VZCZCXRO2980
OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHGP #0725/01 0680459
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 090459Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9078
RUEAHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 2110
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1600
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 3822
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 5285
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 1260
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 5956
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 6351

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 SINGAPORE 000725 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
FOR SECRETARY CHERTOFF FROM AMBASSADOR HERBOLD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER PREL ETRD KCRM EFIN SN
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY CHERTOFF'S VISIT TO 
SINGAPORE 
 
¶1. (SBU) I warmly welcome your March 28-30 visit to Singapore 
and look forward to introducing you to Singapore's 
leadership.  The bilateral relationship is at an historic 
high point and your visit offers tremendous opportunities to 
move it further forward, particularly in law enforcement 
cooperation, trade security, money laundering/terrorist 
finance controls, and counterterrorism.  The other U.S. 
Ambassadors to Southeast Asian countries and I are confident 
that our roundtable with you will show us ways to strengthen 
further the positive and multifaceted working relationships 
between the Department of Homeland Security and our missions 
in the field. 
 
Singapore Leadership 
-------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Singapore's senior leadership highly values the 
U.S.-Singapore relationship and is pleased that you have 
chosen to stop here.  You will meet with all the top leaders: 
Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, Senior Minister Goh Chok 
Tong, Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew, Deputy Prime Minister and 
Minister for Home Affairs Wong Kan Seng, and Deputy Prime 
Minister and Co-Ordinating Minister for Security and Defence 
¶S. Jayakumar.  Important messages for your calls are: 
encouraging Singapore to deepen our law enforcement 
cooperation and share financial information; noting our 
interest in working together to improve trade security and 
strengthen Singapore's anti-money laundering and terrorist 
finance controls; and thanking Singapore for its 
counterterrorism cooperation. 
 
-- PM Lee has been in office for more than a year and a half 
after 14 years as Deputy Prime Minister.  He will be 
interested in discussing the terrorist threat and U.S. 
engagement with the rest of the region.  He may be on the 
verge of calling an early election, which he will win 
handily. 
 
-- SM Goh was Prime Minister from 1990-2004.  An affable but 
firm leader, he is a strong supporter of close ties with the 
United States and views our regional presence as essential to 
peace and security.  Goh is concerned about the rise of 
radical Islam in Southeast Asia and encourages moderates to 
stand up. 
 
-- MM Lee is modern Singapore's founding father (as well as 
father of PM Lee Hsien Loong) and was Prime Minister for over 
three decades.  He will engage in a strategic review of 
terrorism, regional developments, and the rise of China. 
 
-- DPM Wong, your counterpart, has a strong law and order 
reputation and a firm grasp on the internal security 
agencies.  He will want to discuss counter-terrorism and law 
enforcement cooperation, as well as the implications of 
opening casinos here in 2009. 
 
-- DPM Jayakumar oversees GOS efforts to improve inter-agency 
coordination to deal with the terrorist threat in Singapore. 
 
Strategic Partners, not Allies 
------------------------------ 
 
¶3. (SBU) Our excellent relationship with Singapore is founded 
on a convergence of views on key strategic issues and 
substantial trade and investment ties.  Singapore views a 
strong U.S. diplomatic, military, and economic presence in 
the region as essential to regional peace and prosperity. 
Singapore is a valuable logistics hub for U.S. forces and 
seeks greater interoperability with us, highlighted by its 
recent selection of the F-15SG for its Next Generation 
Fighter.  To expand our strong security ties, President Bush 
and Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong signed the Strategic 
Framework Agreement (SFA) last July.  As with our two-year 
old Free Trade Agreement (FTA), the SFA is designed to make a 
good relationship even better.  To preserve its autonomy and 
credibility with its neighbors, however, Singapore limits its 
closeness to us.  It specifically does not want to be a 
treaty ally: our military leases facilities from the GOS -- 
there are no U.S. "bases" on the island. 
 
 
SINGAPORE 00000725  002 OF 003 
 
 
Terrorism 
--------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) The GOS's greatest fear is a terrorist attack in 
Singapore -- a trophy target -- due to the economic damage it 
would cause and the impact on race relations in this 
multi-ethnic society.  Singapore has been a reliable and 
highly capable partner in the Global War on Terrorism.  In 
2001, the GOS uncovered a plot by Jemaah Islamiya to bomb 
targets in Singapore, including this mission.  Singapore 
continues to view itself as a high-profile terrorist target 
and the GOS regularly warns its citizens that a terrorist 
attack is inevitable.  Singapore's leaders are concerned 
about the growth of radical Islam in Southeast Asia and the 
long-term threat to secular authority in neighboring 
countries. 
 
Law Enforcement Cooperation 
--------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Law enforcement cooperation is good, but could be 
much better.  We want to conclude a Mutual Legal Assistance 
Treaty (MLAT) to raise our cooperation to a level 
commensurate with our close ties and Singapore's status as a 
highly-developed economy and important financial center. 
Singapore is willing to share information quietly through 
intelligence channels, but is much less forthcoming through 
law enforcement channels.  The GOS does not want information 
it provides to become public, such as in a U.S. court 
proceeding.  Singapore has statutory restrictions on sharing 
data from financial records, which hinders cooperation with 
the USG.  We are working to address shortcomings in 
Singapore's anti-money laundering and terrorist finance 
controls.  These issues will be even more important once 
casinos open in 2009.  DPM Wong will be responsible for 
casino regulation. 
 
Border Controls 
--------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) As you will see when you visit the Immigration and 
Checkpoints Authority operations at Woodlands Checkpoint, 
Singapore has effective and efficient border controls.  It is 
a leader in adopting high-tech solutions for cargo and 
passenger screening and is in the forefront for biometric 
passports.  Singapore is strengthening its legislation to 
prosecute citizens who misuse their passports for alien 
smuggling or other purposes.  The GOS is evaluating our 
proposal to share terrorist lookout information under 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive-6.  The GOS has been 
working with Interpol and the embassy to develop mechanisms 
for sharing Lost and Stolen Passport (LASP) information. 
 
Trade Security and Non-Proliferation 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶7. (SBU) Singapore strongly supports the United States, 
global non-proliferation agenda and trade security 
initiatives.  It was the first country in the region to join 
the Container Security Initiative and the Megaports 
Initiative, and participates enthusiastically in the 
Proliferation Security Initiative.  Singapore recognizes its 
own interests in controlling trade in dangerous goods, and in 
2003 it instituted a new strategic goods control law that 
imposes controls on a range of sensitive goods and 
technology, including transshipment cargoes.  Since the 
passing of the law, bilateral cooperation on 
counterproliferation has improved, and Singapore has made an 
effort to improve its own enforcement efforts through 
strengthened regulations, extensive training for its customs 
and checkpoints officials, and cooperation with other 
countries, including the United States. 
 
¶8. (U) While these measures are a vast improvement, the legal 
framework provided by Singapore's strategic goods control law 
still falls short of international best practices and has 
hindered efforts to improve law enforcement cooperation on 
proliferation matters.  Singapore does not yet adhere to key 
multilateral control regimes such as the Missile Technology 
Control Regime and the Australia Group, and only controls a 
 
SINGAPORE 00000725  003 OF 003 
 
 
subset of the items covered by these regimes.  Singapore also 
does not collect manifest data on transshipment (80 percent 
of the containers passing through the port) or transit 
shipments, unless they are bound for the United States. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Singapore acknowledges these weaknesses, and in 
October 2005, the United States and Singapore held a 
bilateral dialogue on improving our counterproliferation 
cooperation.  As a result, we have agreed to pursue an 
aggressive training program for Singapore Customs and 
security officials aimed at improving their ability to 
understand, recognize, and control strategic goods. 
HERBOLD