VZCZCXRO6189
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHMOS RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKO #1136/01 0620542
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 030542Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9304
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 001136 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR CHA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2016 
TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP IAEA JA IR ECON ENER PGOV
SUBJECT: JAPAN'S CONCERNS ABOUT IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM 
DOMINATE IRAN FM MOTTAKI'S MEETINGS IN TOKYO 
 
REF: TOKYO 1064 
 
Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer; Reasons 1.4(b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  Iranian Foreign Minister Mottaki met with FM 
Aso for two hours on February 27 and thirty minutes with PM 
Koizumi on the 28th.  The discussions focused primarily on 
the nuclear impasse but also covered a range of other 
bilateral issues.  During the meetings, FM Aso and PM Koizumi 
made it clear to Mottaki that Iran should comply with all 
IAEA regulations and resolutions and must stop its enrichment 
activities.  Mottaki stuck to Tehran's hardline and argued 
that Iran was responding to the current situation on the 
basis of "peace" and "justice" and cannot renounce its 
sovereign right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 
Mottaki said that there would be no "nuclear apartheid." 
Regarding the Russian proposal, Mottaki said that several 
outstanding "minor" issues remain including where it should 
take place, the time period, and participation in the scheme. 
 He also claimed Iran would not agree to prohibit all 
enrichment activities.  Tokyo is under the impression that 
Iran does not want the nuclear issue to be further discussed 
at the UNSC even though Tehran has publicly said Iran does 
not care.  Officials at MOFA feel it might be useful to 
re-look at the conversion issue in the future if Tehran were 
to accept the Russian proposal.  During the two days of 
meetings, Mottaki only referred to the issue of the Azadegan 
oil fields and Koizumi avoided the topic altogether. 
Mottaki's meeting with METI Minister Nikai was very brief and 
the lengthy discussion of the nuclear issue left no time for 
other economic topics.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) On March 1, EST M/C, POL Deputy and ESToff met with 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Disarmament, Non-Proliferation, 
and Science Bureau Director-General Takeshi Nakane at his 
request to receive a readout on Prime Minister Koizumi and 
Foreign Minister Aso's meetings with visiting Iranian Foreign 
Minister Manouchehr Mottaki.  Nakane reported that FM Aso met 
with Mottaki for two hours on February 27 and thirty minutes 
with PM Koizumi on the 28th.  The discussions focused 
primarily on the nuclear impasse but also covered a range of 
other bilateral issues.  During the meetings, FM Aso and PM 
Koizumi made it clear to Mottaki that Iran should comply with 
all IAEA regulations and resolutions and must stop its 
enrichment activities.  Japan hopes that negotiations based 
on the Russian proposal will offer a breakthrough to the 
impasse. 
 
¶3. (C) On February 27, Aso explained to Mottaki that the 
Japanese public is very sensitive to nuclear issues, 
understandingly, since it is the only country that has 
experienced a nuclear attack. Therefore, Japan is committed 
to strengthening the non-proliferation regime to ensure the 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy.  No one denies Iran the 
right to peaceful use of nuclear energy, but in order to 
exercise this right, Iran has to restore the international 
community's confidence.  Aso told Mottaki that Iran should 
take seriously the resolution adopted on February 4 by 27 
countries.  As long as Iran insists on conducting enrichment 
activities within its territory, it will be difficult to come 
to a resolution.  Japan hopes that negotiations based on the 
Russian proposal will offer a breakthrough to the impasse. 
Aso also stressed that Japan expected Iran to make a wise 
decision regarding enrichment activities and to come back 
into compliance with IAEA resolutions. 
 
¶4. (C) Mottaki said that Iran's enrichment activities are 
only for R&D purposes and on a laboratory scale.  Aso 
responded that Iran needs to understand that Japan does not 
see an essential difference between laboratory scale and 
full-scale commercial activities.  Mottaki said that Iran has 
been a member of the NPT for thirty years and that Tehran has 
been applying voluntary measures for quite some time.  The 
new government in Iran is responding to the current situation 
on the basis of "peace" and "justice" and cannot renounce its 
sovereign right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 
Mottaki said that there would be no "nuclear apartheid." 
 
¶5. (C) Regarding the Russian proposal, Mottaki said that 
several outstanding "minor" issues remain including where it 
should take place, the time period, and participation in the 
scheme.  Iran will not stop its enrichment activities as this 
is something that the central authorities have already 
decided and is a policy the Iranian people support.  Mottaki 
told Aso that it was not good to use the Security Council as 
a tool to create threats against Iran. 
 
TOKYO 00001136  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶6. (C) Nakane told EST M/C that both FM Aso and he were under 
the impression that Iran does not want the nuclear issue to 
be further discussed at the UNSC even though Tehran has 
publicly said Iran does not care.  Nakane said that Iran is 
still negotiating with the Russians, but that he was not too 
optimistic on the outcome.  Nakane did not see any signs of a 
policy shift in Iranian thinking.  In the discussions, 
Mottaki gave the impression that Iran would be able to agree 
with the Russian proposal on the joint-venture project. 
However, in response to a question from FM Aso, Mottaki 
clarified that this does not mean that Iran would suspend its 
enrichment R&D efforts.  In Iran's view, the Russian joint 
venture would be additional, rather than a replacement for 
Iranian enrichment. 
 
¶7. (C) Nakane told EST M/C that most of what Mottaki said at 
the meetings was already known to Tokyo, but that there was 
one new point.  Iran had previously said that enrichment 
activities in Russia could be carried out for two years.  Aso 
said that this was too short of a period of time, and that it 
should continue for five to six years.  Mottaki responded 
that this was unacceptable and that the two-year period would 
not work because Tehran would have to consider a new formula 
that would carry Iran through until the next reactor was 
built.  (Note: Under the proposed agreement with Russia, 
Iranian scientists would be trained in Russia on enrichment 
techniques and Iranian fuel would be enriched in Russian 
facilities for a set period of time; the work would then 
transfer to facilities in Iran.  In this case, Aso is arguing 
in favor of the activities staying in Russia for a 
significantly longer period of time than the Iranians.  End 
Note.) 
 
¶8. (C) During the subsequent thirty minute meeting with 
Koizumi, Mottaki played up the importance of the 
Japanese-Iranian relationship and tried to connect with the 
Japanese PM by talking about his time as Iranian Ambassador 
to Japan from 1995 to 1999.  Koizumi responded that the 
relationship between the two countries was important not only 
in the area of oil, but also in regard to Iran's potential to 
play a constructive role in the Middle East peace process. 
Koizumi then went into a lengthy discussion of how Japan was 
in the past defeated in a war in which Japan fought against 
the rest of the world.  He said that Japan now regrets the 
decisions that led up to that war and that Tokyo would never 
again be isolated from the international community.  Koizumi 
said that the international community is closely watching the 
Iranian nuclear situation and counseled Tehran to make a wise 
decision.  Mottaki told Koizumi that he would convey this 
message to his superiors in Iran. 
 
¶9. (C) In response to a question, Nakane told EST M/C that 
Mottaki only referred to the issue of the Azadegan oil fields 
and that Koizumi avoided the topic altogether.  He confirmed 
that Mottaki did not offer any deals to Tokyo regarding the 
fields. 
 
¶10. (C) Nakane referenced a message from Victor Cha of the 
NSC received by the Japanese Embassy in Washington, in which 
Cha had said Japan should make it clear to Iran that Tehran 
must stop its enrichment and conversion activities in 
Esfahan.  Nakane explained that the EU3 and President Bush 
had both said they support the Russian proposal, which allows 
activities up to conversion but not enrichment.  Nakane 
perceived some inconsistency between Cha's message and the 
President's.  He said that he was not sure if an Iranian 
agreement would be reached on the Russian proposal, but 
explained that the GOJ feels that if it is reached, then it 
would be wise to reopen the issue of conversion activities. 
Nakane underscored that he understood that the United States 
could not accept such a position now, but explained that he 
personally felt it might be useful to re-look at the 
conversion issue in the future.  (Note: We do not know the 
content of the message passed from the NSC to the Japanese 
embassy in Washington.  There may have been some 
misunderstanding of what Cha was saying, or some mix-up in 
communication between Japan's embassy in Washington and 
Tokyo.  This is a point worth clarifying.  For our part, we 
confirmed that the President has gone on record as supporting 
the Russian proposal.  End Note.) 
 
¶11. (C) Nakane concluded the meeting by saying that he had 
recently talked to his counterpart Anatoly Antonov in Russia, 
who had told him very clearly that Moscow would not allow 
enrichment activities within the territory of Iran.  Antonov 
 
TOKYO 00001136  003 OF 003 
 
 
said that Russia would neither agree to negotiate 
indefinitely nor go forward in the negotiations with the goal 
of defending Iran. 
 
¶12. (C) According to MOFA's Second Middle East Division's 
Koichi Nakao, who interpreted at the Koizumi and Aso 
meetings, press reports that the Aso meeting was a tense 
"exchange of barbs" were inaccurate.  Nakao described Aso as 
delivering a strong message that Iran's behavior risked 
isolating it from the international community, and said 
Mottaki replied by promising to pass the message back to 
Tehran, but added that while the tone was serious, at no time 
did it stray from an atmosphere of cordiality.  Even as Aso 
continued to press for Iran to give up its enrichment program 
and Mottaki continued to claim the right to enrich on Iranian 
soil was a red line Tehran would not give up, Nakao said the 
dialogue remained "a discussion between friends." 
 
¶13. (C) Nobuyori Kodaira, Director-General of METI's Agency 
for Natural Resources and Energy, told EMIN that the meeting 
between METI Minister Nikai and Mottaki was very brief and 
that the lengthy discussion of the nuclear issue left no time 
for economic topics.  During the discussion Nikai reminded 
Mottaki of Japan's unique position as the only country ever 
to have experienced a nuclear bombing and went on to ask that 
Iran work with the international community to seek a solution 
to the Iran's nuclear development plans.  Mottaki mentioned 
Japan's investment in the Azadegan field but time did not 
allow for a discussion of the issue.  (Note:  according to a 
British Embassy contact, MOFA instructed Nikai to discuss 
only the nuclear issue during the Minister's meeting with 
Mottaki.  End Note.) 
SCHIEFFER