WELCH AND FM ABDALLAH: ISLAMISM, TUNISIA REFORM 
 
REF: TUNIS 425 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William Hudson for Reasons 1.4 b & d 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: In a March 15 meeting with A/S Welch, FM 
Abdelwahab Abdallah discussed the "dangers of political 
Islam", claiming there is no such thing as moderate Islamists 
and accusing the West of having "insufficient knowledge of 
Islam," and being misled by the "double-speak of Islamists" 
who claim to respect democracy.  Abdallah said the GOT did 
not fear an Islamist political threat due to Tunisia's strong 
economic and social performance, but predictably did not 
respond to A/S Welch's challenge that Tunisia, precisely 
because it did not fear Islamism, was in a better position 
than some to open up politically.  At a dinner for A/S Welch 
hosted by the Ambassador, a group of eight Tunisians 
representing civil society and business highlighted the fact 
that the GOT does not offer any better explanation to its own 
population about the reasons for continued political 
dominance and social control.  These interlocutors spoke 
animatedly at the dinner about the need for greater freedom 
of expression and the development of a new political elite 
and confirmed that the greatest fear across all levels of 
Tunisian society remains the power and degree of control of 
the GOT itself. End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) At a March 15 meeting in Tunis, FM Abdallah stated 
that the USG and the GOT "agree on almost everything, except 
for one thing: Islamists."  Abdallah then launched a 
monologue, frequently heard from GOT officials, about the 
dangers of political Islam.  He said that there "is no such 
thing as a moderate Islamist."  He said once someone accepts 
the ideology of Islam, it "governs all life."  He claimed 
Islam does not tolerate democracy, freedom or women's rights. 
 He said that is why the Tunisian constitution forbids 
Islamist political parties.  Abdallah suggested that if 
Islamist  parties were allowed to participate in democratic 
elections, they would "automatically gain sympathy" due to 
language of "divine will", and that they would win elections 
due to voters "fear of God and hell".  He said that on TV 
debates these parties would invoke religious precepts, and 
that no matter which parties ran, Islamists would always win. 
  Abdallah suggested that perhaps in 50 years Arab societies 
would "develop to the point where voters would be more 
educated and less prone to voting out of religious sympathy 
or fear of going to hell," but that this was not currently 
the case. 
 
¶3. (C) Abdallah said the West was "mistaken" in its view of 
Islamists for two reasons: it had insufficient knowledge of 
Islam and the "duplicity of the double-speak of Islamists" 
who claim to respect democratic values. He claimed there was 
a great difference in what Islamists said publicly and their 
private views and political goals. 
 
¶4. (C) A/S Welch responded that it was difficult to speak 
about Islamist politics without referring to specific 
countries, as political scenarios varied widely in the 
region.  The USG feels some of the same discomfort concerning 
Islamism in the region.  He said despite accusations, the USG 
does not support Islamic governments per se, although we do 
have some relationships with them, e.g. in Turkey, which had 
its own "unique brand of politics."  (Abdallah countered that 
the Turkish government could no longer be characterized as 
Islamist).  A/S Welch reminded Abdallah that political 
openness could serve to "expose Islamist parties" as either 
ineffective or duplicitous.  He asserted that reform must 
occur according to the unique situation in a given country, 
and that "what we see in one country we don't recommend for 
all."  A/S Welch said Tunisia was correct in identifying 
Islamist movements as a potential political threat, noting 
for example that he believed Hamas probably had grander 
political designs, extending perhaps to leading Palestinians 
both in and outside the territories.  A/S Welch continued 
that it was the USG's intention not just to contain, but to 
defeat such movements in a democratic way: they will fail 
when their own people recognize their deficits. 
 
¶5. (C) Reemphasizing that the political landscape is 
drastically different across the MENA region, A/S Welch noted 
that countries would have different reform approaches, but 
hopefully the same destination: an open, democratic system. 
In this regard, he noted that Tunisia enjoyed significant 
social and economic strength, which in our view allows the 
GOT to take some risks while undertaking political reforms. 
He said given Tunisia's domestic strength and political 
stability, the USG was puzzled as to why the pace of reform 
was so slow, observing that Tunisia was "curiously closed in 
some areas" despite "more room to maneuver" than other, less 
politically stable, countries in the region. 
 
TUNIS 00000646  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
¶6. (C) Abdallah responded that the GOT was not afraid of 
Islamists.  He said given Tunisia's homogenous society, 
women's rights, and strong social, economic, and education 
performance, Islamism has "no room to prosper in Tunisia." 
He said the GOT feared mainly terrorism.  He said the GOT 
feared links between some Tunisians, notably "released 
prisoners", and Al Qaeda; the GOT "had to keep its eye on" 
these Tunisians. (NB: Abdallah was likely referring to 
recently released prisoners that were members of the banned 
Tunisian Islamic political party En-Nahdha and other 
recently released prisoners who had been arrested for 
allegedly preparing to commit terrorist attacks. Ref A). 
 
¶7. (C) Comment:  Abdallah's comments were entirely consistent 
with what we hear across the board from GOT officials.  He 
predictably did not respond to A/S Welch's comment that 
Tunisia, precisely because it did not fear Islamism, was in a 
better position than some to open up politically, except 
unintentionally to validate it by reiterating Tunisia's 
strengths and impermeability to extremism. 
 
¶8. (C) Comment (cont'd):  Similarly, the GOT does not offer 
any better explanation to its own population about the 
reasons for continued political dominance and social control. 
At a dinner for  A/S Welch hosted by the Ambassador, a group 
of eight Tunisians representing civil society and business 
spoke animatedly about the need for greater freedom of 
expression and the need to develop a new political elite. 
"The old dinosaurs are disappearing," with no new leadership 
in the wings.  Like the majority of well-educated Tunisians, 
none advocated an Islamic government, but notably, neither 
did they gauge the threat of radical Islam in Tunisia to be 
high. They had the usual theories about increased religious 
observance among Muslims in Tunisia, (e.g. lack of moral 
leadership from the family and from government, rebellion 
against an older, secular generation, a sense of Muslim 
victimization in the world) but did not believe that fear of 
political Islam should retard reform efforts here. In fact, a 
woman business leader present claimed that should Islamists 
ever gain strength in Tunisia, women would take to the 
streets to thwart any attempts to limit their freedom. 
 
¶9. (C) Comment (cont'd): The dinner confirmed that the 
greatest fear across all levels of Tunisian society is the 
power of the GOT itself.  All guests cited examples of the 
expansive, punitive powers of government authorities. 
However, when asked by A/S Welch to name the specific red 
lines set by the GOT, even these comparatively outspoken 
interlocutors were visibly reluctant to voice what they all 
knew.  After A/S Welch repeated the question for a third 
time, a political science professor finally blurted, "you 
cannot challenge the President, his family, or the police." 
Met with silence, he quickly added that any public criticism 
of Islam was also strictly taboo.  Relieved of this slight 
changes of subject, other immediately retorted, "but you 
could criticize religion privately, just not on TV or in 
public." End Comment. 
HUDSON