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PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #0905/01 0800751
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 210751Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6719
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0317
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 7190
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0400
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OSD/ISA/EAP//

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000905 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/21/2015 
TAGS: PREL PNUC KS KN
SUBJECT: GNP ELDERS REAFFIRM SUPPORT FOR ALLIANCE, FORECAST 
VICTORY AT POLLS 
 
REF: SEOUL 822 
 
Classified By: DCM Mark C. Minton.  Reasons 1.4 (b,d). 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  Stressing the primacy of the U.S.-ROK 
alliance, four elder statesmen of the opposition Grand 
National Party (GNP) told the DCM March 16 that the 
alliance's current state of "disrepair" could only be 
reversed when the GNP retook the Blue House and Kim Jong-il 
fell.  Expressing broad dissatisfaction with President Roh 
and the ruling Uri Party, they were confident that GNP would 
prevail in the May 31 local elections and beyond. END SUMMARY. 
 
DCM HOSTS FORMER GNP POLICY CHIEFS 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) The DCM on March 16 hosted a dinner for the 
following former Grand National Party (GNP) policy chiefs: 
Lee Kang-too, who is serving his fourth term in the National 
Assembly; Maeng Hyung-kyu, a leading candidate in the Seoul 
mayoral race; Lee Sei-kee, a former three-term member of the 
Assembly and current president of the Korea-China Friendship 
Association; and Park Sei-hwan, a retired Lieutenant General 
of the ROK Army and former two-term member of the National 
Assembly.  All are respected senior members of the 
conservative political establishment. 
 
GOOD RELATIONS WITH U.S., NEIGHBORS IMPORTANT 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) All four veteran lawmakers stressed the centrality 
of the U.S.-ROK relationship for the ROK's continued 
prosperity and security.  According to Lee Kang-too, the 
majority of South Koreans understood that a strong 
relationship with the U.S. was in the interest of the people 
and the security of the nation.  Unfortunately, some Koreans, 
including those in the Roh administration, undervalued the 
relationship.  The Korean people had not noticed in the early 
stages of the Roh administration, but now most Koreans had 
come to the conclusion that Roh's foreign policy was a 
failure, Lee stated. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Maeng decried President Roh's failure to maintain 
good relations with neighbors and great powers, specifically 
blaming him for weakening the U.S.-ROK alliance and 
destroying the ROK-Japan ties.  The ROK needed to pursue a 
more realistic and practical approach in keeping with the 
ancient Chinese maxim of "won gyo geun gong," which 
prescribed good relations with distant powers in order to 
attack neighbors.  Although the ROK had no intention of 
attacking anyone, Maeng stressed, it was critical for the ROK 
to have a strong alliance with the United States in order to 
defend itself against China and Japan. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Responding to the DCM's query as to how to improve 
the bilateral relationship, Lee Sei-kee stated that the 
relationship would return to health once the GNP returned to 
power and the Kim Jong-il regime collapsed, an assertion met 
with approval by the other three lawmakers. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) The DCM expressed appreciation to the group for 
their strong support for the U.S.-ROK alliance and noted 
that, despite appearances of strained relations, Seoul and 
Washington had accomplished much in recent years.  Not only 
had we made progress on modernizing the alliance, we were now 
working on an FTA, which, if achieved, would be a key element 
to strengthening U.S.-ROK ties.  An FTA would reinforce the 
value of the relationship by delivering real benefits to both 
sides, the DCM observed.  Lee Sei-kee agreed that the FTA was 
important, but insisted that the real key to improving the 
future of the alliance was the return of the GNP coupled with 
the demise of Kim Jong-il. 
 
DPRK COUNTERFEITING 
------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Responding to a query from Lee Kang-too, the DCM said 
that it was difficult to determine the exact dollar amounts 
involved in the DPRK's counterfeiting activities, but that, 
as a matter of principle, counterfeiting of any amount of 
currency was unacceptable.  The DCM pointed out that U.S. 
defensive measures against Banco Delta Asia in Macao had the 
effect of shutting down the DPRK's entire international 
financial system, an impact far greater than most people had 
expected.  The counterfeiting issue was now a complex 
 
international banking issue, and the DPRK would have to 
convince not only the United States, but also international 
banks, that it had stopped counterfeiting currency and that 
its international financial practices were sound.  Satisfying 
international bankers, predicted the DCM, would be a very 
difficult undertaking.  Lee urged Washington to continue to 
apply pressure on the DPRK. 
 
GNP POSITIONED FOR VICTORY 
-------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU) All the lawmakers agreed that the GNP was poised 
for victory in the May 31 regional elections.  They also 
expressed optimism about the party's prospects in the 2007 
presidential election.  Lee Sei-kee said that the 2002 
election had divided typical Korean families, with parents 
generally voting for the GNP while their children voted for 
the Uri Party.  Now, after three years under the Roh 
Administration, the younger generation accepted that they 
deserved to be reprimanded for having put Roh Moo-hyun in the 
Blue House.  In other words, the average Korean had no 
further illusions about Roh, and now only a small group of 
extreme leftists supported the president. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Maeng, himself a candidate for the Seoul mayorship, 
agreed that the overall atmosphere was favorable to the GNP. 
The local elections would be, in essence, a midterm 
evaluation for President Roh's performance.  President Roh 
would have difficulty recovering from the scandal that 
resulted in PM Lee Hae-chan's resignation (reftel) and would 
be unable to win back the hearts of the people prior to the 
election.  Meanwhile, the GNP had learned from its mistakes 
in the 2002 presidential race.  For example, to remedy its 
failure then to communicate with young voters, the GNP had 
invested heavily in its website and other tools to reach 
"netizens."  Maeng boasted that the GNP now had the best 
website among all the ROK political parties.  If the 
presidential race were held now, he said, he was 100 percent 
confident that the GNP would win. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Asked about the hostility between the ruling and 
opposition parties, Lee Kang-too observed that the history of 
democratic politics in the ROK was relatively short, and the 
unique situation of the North-South divide made political 
discourse even more challenging.  Jumping in, Maeng said that 
these characteristics caused ROK politics to be 
"revolutionary," in that a party that won an election tended 
to want to vanquish its opponent.  For many years those in 
the ruling party were excluded from politics and felt 
victimized.  Now that these outsiders were in power, others 
were fearful.  A complete lack of communication among the 
parties in the National Assembly was contributing to this 
problem, he said. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) The DCM noted that over time in a healthy 
democracy, politics was tempered by power-sharing between 
those in and out of office.  Indeed, it was important that 
the former opposition party now had an opportunity to govern, 
as it would help them evolve.  Praising the speed and 
enthusiasm with which the ROK had become a full-fledged 
democracy, the DCM expressed confidence that Korea's 
political parties would eventually develop more civil 
relations among themselves. 
VERSHBOW