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FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
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RUEHAO/AMCONSUL CURACAO PRIORITY 0219
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 0256

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 000528 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR WHA/FO (C. SHAPIRO) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/09/2011 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR VE NT NL
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR WHA PDAS SHAPIRO'S VISIT TO THE 
NETHERLANDS 
 
REF: A) STATE 37476 B) 05 THE HAGUE 1556 
 
Classified By: Political Officer Ted Burkhalter; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d 
). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Your visit comes at a time when GONL concern 
about Venezuela is growing.  You could use this opportunity 
to press the Dutch to actively campaign against Venezuela's 
UNSC bid, and to help ensure a stronger EU response toward 
Venezuelan human rights and weapons procurement activities. 
On Colombia, the Dutch have been helpful and are considering 
future Dutch security sector reform activity.  Be prepared to 
discuss Venezuela, Colombia, and regional issues, including 
recent and upcoming elections.  End summary. 
 
Netherlands Antilles and Aruba 
------------------------------ 
 
¶2. (U) You will meet with Kingdom Affairs Director, of the 
Ministry of Interior, Drs. van Craiikamp.  She will discuss 
the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba, which constitute the 
primary Dutch national interests in the Caribeean and South 
America.  Their combined population of 290,000 has strong 
cultural and family ties to Venezuela.  However, as 
demonstrated in the January Antillean elections, where 
pro-Chavez parties did extremely poorly, there is very little 
political interest in closer ties to Venezuela. 
 
¶3. (U) The Netherlands Antilles entered inter-Kingdom 
discussions in November 2005 on constitutional reforms.  The 
talks should conclude sometime in 2007 or 2008.  Popular 
expectations in the islands are that they will result in 
increased autonomy similar to that of Aruba.  The Dutch would 
like to see immigration and repatriation addressed. 
Delinquent Antillean youth living in The Netherlands have 
created crime problems in major cities like Rotterdam, and 
laws have already been passed facilitating the expulsion of 
unemployed or out-of-school youth.  The Dutch parliament has 
become concerned about the administration of finances and the 
justice system in the Netherlands Antilles and is pressing 
for increased control. 
 
¶4. (C) In Aruba, the Dutch are concerned about lax 
administration of customs and immigration.  Interior Minister 
Pechtold visited earlier this year and privately informed 
local officials that, if procedures were not tightened up, 
the Dutch government might exercise its prerogative to 
intercede. 
 
Venezuela and the Islands 
------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) The GONL is concerned about Chavez's intentions toward 
the islands.  The MFA tends to prefer engagement, in order 
not to provoke Chavez.  The military, including Defense 
Minister Kamp, take a harder line.  Kamp told parliament on 
March 9 that Chavez "casts big eyes on the morsels along the 
coast of Venezuela that form part of the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands." 
 
Military Exercises 
------------------ 
 
¶6. (C) The Ministry of Defense, after substantial GONL 
review, was allowed to ramp up its Caribbean Lion exercise, 
which now includes an amphibious landing with three U.S. 
warships.  Likewise, the Dutch, after lengthy hand-wringing, 
agreed to allow the aircraft carrier USS George Washington to 
make a port call in St. Maarten, following our Partnership of 
the Americas exercises.  Although we would have preferred a 
carrier port call to Curacao, we see this as a positive step. 
 Smaller ships will visit Aruba and Curacao. 
 
¶7. (C) We have invited Dutch F-16s to participate in the 
Partnership of the Americas exercises but have not received a 
response.  You might also raise the Antilles and Aruba SOFA, 
stressing that we are ready to move forward on a long-term 
agreement. 
 
¶8. (C) The GONL shares our concern regarding Venezuela's 
growing ties with both Iran and Cuba, and they are concerned 
about the GOV's departure from democratic and human rights 
norms.  The GONL does not want to see Venezuela obtain a UN 
Security Council seat, and you might ask them to play a 
stronger role in convincing other European countries to 
oppose the Venezuelan bid. 
 
¶9. (C) The GONL opposes submarine sales to Venezuela but does 
 
THE HAGUE 00000528  002 OF 002 
 
 
not believe that the GOV is at this time making a serious 
procurement effort.  The Dutch would be concerned by a 
serious procurement effort, and they have assured us that 
they would then be willing to press the issue vigorously 
within the EU.  The GONL does not share our concern about 
small arms purchases to the Venezuelans, so you may wish to 
stress the destabilizing aspects of small arms sales to date. 
 
Colombia 
-------- 
 
¶10. (C) The GONL has warm relations with Colombia and 
respects President Uribe.  The MFA's new Security Sector 
Reform task force is exploring possibilities for eventual SSR 
projects there.  Keeping in mind that Dutch SSR resources are 
currently focused on Africa, Iraq, Afghanistan and parts of 
the Balkans, you may want to at least welcome the interest in 
Colombia.  The Dutch have just agreed to fund a $77,000 
shortfall for the completion of the UN Office of Drug Control 
Policy's coca production survey in Colombia. 
 
Regional Issues 
--------------- 
 
¶11. (C) Regionally, the Dutch are likely to raise Cuba, 
particularly ways in which the Dutch can assist in keeping 
open the channels of communication.  On Bolivia, Foreign 
Minister Bot had a good meeting in January with Evo Morales. 
The two discussed at length the possibilities for Dutch 
technical assistance in natural gas exploration and 
exploitation.  Bot stressed to Morales the importance of not 
imitating Chavez's anti-Americanism.  Morales, according to 
the MFA, came off as "potentially" reasonable and 
level-headed.  Finally, the Dutch will want to discuss recent 
and upcoming Latin American elections. 
 
¶12. (C) The MFA does not intend to raise Guantanamo, but you 
should be prepared.  Bot has parlayed much parliamentary 
criticism, by assuring PMs that he raises this issue with us 
at every opportunity.  His subordinates have also 
consistently mentioned it to USG visitors and embassy 
officers. 
ARNALL