VZCZCXRO0919
RR RUEHAO
DE RUEHTC #0642/01 0831340
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 241340Z MAR 06 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5208
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 1645
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 0140
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0607
RUEHGE/AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN 1135
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ 0410
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 0801
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0143
RUEHAO/AMCONSUL CURACAO 0221
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 0033

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 000642 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2011 
TAGS: PREL MARR PGOV BL CU CO NT VE NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS: CONCERN SIMMERS OVER VENEZUELAN 
INTENTIONS 
 
REF: THE HAGUE 528 
 
THE HAGUE 00000642  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: Political Officer Ted Burkhalter; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d 
). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: WHA PDAS Charles Shapiro met March 15 with 
Dutch MFA, Interior, MOD and military intelligence officials. 
 The Dutch message was consistent.  The GONL is deeply 
concerned about developments in Venezuela - its neighbor - 
but does not currently see a direct military threat to the 
Netherlands Antilles and Aruba.  Colombian paramilitary 
demobilization, counter-narcotics, gangs and the future of 
Cuba are all on the Dutch radar screen.  End summary. 
 
Venezuela and the Netherlands Antilles: Tempered concern 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶2. (C) GONL officials consistently expressed dismay over the 
direction President Hugo Chavez is taking Venezuela. 
According to MFA Director General for Political Affairs (P 
equivalent) Hugo Siblesz, the GONL is "quite aware" of 
developments in Venezuela and is not pleased.  Its concern, 
however, focuses on the Dutch islands.  Foreign Minister Bot 
has been trying unsuccessfully for six months to arrange a 
meeting with Chavez, to warn him not to trifle with the 
Netherlands Antilles and Aruba.  The Dutch ambassador in 
Caracas had to wait eight months, before presenting his 
credentials on March 15.  Nonetheless, most civilian 
officials expressed confidence that, as long as the islands 
are part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Venezuela will 
keep at arm's length.  They were encouraged by the results of 
January's local elections in the Antilles, where pro-Chavez 
politicians were thoroughly trounced. 
 
¶3. (C) Dutch military intelligence analysts were more 
cautious, saying Venezuelan political activity in the 
Antilles remains a major concern.  They felt that the 
constitutional reform process, now underway, could create 
opportunities for Chavez to meddle.  As Ministry of Interior 
officials made clear, Dutch attitudes toward Curacao's and 
St. Maarten's aspirations for increased autonomy are 
hardening.  If the islands want more autonomy, they are going 
to have to develop the capacity to enforce customs, 
immigration and judicial standards.  Moreover, there is a 
growing feeling within the Dutch parliament that some core 
governance functions need to revert to Dutch control.  This 
could cause difficulties, that Chavez could seek to exploit. 
 
EU weapons sales to Chavez: Normal replacement cycle 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶4. (C) GONL officials were satisfied that Venezuelan 
purchases of rifles, aircraft and maritime vessels are 
innocuous.  Military intelligence analysts said Venezuelan 
plans to purchase 100,000 rifles pre-date Chavez, and the 
purchase of aircraft is part of a normal replacement cycle. 
The analysts added that patrol vessels, to be sold by the 
Spanish parastatal Navantia, are primarily of a 
counter-narcotics and coastal patrol nature.  Ambassador 
Shapiro noted that Guyana police officials have already 
complained of criminals obtaining old, discarded Venezuelan 
rifles.  Moreover, he said, any Venezuelan arms procurement 
risks worrying the Colombians and distracting them from 
pressing internal issues.  (Note: The MFA informed us on 
March 21 that the GONL has blocked the proposed sale of some 
Dutch-made shipboard weapons systems to Venezuela.  Others 
were approved, and at least one request is pending.  We have 
requested details.  On assault rifles, we are not certain the 
plans to purchase the rifles do indeed pre-date Chavez.  End 
note.) 
 
¶5. (C) Marion Kappeyne van de Coppello, Director of the MFA 
Western Hemisphere Department, emphasized the GONL's hard 
line on submarine sales.  She speculated that Dutch 
opposition may have played a key role in the French decision, 
last week, not to sell Scorpene class attack submarines to 
the Venezuelan Navy. 
 
¶6. (C) Defense Staff officials (JCS equivalent) said that, 
although the Venezuelans are clearly engaged in a build-up, 
the scale does not indicate that Chavez has aggressive 
intentions.  Ambassador Shapiro agreed that Venezuela does 
 
THE HAGUE 00000642  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
not pose a serious military threat to the Antilles and Aruba 
at this time.  He said, though, that Chavez clearly intends 
to develop force projection capabilities in the Caribbean. 
 
Colombian paramilitary demobilization: funds needed 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶7. (SBU) The GONL is heavily involved in Colombian 
paramilitary demobilization and reintegration.  MFA's Siblesz 
and Kappeyne were concerned, however, that the U.S. funding 
bottleneck could harm the program.  Demobilized fighters, 
with no jobs or training, are already "recycling" and 
returning to violence.  The GONL has overcome heavy domestic 
and EU criticism about the program, and it takes particular 
pride in having led the way within the EU. 
 
Counter-narcotics 
----------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Kappeyne stressed the importance of 
counter-narcotics in theDutch approach to Latin America. 
She reported god working level cooperation with the 
Venezuelanson this issue.  In Colombia, the GONL has just 
prvided $77,000 toward the UNODCP's coca production urvey 
and is interested in manual eradication prgrams (reftel). 
 
Gangs and crime 
-------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Gangs, and crime in general, are als major Dutch 
concerns.  The Spanish have suggeste The Netherlands, the UK 
and France cooperate onthe problem.  MFA DG for Political 
Affairs Siblez felt that this could be used to enhance EU 
intrest in the region and to redirect EU attention frm 
purely economic concerns. 
 
Cuba: Post-Castro ransition 
---------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C On Cuba, Kappeyne said that neither EU engagementnor 
U.S. isolation has produced results.  Ambassdor Shapiro 
noted that we are focused on the futre, and that our policy 
aims to ensure that thereis a transition in Cuba is to 
democracy, rather han a succession from one communist regime 
to anther.  He added that Chavez's strategic goal is jut 
the oppositie and that he is using his oil revnue to 
sunbsidize Cuba. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) The Dutch do not see eye to eye with the U.S on 
every issue, but they have been useful in braking Spain's 
lock on EU Latin American policy. They breathed a sigh of 
relief after Chavez's alies were mauled in the local 
elections in the Antlles but remain alert.  Their concerns 
extend tothe PDVSA-operated refinery in Curacao, the larges 
single non-tourism employer on the island, and hell's 
problems with the GOV.  On Colombia, The etherlands has been 
a leader in providing assistace to the GOC demobilization 
and reintegration pogram and has brought along Sweden. 
Frin Minister Bot will visit Peru, Bolivia and Chile March 
27, 28 and 29, respectively, and then join Queen Beatrix in 
Argentina for a March 30 - April 1 state visit.  Coordination 
with The Netherlands in The Hague, Washington and in other 
capitals will continue to pay dividends. 
 
¶12. (U) This cable has been cleared by PDAS Shapiro. 
HUFF