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DE RUEHUL #0900/01 0800640
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 210640Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6709
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0309
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 7182
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0391
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OSD/ISA/EAP//

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000900 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/21/2015 
TAGS: PREL PNUC KS KN
SUBJECT: AMB BRIEFS CONSERVATIVE LAWMAKERS ON ALLIANCE AND 
DPRK STRATEGY 
 
 
Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow.  Reasons 1.4 (b,d). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
¶1.  (C) Addressing a study group of Grand National Party 
lawmakers on March 17, the Ambassador said that growing 
military, economic and people-to-people ties indicated that, 
contrary to press reports, the state of the U.S.-ROK alliance 
was "confident and strong."  The Ambassador said that with 
regard to North Korea, while our tactics may sometimes 
differ, we shared a common commitment to the Six Party 
Process and the goal of a peaceful transition toward a 
unified peninsula.  Apparently skeptical of this positive 
outcome, questions from these opposition party lawmakers 
focused on contingency planning for the sudden collapse of 
the DPRK.  END SUMMARY. 
 
U.S.-ROK RELATIONS 
------------------ 
 
¶2.  (U) On March 17, Ambassador Vershbow met for 90 minutes 
with the "Institute of National Strategy Studies," a study 
group comprised of 33 GNP National Assembly members.  Rep. 
Kim Moon-soo, who is presently the leading gubernatorial 
candidate for Gyeonggi Province, founded this Institute. 
Other prominent members include GNP Floor Leader Rep. Lee 
Jae-oh. 
 
¶3.  (U) Evaluating the state of the U.S.-ROK relationship as 
"strong and confident," the Ambassador pointed to the 
alliance's record of achievements.  For example, as a result 
of the Future of the Alliance talks, the U.S. and the ROK 
agreed to redeploy 12,500 U.S. troops out of Korea by the end 
of 2008, relocate U.S. troops out of downtown Seoul and 
return Yongsan Garrison to the ROKG; consolidate the 
remaining 25,000 troops into two hubs south of Seoul by the 
end of 2009; and transfer several military missions to the 
ROK military. 
 
¶4.  (U) Moving to the economic relationship, the Ambassador 
underscored the strength of the economic and trade 
relationship and spoke of the compelling benefits to be 
gained by both sides should agreement on an FTA be achieved. 
He praised the ROKG for its seriousness of purpose in 
addressing these issues and said the FTA would represent an 
historic achievement in our economic relationship.  The 
Ambassador also cited the importance of human ties between 
the two nations and shared his hope that, just as the FTA 
agreement would form the basis for the U.S.-ROK economic 
relationship in the 21st century, the roadmap toward the Visa 
Waiver Program would lay the basis for expanded 
people-to-people ties. 
 
¶5.  (U) North Korea, said the Ambassador, presented the 
greatest challenge.  He emphasized that while the ROK and the 
U.S. might differ on some details and tactics, there was no 
gap in basic objectives.  He said that both countries agreed 
that the Six Party Talks were the best way to denuclearize 
North Korea and open the way to a normal relationship with 
the DPRK.  The governments remained committed to the Six 
Party Talks and both wanted to see the commitments contained 
in the September 19 Joint Statement implemented soon.  The 
Ambassador also briefed the lawmakers on the March 7 meeting 
in New York, stating that the "constructive and 
business-like" meeting with the North Koreans was a useful 
opportunity to reiterate our desire for an early resumption 
of the Six Party Talks without preconditions.  The Ambassador 
said that we would continue to advance policies that demanded 
that all governments, including Pyongyang, respect the 
universal rights that belong to every human being. 
 
LAWMAKERS PROBE FOR DPRK COLLAPSE SCENARIOS 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) Questions following the Ambassador's address focused 
on how the United States would handle the sudden collapse of 
the DPRK regime.  The Ambassador repeatedly stressed that 
internal reform of the DPRK was needed in order to avoid some 
of the darker scenarios of a collapse.  He said the U.S. and 
ROK should focus their efforts on persuading the North Korean 
government to change, introduce market reforms, and 
ultimately open up politically.  He expressed hope that the 
Six Party Talks would soon resume and that North Korea would 
show that it was serious about getting rid of nuclear 
weapons.  The parties would then be able to engage more 
directly with North Korea and encourage policy changes in the 
 
DPRK that would help the North Korean people.  The ROK and 
the U.S. must plan for more difficult scenarios, he 
acknowledged, but the best approach was to encourage reform 
so that a peaceful transition could take place. 
 
¶7.  (C) Pressed on what the U.S. role would be in a collapse 
scenario, the Ambassador said that the U.S. would work as 
closely as possible with the ROK to bring about stability and 
the establishment of democratic institutions.  South Korea 
would be in the lead and probably bear more of the burden 
than the U.S., but the U.S would be right by the ROK's side. 
Rep. Lee Jae-oh, Floor Leader (number two) of the GNP, 
questioned whether the U.S. would assert military control 
over North Korea like it did over the South following World 
War II.  The Ambassador replied that because the ROK now had 
a capable military, strong political institutions, and a 
stable administrative structure, the situation was totally 
different.  Although there might be some good reasons to work 
jointly with the ROK, such as working together to eliminate 
any remaining risks from the DPRK military or weapons of mass 
destruction, the United States would generally view South 
Korea as being in the lead. 
 
¶8.  (C) Rep. Ahn Myong-ok asked what plans were in place for 
refugees.  The Ambassador said that although the ROK would be 
the lead actor, the international community would likely 
provide assistance if there were any major flow of refugees. 
The international community would likely move quickly to 
deliver aid to North Korea to prevent people from panicking 
and feeling the need to flee. 
 
MORE CHINA AND RUSSIA ASSISTANCE WOULD BE USEFUL 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶9.  (C) The Ambassador said that prospects for change in the 
DPRK would be increased if China were in closer alignment 
with U.S. and ROK policy.  Rep. Kim Sook-joon asked whether 
U.S. and China positions were in conflict.  Although China 
had been helpful in the Six Party process, the Ambassador 
replied, its long-term objective might be different than that 
of the U.S. and the ROK.  Rather than unification, China 
might prefer to have a separate North Korean state as a 
buffer between itself and a U.S.-allied ROK. 
 
¶10.  (C) Responding to Rep. Kim's follow-up question on 
whether Russia or other countries could provide more 
assistance, the Ambassador suggested that Russia could play a 
more active role in promoting change in the DPRK, including 
in the Six Party Talks.  Russia could be a source for energy 
assistance and could contribute to regional economic 
projects.  An oil or gas pipeline stretching from Russia 
through the two Koreas could show the DPRK that it was better 
to become integrated than remain isolated.  Russia could also 
serve as a positive example for the DPRK as a country that 
had greatly improved the living standards of its people 
through a process of structural reform. 
 
THE U.S.-ROK MILITARY PARTNERSHIP 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (C) Rep. Shim Jae-chul asked whether the U.S. was 
satisfied with the ROK's role in the military relationship. 
The Ambassador said that the U.S. was pleased with state of 
ROK military modernization and that bilateral agreements to 
transfer certain key missions, such as counterfire, to the 
ROK had been achieved.  These transfers of major 
responsibilities did not diminish the U.S. commitment to 
assist with the defense of the ROK; rather, they spoke well 
of the health of the alliance. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶12.  (C) The questions posed by this particular group of GNP 
lawmakers illustrate that skepticism about the health of the 
U.S.-ROK relationship is persistent.  Opposition legislators 
are also concerned about ROKG policy toward the DPRK, 
questioning the lack of reciprocity in Seoul's economic 
assistance to North Korea.  We expect that these misgivings 
will only grow louder in the run-up to presidential elections 
next year.  END COMMENT. 
VERSHBOW