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C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000901 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR CHA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2015 
TAGS: PREL PHUM EINV KS KN
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MARCH 17 MEETING WITH URI CHAIRMAN 
CHUNG DONG-YOUNG 
 
REF: SEOUL 827 
 
Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow.  Reasons 1.4 (b/d). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (C) In a March 17 meeting, Uri Party Chairman Chung 
Dong-young pressed the Visa Waiver Program (VWP) for South 
Korea and for the inclusion of Kaesong-made goods in the 
U.S.-ROK FTA.  On North Korea, Chung recommended de-linking 
illicit DPRK activities from the Six Party Talks.  The 
Ambassador said he supported Korea's inclusion in the VWP and 
negotiation of an FTA.  The Kaesong Industrial Complex, 
however, raised questions about North Korean labor 
conditions, which made it hard to envision an easy solution 
to its inclusion in a U.S.-ROK FTA.  END SUMMARY. 
. 
VWP, FTA, and the Alliance 
-------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) After exchanging pleasantries, Uri Chairman Chung 
Dong-young asked the Ambassador to consider South Korea for 
the Visa Waiver Program.  The Ambassador responded that this 
was something that he wanted to see accomplished.  South 
Korean admission to the VWP along with a U.S.-ROK Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) would demonstrate that bilateral relations 
had advanced to the next level.  South Korea was close to 
meeting the VWP refusal rate requirement and other technical 
issues were being worked out.  The Ambassador was optimistic 
about possible South Korean VWP inclusion.  He commented that 
on the FTA issue, various representatives from industry were 
supportive, and he was optimistic about its prospects. 
Washington and Seoul shared very similar views about the 
potential benefits of the FTA.  The Ambassador said that he 
and his ROK counterpart, Ambassador Lee Tae-shik, planned to 
go on a joint speaking tour in May in the United States to 
promote the FTA and the overall U.S.-ROK bilateral 
relationship. 
 
¶3.  (C) Chung noted that there were many difficult issues in 
the bilateral relationship, but South Korea was moving 
forward to resolve them.  Washington and Seoul had made 
progress on issues such as USFK realignment, the ROK dispatch 
of troops to Iraq, FTA discussions, and the strategic 
flexibility concept because there was a certain level of 
trust between Seoul and Washington.  For the past 53 years, 
the Mutual Defense Treaty was the main pillar of the 
bilateral relationship.  Once the FTA was accomplished, there 
would be a second major pillar that would support the 
relationship for the next 50 years. 
 
¶4.  (C) The Ambassador said that resolution of the strategic 
flexibility issue was good news, despite some negative 
publicity in the ROK based on a misunderstanding of the 
impact of the agreement.  USFK was continuing to work with 
ROKG counterparts to resolve the environmental aspects 
related to the return of some USG military facilities to the 
Korean side.  The Ambassador said he hoped press reports 
would not be too sensationalized.  Regarding the discussion 
on the transfer of wartime operational command, Washington 
and Seoul needed to work as privately as possible to avoid 
allowing the press to negotiate for us.  USFK Commander 
General Bell had some good ideas for arriving at a mutually 
beneficial result, the Ambassador noted. 
. 
NORTH KOREA 
----------- 
 
¶5.  (C) The North Korean issue involved more than just the 
alliance because we also needed to convince the DPRK side. 
The Ambassador stressed that the USG sought an early DPRK 
return to the Six Party Talks (6PT).  The 6PT forum could 
achieve more than just resolution of the nuclear issue, since 
the agenda included the issues of a peace regime and the 
normalization of relations with the North. 
 
¶6.  (C) Chung interjected that we needed to keep the 6PT 
separate from other issues including illicit activities, and 
this was why the recent U.S.-DPRK meeting in New York carried 
a great significance.  Chung said that at the inter-Korean 
ministerial meetings in December, his last as Unification 
 
Minister, he had made three points to his North Korean 
counterpart: (1) the DPRK should not link the 6PT with other 
issues; (2) illegal DPRK activities were unacceptable and 
must be resolved; and (3) human rights should be addressed. 
Chung elaborated that there had been an EU-DPRK dialogue on 
human rights, and perhaps this could be restarted.  Chung 
stressed that his North Korean interlocutors did not walk out 
of the talks and instead indicated they would report his 
points to their superiors, which Chung believed was a 
promising sign. 
 
¶7.  (C) The Ambassador agreed that this could be seen as a 
good sign.  The 6PT should not be linked with other issues, 
but the forum provided an opportunity to talk about other 
topics in addition to the nuclear issue, based on the 
September 19 Joint Statement.  Washington was prepared for an 
early resumption of the 6PT and was thinking of ways to move 
forward with a peace regime, normalization, and measures to 
promote economic reform in North Korea.  The North should 
realize that delaying the 6PT was not in its interests. 
 
¶8.  (C) Chung assessed that Kim Jong-il knew that time was 
not on his side, and barring changes, the DPRK economy would 
fall further behind its neighbors.  He cited Kim's recent 
visit to China as significant because it reflected the 
North's interest in reforming its agricultural and 
information technology sectors.  We should continue to use 
various channels to convince Kim Jong-il of the need to make 
a bold decision to reform.  In response to a question about 
contacts between the Uri Party and the North, Chung said the 
dialogue was good.  The North Koreans felt comfortable that 
the Uri Party was not trying to cause the DPRK to collapse, 
so they sought to build trust with Uri officials.  Chung 
stressed that the Uri Party would endeavor to convince the 
North to make the decision to reform. 
. 
Human Rights and the KIC 
------------------------ 
 
¶9.  (C) The Ambassador remarked that the Kaesong Industrial 
Complex (KIC) was receiving more international attention, but 
this might be a mixed blessing for the ROKG.  Some were 
asking questions about labor conditions and whether the DPRK 
workers were receiving their full wages.  Washington and 
Seoul needed to maintain close contact on this issue to 
ensure that North Korea received the right message. 
Hopefully, Kim Jong-il's visit to China would have a positive 
effect on his decisions.  It seemed, however, that Kim's 
priority remained political control rather than the economic 
reforms that were needed to improve the lives of the North 
Korean people. 
 
¶10.  (C) Chung said that as we entered discussions on an FTA, 
he hoped we could address rules of origin issues to allow ROK 
companies that used South Korean inputs to build products in 
the KIC for export to the United States.  Chung said that 
during his visit to Washington, he had discussed with U.S. 
Commerce officials his desire for U.S. companies to open KIC 
operations and that the Deputy Secretary of Commerce had 
responded that there were no obstacles for U.S. investment in 
the KIC, although firms would need to comply with limits on 
technological transfers.  Chung also claimed that senior 
Chinese party officials had expressed a desire to visit KIC 
and perhaps support PRC business operations in the KIC. 
 
¶11.  (C) The Ambassador responded that inclusion of the KIC 
in the FTA was complicated.  Technical solutions to rules of 
origin might exist, but questions over human rights and 
whether the KIC served to support the Kim Jong-il regime were 
also significant.  The Ambassador was not optimistic that 
there would be an easy solution.  It would be better if ROK 
companies could provide wages directly to their North Korean 
workers.  Acknowledging that the ROKG was already trying to 
address the issue of providing wages to the workers directly 
(reftel), the Ambassador said that until there was progress 
on such issues, the KIC would continue to have critics as 
well as supporters in the United States. 
 
¶12.  (C) Chung said that the 6,200 North Korean workers in 
the KIC received about $57.50 dollars a month, so the North 
was receiving around $400,000 a month.  In comparison, for 
the Kumgang tourism project, the North received $50 per 
 
tourist for a three-day, two-night trip.  Chung concluded 
that for the same amount of money, the South got more bang 
for its buck with the KIC project.  Chung claimed that there 
were two or three children of high-ranking DPRK military 
officers working at the KIC.  He understood that some 
students at the elite Kim Il-sung University viewed KIC 
employment as a good opportunity.  As operations at the KIC 
expanded, the number of North Korean workers could reach as 
high as 700,000 by the year 2012, alongside with tens of 
thousands of ROK workers, so the ripple effect in the North 
would be great. 
 
¶13.  (C) The Ambassador expressed appreciation that the ROKG 
brought up human rights with North Korean counterparts.  We 
needed to remind North Korea of international values and why 
human rights were important.  The North should agree to 
receive a visit from the UN Special Rapporteur on Human 
Rights in the DPRK.  The DPRK had signed the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights and should behave as a member of 
the international community.  The Ambassador said he hoped 
that the Korean Government would find it easier to talk 
publicly about human rights in North Korea. 
VERSHBOW