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DE RUEHUL #0902/01 0800718
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P 210718Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6714
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0314
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 7187
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0396
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0045
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0230
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OSD/ISA/EAP// PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000902 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/21/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MNUC PINR KS KN
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MARCH 17 LUNCH WITH FORMER PM GOH KUN 
 
Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow.  Reasons 1.4 (b/d). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Former Prime Minister Goh Kun, a leading 
presidential contender, expressed to the Ambassador March 17 
his deep concern about the apparent lack of communication 
between Washington and Seoul.  He pressed for the ROK's 
inclusion in the Visa Waiver Program and expressed confidence 
about progress on USFK's relocation to Pyongtaek.  On North 
Korea, Goh worried that North Korea would drag out the Six 
Party Talks, in the meantime observing Iran as a possible 
model for allowing the DPRK to retain nuclear weapons. 
Turning to domestic politics, Goh predicted defeat for Uri in 
the May 31 regional elections. END SUMMARY. 
 
U.S.-ROK RELATIONS 
------------------ 
 
¶2.  (C) The Ambassador expressed appreciation for the former 
prime minister's years of service in national office, 
especially his steady management of the U.S.-ROK relationship 
during his tenure as acting president in spring 2004, when 
President Roh was under impeachment.  Touching on Goh's 
meeting then with visiting Vice President Cheney, the 
Ambassador observed that all the bilateral issues that the 
two had discussed at that time, except the resumption of U.S. 
beef imports, had found satisfactory solutions. 
 
¶3.  (C) Goh agreed that Seoul and Washington had made good 
progress on the bulk of bilateral issues discussed in April 
2004 -- USFK realignment, Yongsan relocation, the New Embassy 
Compound -- and expressed hope that the beef issue, too, 
would be solved soon.  Goh turned to the launch of FTA talks, 
calling it a sign of good progress in U.S.-ROK relations.  He 
also credited the Vice President's visit with helping to 
ensure stability in the ROK at a time of political difficulty. 
 
¶4.  (C) Recalling the achievements of the bilateral 
relationship in recent years, Goh said the state of the 
official relationship appeared to be "good."  Nevertheless, 
he continued, the alliance did seem more frayed than in the 
past and gaps between the two allies had become exaggerated 
due to poor public diplomacy on the part of the ROKG and poor 
communication between Washington and Seoul.  For example, in 
2005, the Ministry of National Defense had issued a white 
paper in which it had dropped its traditional reference to 
the DPRK as the ROK's "main enemy."  At the same time, 
however, the white paper had specifically listed the three 
threats to the ROK posed by the DPRK, i.e., conventional 
forces, forward-deployed artillery, and nuclear weapons and 
other WMD.  The ROKG, Goh said, should have done a better job 
of clarifying that it was dropping the "main enemy" label in 
keeping with modern practice throughout the rest of the 
world, but that the ROK remained no less alert to the 
continuing serious threat posed by the DPRK. 
 
¶5.  (C) The lack of communication between Washington and 
Seoul was even more unfortunate given the fundamental shifts 
that were taking place in both the United States and the ROK, 
Goh said.  Just as Washington was changing its global 
strategy for the post-9/11 era, the ROK was seeing dramatic 
domestic changes.  The bilateral relationship, too, was in a 
period of transition, making it all the more crucial for the 
two sides to communicate well. 
 
¶6.  (C) On other bilateral issues, Goh underscored that the 
ROK's inclusion in the Visa Waiver Program would be critical 
to the shaping of Korean public opinion about the United 
States.  He also expressed confidence in the ROKG's plan for 
relocating USFK Command to Pyongtaek.  There were some 
sporadic, albeit highly publicized, demonstrations, but the 
relocation was "fundamentally not a big problem," Goh said. 
 
NORTH KOREA 
----------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Goh stated that most South Koreans recognized that 
the U.S.-ROK alliance had been essential to their country's 
economic and political development over the past 50 years. 
Moreover, the alliance would be sustained and enhanced in the 
future on the basis of the growing shared values and common 
interests between the two countries.  However, the ROK's 
emergence as a democracy with a prosperous market economy was 
being accompanied by changing attitudes among Korean youth. 
The younger generation, which had grown up comfortable and 
confident, were calling for greater Korean "independence," 
often defined in terms of opposition to the United States. 
This phenomenon was not unique to the ROK, Goh observed, but 
it was intensified by the longing for the two Koreas to be 
reunified, and to act as one people.  Ironically, the United 
States, more than China or Japan, was best positioned to 
provide the support necessary for reunification, inclusive of 
maintaining a military presence on the Peninsula to ensure 
stability post-reunification. 
 
¶8.  (C) The Ambassador stressed that the United States 
supported the goal of reunification on the Korean Peninsula 
and wanted to contribute its strength and influence toward 
that goal.  Washington and Seoul might sometimes differ in 
our respective tactics for dealing with North Korea, but the 
two agreed that it was in our interest, and that of the North 
Koreans, to open up the DPRK.  It would help if we could 
convince China that it was in its interest as well. 
 
¶10.  (C) Turning to U.S. action on North Korea's illicit 
activities, the Ambassador reiterated that these measures 
were defensive in nature and not subject to negotiation. 
That said, we remained committed to the Six Party Talks and 
saw it as a vehicle not only to achieve denuclearization but 
also for addressing the range of issues related to North's 
entry into the international community, including negotiating 
a peace regime, normalizing U.S.-DPRK ties, and economic 
development.  We were thus frustrated by Pyongyang's refusal 
to return to the talks, the Ambassador said. 
 
¶11.  (C) Goh expressed concern that even if the Six Party 
Talks were to resume, the nuclear situation would have become 
more complicated, requiring much more time to solve.  He 
assessed that Pyongyang was stalling for time while it 
watched the Iran situation closely to see if it might offer a 
model that would allow the DPRK to retain nuclear weapons. 
Goh recommended that when the Six Party Talks resumed, the 
parties should have a roadmap that clearly laid out benefits 
for each action.  The Ambassador responded that Washington 
agreed in principle, but that Pyongyang must be prepared to 
act, not just declare.  He agreed with Goh that the DPRK's 
decision to continue to reprocess plutonium after the 
September 19 agreement had worsened the situation. 
 
¶12.  (C) Responding to Goh's query, the Ambassador stated 
that the U.S. briefing for Li Gun in New York had been 
useful.  Li had proposed the establishment of a bilateral 
working group to address the illicit financial activities 
issue, but we had demurred, as our defensive measure were not 
subject to negotiation, and we did not want to allow a 
diversion of attention from the Six Party Talks to possible 
bilateral talks. 
 
DOMESTIC POLITICS 
----------------- 
 
¶13.  (C) Goh predicted that the Uri Party would be defeated 
in the May 31 regional elections.  The ruling party had 
sustained significant damage that could not be undone in the 
short time left.  Goh added that Uri was at a further 
disadvantage because regionalism remained strong, making it 
difficult for the non-regionally-based Uri Party to challenge 
the other parties whose roots are firmly planted in their 
respective regions. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶14.  (C) A moderate independent, former PM Goh Kun is among 
the top three contenders for the 2007 presidential election. 
He led the polls throughout 2005, but has now slipped to 
second or third, behind Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye. 
Goh's popularity derives from his strong performance as 
acting president during the 2004 impeachment crisis, his 
breadth of experience as a life-long public servant, and his 
image as a clean, cautious, and stable "adult" politician. 
At the same time, political observers say these same traits 
have prevented Goh from establishing himself as a political 
power in his own right.  Indeed, although he has served six 
presidents at the highest levels, he does not appear to have 
developed any particular personal or political ties to any of 
these leaders or their parties. 
 
¶15.  (C) Buoyed by popular support but without a political 
machine to call his own, Goh appears to be encouraging the 
established parties to "persuade" him to be their candidate. 
This strategy is working to some extent, as the Uri Party, 
Grand National Party (GNP), Democratic Party (DP), and the 
People Centered Party (PCP) have each approached Goh about 
the possibility of him either joining the party or forming an 
alliance.  Thus far, Goh has responded coyly, declaiming 
publicly that he is not interested in any of his suitors, 
while allowing associates to stoke rumors of possible deals. 
He told the Ambassador he was considering forming his own 
party, but he is likely to fare better in alliance with one 
of the existing parties. 
 
¶16.  (C) During his tenure as prime minister, Goh oversaw the 
initiation of a number of interagency processes related to 
bilateral issues, including Pyongtaek relocation, the New 
Embassy Compound, and the beef issue.  His comments to the 
Ambassador showed his continuing interest in and grasp of the 
details of these issues. END COMMENT. 
VERSHBOW