This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 09 TEL AVIV 000922 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR S/CT COORDINATOR AMB. CRUMPTON AND NEA/IPA (MAHER) 
PENTAGON FOR OSD ISRAEL DESK OFFICER ANDERSON 
TREASURY FOR PATRICK HEFFERNAN 
UNVIE FOR CD DELEGATION 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2016 
TAGS: PREL PTER PINR PINS PGOV KPAL KWBG ASEC EG JO IS COUNTERTERRORISM GOI EXTERNAL ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS
SUBJECT: U.S.-ISRAEL JOINT COUNTERTERRORISM GROUP (JCG) 
MEETING, FEBRUARY 22, 2006 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones.  Reasons: 1.4 (b, d). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1. (C) On February 22, the Israeli MFA hosted the latest 
session of the U.S.-Israel Joint Counterterrorism Group (JCG) 
-- the prior one having occurred over a year and a half 
earlier.  The Israeli side stressed the importance it placed 
on the JCG's resumption (following the January meeting of the 
Joint POL-MIL Group (JPMG) and the November 2005 Strategic 
Dialogue) within the framework of U.S.-Israel bilateral 
relations.  The MFA rolled out its experts on terrorism and 
terror finance to brief on HAMAS and the new political 
challenge it poses, the continued threat posed by Hizballah, 
the situations in Syria and Lebanon, the multilateral 
approach to counterterrorism (CT), legal aspects of CT, and 
the MANPAD threat.  The Directorate of Military Intelligence 
provided its assessments on terrorist threats to Israel and 
on the Global Jihad.  Israel's National Security Council was 
represented by Deputy NSA Daniel Arditi, who co-chaired the 
Israeli side with the MFA's new Deputy Director General for 
Strategic Affairs, Ambassador Miriam Ziv. 
 
¶2. (C) The U.S. side, led by State Counterterrorism 
Coordinator Ambassador Henry Crumpton, made presentations on 
terror finance, safehavens, and the future of the Technical 
Support Working Group (TSWG).  The two sides agreed on a set 
of action items (para. 22) and agreed to hold the next JCG 
session in six months.  The plenary session of the JCG was 
followed by a full day of panel discussions at the NSC on 
February 23, and a meeting with the director of Military 
Intelligence (septels).  END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------- 
ISRAEL PREPARING FOR GLOBAL JIHAD 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Israeli MFA Deputy Director General Miriam Ziv opened 
the plenary session by making the following points: 
 
¶A. Israel believes that terrorism needs to be dealt with at 
the international, regional and national level.  On the 
national level, Israel is disturbed by HAMAS's entry into 
politics.  More needs to be done to raise public awareness 
about the phenomenon of terrorist groups using politics to 
achieve their agendas. 
 
¶B. Israel is reaching out to other countries on the subject 
of counterterrorism.  It is discussing the legal aspects of 
counterterrorism with India, and will soon discuss the matter 
with China. 
 
¶4. (C) Deputy National Security Adviser Daniel Arditi 
identified the three main threats facing Israel as HAMAS, 
Hizballah and the Global Jihad.  Arditi said he spends more 
than 50 percent of his time trying to understand the Global 
Jihad, and that Israel needs assistance from the U.S. on this 
issue. 
 
¶5. (C) Ambassador Crumpton referred the Israeli side to 
Secretary Rice's Georgetown University speech on 
 
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transformational diplomacy, underscoring her point that the 
regional approach is vital in combating the formation of 
terrorist safehavens in border areas.  Crumpton suggested 
that more thought needs to be given to how countries measure 
success in fighting al-Qa'ida and Hizballah. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
ASCENDANT HAMAS REACHING OUT FOR LEGITIMACY 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Israeli MFA Strategic and Economic Affairs Bureau Head 
Daniel Kutner said the following about HAMAS and the current 
political situation: 
 
¶A. HAMAS's victory in the January 25 Palestinian Legislative 
Council elections was the continuation of a five-year trend 
on the Palestinian side, in which the masses impose strategic 
choices on the Palestinian Authority (PA) leadership.  This 
trend threatens to undo the Oslo achievements of the 1990s. 
The Palestinian electorate elected HAMAS to power, knowing 
that it would have an adverse impact on Palestinian relations 
with Israel and the peace process. 
 
¶B. The rise of political Islam in the Middle East and failure 
by Fatah and PA Chairman Abu Mazen to lead the Palestinians 
were the main reasons behind HAMAS' ascendancy. 
 
¶C. HAMAS will continue to seek legitimacy through contact 
with foreign governments, and to secure foreign aid.  HAMAS 
will make tactical adjustments, as necessary, without 
sacrificing its long-term, basic aim of recovering Palestine 
in its entirety, or altering its worldview that sees Israel 
as the oppressor, and the Palestinians as victims.  HAMAS 
leaders have already visited Egypt, Turkey and Iran, and will 
visit Russia in the near future.  HAMAS leaders are not 
necessarily receiving high-level attention during the visits, 
but are not "paying a political price" for their visits, 
either. 
 
¶D. In Israel's view, HAMAS seems intent on (1) forming a 
broad coalition government so that it will be able to assign 
blame for failures to other coalition members; and (2) 
keeping a weak Abu Mazen in his position.  While HAMAS's 
political program appears to be based on a long-term 
continuation of the 2005 cease-fire (hudna), it is not 
speaking about the permanent end to conflict or recognition 
of a Jewish state, and is reinforcing its own military 
capabilities and consolidating power.  HAMAS wants to keep a 
tight leash on Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and other 
radical terrorist groups. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
HIZBALLAH ADAPTING, USING POLITICS AS A TOOL 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) On Hizballah, Kutner said the following: 
 
¶A. Hizballah is adapting its strategic concept to changes in 
the international environment that are working against it. 
(He cited, as changes, Iran's "collision course" with the 
international community, increased international pressure on 
Syria, and Israel's disengagement from Gaza). 
 
¶B. Hizballah still wants to preserve its jihadist nature and 
thus continues to coordinate with Iran and Syria. 
 
¶C. Hizballah joined the Lebanese government in order to 
influence it from within in a step-by-step way.  It wants to 
form a coalition that will prevent the implementation of 
UNSCR 1559. 
 
¶D. Hizballah has "vigorously" renewed its activities along 
the Lebanon-Israel border, and continues to claim credit for 
Israel's withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000. 
 
¶8. (C) Kutner added that Israel's assessment is that the 
election of a new Lebanese president could cause a nationwide 
crisis as it forces pro- and anti-Hizballah forces to clash 
with one another. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
SYRIA WEAK BUT STILL SPONSORING TERROR 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) On Syria, Kutner said the following: 
 
¶A. President Bashar al-Assad's regime is under no serious 
internal threat, even though his personal position has 
weakened.  Bashar al-Assad will not be personally weakened as 
a result of the UN's investigation into the Hariri 
assassination.  This is especially so as chief investigator 
Mehlis has been replaced. 
 
¶B. Syria is coordinating closely with Iran in the wake of 
HAMAS's victory in January 2005 Palestinian Legislative 
Council elections.  (NOTE:  Ambassador Ziv added that the 
Israeli press reported earlier in the day claims that the 
Iranians told HAMAS that they will finance terrorist attacks 
against Israel.  END NOTE.) 
 
¶C. Syria's relations with HAMAS are excellent.  Palestinian 
Islamic Jihad (PIJ) is controlled out of Damascus. 
 
------------------------------------- 
REVIEW OF TERRORIST THREATS TO ISRAEL 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) An Israeli Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) 
representative said the following about terrorist threats to 
Israel: 
 
¶A. Hizballah presents a multi-layered threat.  It is a threat 
to Lebanon's internal stability.  It is behind an "ongoing 
confrontation" along Israel's northern border.  It has 
deployed activities around the globe -- including to distant 
places like Argentina.  It is developing strategic 
capabilities, an example of which is its work with UAVs.  It 
assists the Palestinians in their conflict with Israel by 
supporting local Palestinian cells with finances, know-how 
and encouragement.  Deputy NSA General Arditi claimed that in 
2005, the five main terrorist attacks in Israel were 
supported by Hizballah, which he said sent the money for the 
attacks into Israel through Lebanon.  Arditi warned that, as 
a result of disengagement, Hizballah and HAMAS now have more 
maneuvering space in the Gaza Strip. 
 
¶B. The factors shaping the terrorist threat against Israel 
include disengagement, the cease-fire (tadiyah), Palestinian 
elections, and Israeli CT policy.  Disengagement has led to a 
reduction in the number of terrorist attacks.  The 
terrorists' modus operandi has not changed, however, and they 
continue to fire artillery and Kassam rockets from the Gaza 
Strip, and send out suicide bombers from the West Bank. 
HAMAS restrained itself in 2005 in accordance with the 
cease-fire, but is regrouping for the "next phase of 
operations," and is improving its weapons.  PIJ is leading 
the attacks against Israel now, and is trying to create a 
"jihadist front" during what PIJ terms, "the appeasement 
phase."  The PIJ often responds to IDF actions in the Gaza 
Strip by attacking from the West Bank, and vice-versa.  It is 
upgrading the quality of its explosives and weapons.  (NOTE: 
The DMI briefer said that the notion that Katyusha rockets 
have entered the Gaza Strip remains unverified.  Arditi said 
he does not believe the Palestinians have MANPADS or 
Katyushas.  END NOTE.) 
 
¶C. Israel is concerned about smuggling on its southern 
border.  The Egyptian border guard forces are slowly 
deploying to the Egypt-Gaza border, but Israel expects that 
smuggling into Israel and Gaza will be allowed to reach a 
certain level.  (NOTE:  Arditi admitted that Israel has seen 
some improvement in how the Egyptians have controlled the 
border over the last few months.  He nevertheless requested 
that the USG tell Egypt that it expects Egypt to tighten up 
security along its border with Gaza and Israel.  END NOTE.) 
The main smuggling route is from Gaza to Egypt to Israel. 
Israel is concerned that tons of TNT and thousands of rifles 
will be smuggled into Gaza from Egypt.  Israel is afraid that 
HAMAS now has an "open route" to Egypt.  The DMI assesses 
that the Bedouin "are heavily involved" in smuggling all 
types of items into Israel.  The Egyptians have neglected the 
Bedouin in the Sinai, and have allowed them to form 
connections with terrorist groups.  (NOTE:  Arditi said that 
he is certain that Bedouin were involved in the terrorist 
attacks on Taba and Sharm-el-Sheik.  He said that he does not 
believe that HAMAS is involved in terrorist attacks in the 
Sinai.  END NOTE.) 
 
-------------------------- 
REVIEW OF THE GLOBAL JIHAD 
-------------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) The DMI presenter switched to a presentation on the 
Global Jihad, saying: 
 
¶A. The Global Jihad relies on globally-positioned al-Qa'ida 
cells that are strictly organized and operated by committees. 
 As examples, he claimed that the Pakistan-Afghanistan border 
is operated by al-Qa'ida's "internal unit", and that an 
"external unit" -- led by Hamza Rambia until his death last 
year -- runs global operations.  (NOTE:  The DMI presenter 
said Israel believes the last attacks run by the external 
unit were the London bombings, and that the unit will recover 
from Rambia's death.  END NOTE.)  The third layer consists of 
local organizations.  Since 9/11, four to six of these local 
organizations -- including Jemaah Islamiya and the Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) -- have enlarged their agendas 
to hit Western targets. 
 
¶B. The Global Jihad also enjoys support from local-level 
terrorist elements that operate in the name of Global Jihad 
without formal connections to al-Qa'ida  These groups 
radicalize disenfranchised Muslim communities in Europe.  One 
such group was behind the Madrid bombing.  Israel sees these 
kinds of groups active in the Netherlands and the U.S.  The 
DMI presenter claimed that one unspecified group worked with 
local gangs in California to attack military bases and 
synagogues in the U.S. 
 
¶C. All the elements of the Global Jihad are being directed by 
the al-Qa'ida leadership located in the border region between 
Pakistan and Afghanistan.  The Global Jihad has developed 
well-oiled logistical networks for recruiting and the raising 
and transfer of funds.  Activists are being sent across 
borders, to places like Casablanca (where they launched a 
terrorist attack in May 2003) and Iraq.  The DMI presenter 
added that Iraq now exports terrorism. 
 
¶D. Israel does not know what Usama Bin Ladin's health 
situation is like, but believes his power has diminished, 
while the power of Ayman al-Zawahiri and Zarqawi has 
increased.  Zawahiri is physically located with the al-Qa'ida 
leadership and controls the organization.  Zarqawi is farther 
afield but enjoys glory as a fighter.  Both de-facto leaders 
are focused on the Middle East and are bent on toppling 
governments in the region and destroying Israel. 
 
¶E. The following affects al-Qa'ida's operations:  the 
situation in Iraq; the growing terrorist threat to Jordan, 
Egypt and the Sinai; and what the briefer cited as the 
relative freedom the Palestinians enjoy as a result of 
disengagement and the cease-fire.  The DMI presenter claimed 
that Palestinians within the territories are now trying to 
establish contacts with "jihadists" via the Internet, and 
that "many Palestinians in Gaza" are claiming they work for 
al-Qa'ida  The DMI presenter said that DMI has not yet found 
connections between al-Qa'ida and the terrorist attacks in 
the Sinai in 2005, but believes it eventually will. 
 
¶F. Cooperation between Palestinians in refugee camps in 
Lebanon and terrorists in Iraq -- and the role of "Lebanese 
infrastructure" in the struggle for Iraq -- are growing. 
Syria is now a main transit country, and Israel is worried 
that the Muslim Brotherhood there will grow in power as 
Bashar al-Assad's regime weakens.  Israel is concerned that 
the fall of a moderate Arab regime will boost the Global 
Jihad's influence worldwide.  Israel expects to see more 
regular attacks in the years ahead -- attacks that cross 
borders, that inflict massive destruction ("mega-attacks"), 
and which involve foreigners who are not necessarily 
suspicious looking.  (NOTE:  Ambassador Ziv expressed concern 
that HAMAS and Hizballah's direct links to Iran and Syria 
raise the potential of their acquisition of WMD.  Arditi said 
that Israel does not see HAMAS and Hizballah showing any 
intention of obtaining WMD.  END NOTE.) 
 
¶12. (C) Ambassador Crumpton said that the USG sees Iran 
increasingly providing technical support and training to the 
perpetrators of IED attacks in southern Iraq.  He noted the 
danger of a "trifecta" emerging in Lebanon that would involve 
Hizballah, Palestinian rejectionist groups, and groups linked 
to al-Qa'ida.  He noted that foreign fighters entering Iraq 
tend to die there, and that those who do leave usually become 
demoralized. 
 
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U.S. PRESENTATIONS ON TERRORIST SAFEHAVENS AND FINANCE 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶13. (C) U.S. National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) 
Representative Gershon Kieval presented for the U.S. side a 
briefing on terrorist safehavens, highlighting the following: 
 
¶A. Congress requires the U.S. intelligence community to 
report annually on terrorist safehavens around the world. 
There are many views on what a "terrorist safehaven" 
constitutes.  The authors of the annual report to Congress 
consider safehavens as areas where concentrations of 
terrorists operate with relative security.  Safehavens can be 
found in countries where ineffective governments exist, or 
where governments sanction terrorists; in ungoverned areas; 
and in areas that could become sanctuaries for terrorists 
with very little difficulty. 
 
¶B. Based on terms of reference used, the authors have 
identified the following countries as safehavens:  Iraq, 
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, 
Yemen, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Somalia. 
 
¶C. In addition, the report notes that safehavens also exist 
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the Sahel region in Africa, 
and the tri-border area in Latin America.  Kieval said that 
analysts believe that Turkey and Bangladesh could become 
safehavens if the conditions change in those countries. 
 
¶14. (C) Deputy NSA Arditi said in response that Israel 
believes there may be a growing rivalry between Hizballah and 
al-Qa'ida in Lebanon.  Kieval replied that this would make 
sense, but that the U.S. has not seen evidence of this. 
 
¶15. (C) MFA Principal Deputy Legal Advisor Daniel Taub 
delivered the Israeli presentation on terror finance, making 
the following points: 
 
¶A. Israel is dissatisfied with the UK and French governments 
for not mustering the political will to enact legislation 
that would close two particular funds -- Interpal in the UK 
and CDSP in France -- that the Israelis claim are known 
sources of terror financing.  Israel believes that the 
willingness of British Jews to accept an out-of-court 
settlement of a private lawsuit against an Islamic fund in 
the UK has created the false impression that the British 
government has cracked down on terror financing there. 
¶B. Israel would like the U.S. to target a public diplomacy 
campaign at Western European countries to increase public 
awareness of terror financing emanating from their countries 
and support legislation to eradicate it. 
 
¶16. (C) Patrick Heffernan from the Treasury Department made 
the following points in his presentation: 
 
¶A. Treasury is frustrated with the inefficiency of the UN 
process as a tool to counter terrorism financing, and is 
trying a different tactic. 
 
¶B. The USG is now focusing on individual states that lack the 
national capabilities to comply with UN standards for 
countering terror financing, and will consider targeted 
financial sanctions against such states in an effort to 
achieve compliance. 
 
¶C. The USG has struggled to find levers to stop financial 
flows to HAMAS and Hizballah and welcomes Israeli suggestions 
for how the U.S. can better help. 
 
¶D. The USG is seeking willing partners to disrupt trade and 
financial flows to countries where Hizballah operates, 
particularly in South America and West Africa.  (NOTE:  The 
Israeli side responded by offering to cooperate on countries 
in South America and West Africa with vulnerable financial 
sectors that are being exploited by Hizballah.  END NOTE.) 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
MFA WANTS MORE ACTION IN THE MULTILATERAL APPROACH TO CT 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶17. (C) MFA Nonproliferation and Counterterrorism Department 
Director Yehuda Yaakov made the following points in his 
presentation on multilateral counterterrorism efforts: 
 
¶A. Israel sees terrorism proliferating, in much the same way 
as the WMD threat is proliferating.  Israel also sees a 
symbiotic relationship between state sponsors of terrorism 
and their terrorist proxies. 
 
¶B. The international community needs to confront both active 
and passive support for terrorists.  The passive area is more 
difficult to address.  Lebanon is an instructive example: 
The GOL acts against jihadists, but helps Hizballah.  Israel 
rejects this trade-off. 
 
¶C. With respect to the way ahead, the international community 
has a good road map in all the CT-related UNSCRs passed to 
date.  They need to be fully implemented.  That has not 
happened so far.  Israel believes that UN member states need 
to be called to task under Chapter 7 with respect to 
implementation of UNSCR 1373 on terrorist safehavens. 
 
¶D. There is plenty of discussion about terror finance, but no 
discussion about the "dawa" -- the social welfare 
infrastructure that HAMAS uses to facilitate terrorist 
attacks.  The dawa needs to be addressed. 
 
¶E. Incitement to violence must also be addressed. 
 
¶F. In Israel's view, there needs to be more of a coalition of 
like-minded nations and organizations arrayed against 
terrorism.  Israel supports the UN's Counterterrorism Action 
Group (CTAG), but is aware of an ongoing dispute between the 
CTAG and the UN's Counterterrorism Center (CTC).  It would 
help if the U.S. would "push the process in the right 
direction." 
 
¶G. Israel does not feel comfortable with passing information 
directly to the UN's al-Qa'ida Committee. 
¶18. (C) Ambassador Crumpton agreed that there is a leadership 
problem in the UN, but suggested that countries like Israel 
should help countries faltering on the CT front to identify 
problems and find solutions for them, rather than simply 
exhorting those countries to action and shaming them by 
"naming names." 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
MFA LEGAL ADVISER ON THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF CT 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶19. (C) Israeli MFA Principal Deputy Legal Advisor Daniel 
Taub highlighted the following in his presentation on the 
legal aspects of fighting terrorism: 
 
¶A. The laws Israel applies in fighting terrorism today were 
passed prior to Israel's independence in 1948, and in early 
¶1948. 
 
¶B. Israel's Ministry of Justice has a team that is looking 
into how other countries confront incitement.  The GOI feels 
the need to strike the right balance between freedom of 
speech and incitement. 
 
¶C. The Israeli Supreme Court is reviewing the legality of 
targeted killings, the security fence, and the "neighbor 
procedure" (whereby Palestinian neighbors are sent into a 
home in which a wanted Palestinian is hiding, with 
instructions to encourage the wanted person to surrender). 
 
¶D. Israel is a party to eight of the 12 UN counterterrorism 
conventions and protocols.  It is working hard to ratify the 
remaining UN CT protocols and conventions.  Israel has 
objections to the International Convention Against the Taking 
of Hostages, so it is unlikely that Israel will ratify that 
convention in the near future.  (NOTE:  Taub did not explain 
what Israel's objections were, but stated that they are very 
complex and have a long history behind them.  END NOTE.) 
 
¶E. Israel is concerned with Liechtenstein's addition to 
Article 18 on the Comprehensive Convention on International 
Terrorism.  Israel still has concerns about references in the 
convention's preamble to the "struggle with foreign 
occupation." 
 
¶F. The GOI would appreciate learning what the USG's position 
is on the international conference that Egypt is proposing in 
order to make headway on the Comprehensive Convention on 
International Terrorism. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
MANPADS: ISRAEL TO PROPOSE DISCUSSION OF AIRPORT SECURITY 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶20. (C) Israel MFA Arms Control Department Director Alon Bar 
made the following points on MANPADS: 
 
¶A. MANPADS offer terrorists an enormous, destructive 
capability at a low price.  Israel believes international 
awareness about the MANPAD threat needs to be raised.  The 
"costs" of transferring MANPADS to terrorists must be raised. 
 An UNGA resolution and several Wassenaar Arrangement and 
OSCE documents refer to the MANPAD problem, but these are not 
enough.  Israel feels that airport security and the 
protection of aircraft need to be discussed as a package. 
Israel intends to start discussion on this package proposal 
at this year's Conference on Disarmament, starting April 5. 
 
¶B. The Israeli MFA will host a seminar on MANPADS on April 
4-5.  Representatives from 34 countries have been invited. 
The Russians and Chinese have already replied positively. 
The U.S. will send a delegation of three or four people. 
¶C. The November 2002 MANPAD attack on an Israeli charter 
aircraft in Mombasa has forced Israel to upgrade MANPAD 
countermeasures on Israeli civilian aircraft. 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
TSWG EXTENDED FOR TEN YEARS, WITH FLEXIBLE SPENDING CAP 
 
SIPDIS 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶21. (C) State Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) 
Technical Programs Director Michael Jakub highlighted the 
following points in his presentation on the TSWG: 
 
¶A. Both sides agree that TSWG is a success story and benefits 
both Israel and the U.S.  Its goal is to focus joint 
scientific research into products that are operationally 
relevant and can come on-line within a short time. 
 
¶B. A new Memorandum of Agreement was signed in March 2005 
that extends the TSWG for ten years and sets a USD 250 
million spending ceiling that can be increased, if necessary. 
 The budget for FY 2006 is USD 25 million.  There are 
currently 58 projects in train, including new projects on 
chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) 
countermeasures, and a project looking at future threats. 
 
------------------------ 
WRAP UP AND ACTION ITEMS 
------------------------ 
 
¶22. (C) The two delegations agreed on the following action 
items and possible areas of cooperation for follow-up in 
preparation for the next JCG session in six months time: 
 
¶A. Terror Finance in Europe and Abroad: Both sides agreed 
that a combined approach to Europe is worthwhile, and that 
attention needs to be paid to other regions.  It was agreed 
that an interagency working group should be established to 
facilitate this cooperation. 
 
¶B. Public Awareness and Public Diplomacy: Both sides agreed 
that the U.S. and Israel hold a different view from Europe on 
how to wage the Global War on Terror, and that the U.S. and 
Israel should work together to narrow the difference with 
Europe. 
 
¶C. Analytical Exchange: Both sides agreed to exchange 
information and ideas over the next six months on how best to 
confront the challenges in points A and B. 
 
¶D. Cooperation in the UN: Both sides agreed to seek 
opportunities for enhanced cooperation in the UN on issues 
such as terror finance, terror travel, arms embargoes and the 
CTAG. 
 
¶E. Lebanon: Both sides agreed to seek opportunities to 
enhance cooperation in order to help transform Lebanon into a 
responsible and responsive state. 
 
¶F. Homeland Security: Both sides agreed to explore further 
opportunities for cooperation on homeland defense, 
recognizing that Israel has considerable experience that 
could be of use to the U.S. 
 
¶23. (U) Regarding the Proliferation Security Initiative 
(PSI), ISN/WMDT Deputy Director David Weekman encouraged 
Israel to participate in a PSI exercise that Turkey will host 
in May, and a conference that Poland will host this year. 
 
------------ 
PARTICIPANTS 
------------ 
 
¶24. (U) Representing Israel: 
 
MFA Deputy Director General Ambassador Miriam Ziv (chair) 
Daniel Arditi, deputy national security advisor, NSC (deputy 
chair) 
Daniel Kutner, head, Strategic and Economic Affairs Bureau, 
MFA 
Yehuda Yaakov, director, Nonproliferation and 
Counterterrorism Department, MFA 
Joseph Moustaki, deputy director, Nonproliferation and 
Counterterrorism Department, MFA 
Dan Arbell, director, North America Department, MFA 
Daniel Taub, principal deputy legal advisor, Legal Division, 
MFA 
Alon Bar, director, Arms Control Department, MFA 
Eynat Shlein, counselor for Middle Eastern Affairs, Embassy 
of Israel, Washington, D.C. 
A representative from the Directorate of Military 
Intelligence's (DMI) Production Division 
 
¶25. (U) Representing the U.S.: 
 
Ambassador Henry Crumpton, S/CT (chair) 
Ambassador Richard H. Jones, U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv (deputy 
chair) 
Patrick Worman, regional policy advisor, S/CT 
Michael Jakub, director of Technical Program, S/CT 
David Weekman, deputy director, ISN/WMDT 
Alison Maher, POL-MIL Officer, NEA/IPA 
Patrick Heffernan, director, Global Affairs, Treasury 
Gershon Kieval, National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) 
DAO Rep, U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv 
ECON Rep, U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv 
POL-MIL Officer, U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv 
 
¶26. (U) S/CT Coordinator Ambassador Crumpton cleared on this 
report. 
 
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JONES