VZCZCXRO0754
OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHNH RUEHPB
DE RUEHKO #1566/01 0830834
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 240834Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0127
INFO RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 7936
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 8452
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 6486
RUESLE/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 2019
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 5952
RHMFISS/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
RUYNAAC/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 001566 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT PASS USTR FOR CUTLER/NEUFFER/BEEMAN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2031 
TAGS: PREL ASEAN APEC ETRD CH IN RS JA
SUBJECT: MOFA UPDATE ON EAST ASIA SUMMIT DEVELOPMENTS 
 
TOKYO 00001566  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer.  Reasons:1.4(b/d). 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary:  In comments to the Embassy on March 22, 
our MOFA contact on regional integration averred that efforts 
to create an East Asian community would move ahead, even if 
progress is slow and unsteady.  He informally suggested that 
the United States might want to take advantage of Russia's 
efforts to become a member of the East Asian Summit (EAS) by 
telling ASEAN that the United States and Russia should be 
treated equally by both being made observers.  Concerned that 
Russian participation in the EAS would redound in China's 
favor, Japan is seeking U.S. involvement in the EAS to 
counter Beijing's growing influence in Asia.  End Summary. 
 
Road Toward an East Asian community 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C)  On March 22, MOFA Asian Affairs Bureau Regional 
Policy Director Takio Yamada reviewed upcoming developments 
in Asian regional integration with Embassy Tokyo political 
officer.  Looking beyond the second East Asia Summit 
scheduled for December, 2006, Yamada said a Joint Statement 
being prepared for the tenth anniversary of ASEAN Plus 3 
would be a major declaration on East Asian regionalism. 
Intended to provide a road map for community building, the 
Joint Statement will be issued in Singapore in 2007 and is 
already under preparation.  Yamada observed that while all of 
the goals of the Joint Statement may not be achieved, it 
should be watched carefully as it could greatly affect the 
future course of regional integration. 
 
¶3.  (C)  Yamada noted that among the most immediate questions 
needing to be addressed by the community building effort are: 
1) the relationship between ASEAN Plus 3 and the EAS; and 2) 
the relationship of the EAS to the United States.  Yamada 
opined that the Philippines, as host of the second EAS to be 
held in Cebu in December, was unlikely to make progress on 
major issues, but growing regional interdependence would, 
nonetheless, push forward Asian integration.  For that 
reason, he informally advised, the United States should 
consider how to deepen its involvement in the region and the 
EAS. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Alluding to the contest between Japan and China as 
to which grouping would lead regional integration, Yamada 
asserted that the momentum toward building an East Asian 
community would continue, whether the driving force was the 
EAS or ASEAN Plus 3.  While the United States understandably 
emphasizes the importance of APEC, he said, U.S. 
participation in APEC alone is insufficient to deal with the 
sub-currents of regional integration.  One way to increase 
U.S. engagement with Asia, Yamada suggested, was to become 
involved in the EAS.  Reasoning that the United States was 
unlikely to agree to cabinet-level involvement in the EAS, 
Yamada thought that the United States might want to consider 
seeking participation in the EAS as an observer at the Senior 
Officials Meeting (SOM)-level (Under Secretary). 
 
Observerships For Russia and the U.S.? 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C)  Pointing to the upcoming ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 
ministerial in July in Kuala Lumpur, Yamada said the annual 
ARF meeting might provide an opportunity for the United 
States to engage with the EAS.  He explained that Russia has 
continued to press for membership in the EAS and that a 
decision might come as early as the July ASEAN foreign 
ministers meeting in Kuala Lumpur.  Although Japan did not 
favor Russian membership, he opined that ASEAN would likely 
approve Moscow's entreaties to join the organization.  Noting 
that Indonesia President Yudhoyono would be visiting Moscow 
in June, he predicted that if Indonesia did not object to 
Russian membership in the EAS, it would be approved.  Yamada 
expressed concern that an invitation to Russia to join the 
EAS while Secretary Rice was in Kuala Lumpur for the ARF 
ministerial would upstage the United States and tangetially 
embarrass Japan.  Citing sensitivity on the part of some 
ASEAN countries to U.S. concerns, Yamada suggested that the 
United States could use this opportunity to press for 
observerships for both Russia and the United States on the 
basis of equal treatment. 
 
 
TOKYO 00001566  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
Objective is Countering China 
----------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C)  Yamada readily acknowledged that Russian involvement 
in the EAS, if not balanced by U.S. participation, would be 
inimical to Japanese interests.  While Russian influence in 
Southeast Asia is currently limited, Moscow is stepping up 
its regional activity.  Russia has proposed to make last 
year's Russia-ASEAN summit an annual event and Moscow has 
increased its weapons sales in Asia, he noted.  The danger to 
Japanese interests, Yamada said, is that Russian presence in 
the EAS may unwittingly help China fulfill its agenda for the 
region.  Japan brought India into the EAS to counter China, 
but Russian participation in the EAS would mitigate India's 
ability to counter China.  New Delhi's long-time relationship 
with Moscow would prevent India from standing up to China if 
Moscow joined with Beijing on EAS issues.  Moreover, Russian 
involvement in the EAS would play to China's strategy of 
diluting the EAS, Yamada observed, making ASEAN Plus 3 (where 
the PRC has a relatively stronger voice) the more effective 
grouping for directing the East Asian community. 
 
¶7.  (C)  Acting now while there is a temporary lull would 
enable the United States to gain a foothold in the EAS and to 
check Russian ambitions in Southeast Asia, Yamada continued. 
It would also enable the United States to build on the 
goodwill engendered by the 2005 U.S.-ASEAN summit.  He 
averred that the growing self-awareness of Asian nations 
would ensure continued movement toward an East Asian 
community and that Japan and the United States needed to stay 
engaged with the region in order to protect their interests. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶8.  (C)  Ever since China first proposed the EAS, Japan has 
strongly desired U.S. participation in the EAS for two 
reasons:  1) to help Japan counter China's growing influence 
in Southeast Asia, and 2) to keep Japan from having to choose 
between siding with its geographic neighbors or its 
security-treaty ally.  The Japanese are convinced that the 
march toward an East Asian community will proceed, albeit 
slowly and fitfully.  They cannot afford to be frozen out of 
Asia and so believe they must participate in the EAS.  Japan 
is greatly concerned about perceived Chinese ambitions for 
regional domination, and Tokyo feels it cannot prevent 
Beijing from taking charge of the regional community-building 
process on its own.  Although Japan succeeded in bringing 
India, Australia and New Zealand into the EAS, Japan will 
only feel confident that its interests are protected once the 
United States becomes a participant in the new grouping. 
 
Bio Note 
---------- 
 
¶9.  (C)  Yamada, who has been an excellent contact during the 
past several years while assigned to MOFA, will be 
transferred to New Delhi in April to head the Japanese 
embassy's political section.  Yamada knows South Asia well 
from his recent stint as Director of the Asian Affairs 
Bureau's Southwest Asia Division. 
SCHIEFFER