VZCZCXYZ0006
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #0821 0730909
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 140909Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6584
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0255
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 7172
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0339
RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR 1113
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000821 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR CHA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: AFTER KOREAN REUNIFICATION 
TAGS: PREL PARM EAID ECON KN KS
SUBJECT: DPRK DELAYS NORTH-SOUTH TALKS, ROKG OFFICIALS 
OPTIMISTIC FOR RESUMPTION IN APRIL 
 
REF: SEOUL 731 
 
Classified By: POL M/C JOSEPH Y. YUN.  REASONS 1.4 (B, D). 
 
¶1.  (C) The Korea Central News Agency (KCNA), the DPRK's 
official mouthpiece, reported on March 11 that North Korea 
notified South Korea by telegraph that it would delay the 
March 28-31 inter-Korean ministerial to "an appropriate date 
in April" to protest the March 10 announcement of the annual 
RSOI-Foal Eagle joint military exercise between the United 
States and the ROK.  The KCNA report highlighted expressions 
of regret from Kwon Ho Ung, the DPRK's head of delegation to 
the North-South talks, that the ROK did not heed Pyongyang's 
repeated calls to stop joint exercises with "outside forces." 
 (NOTE: As reported ref A, the DPRK recently conveyed this 
point during the March 2-3 inter-Korean general officer-level 
military talks.  END NOTE.)  The North stressed that Seoul's 
continued participation in exercises with the United States 
ran counter to the spirit of the June 15 North-South Joint 
Declaration.  The ROK's Ministry of Unification subsequently 
released an official statement regretting the DPRK's 
unilateral decision to delay the scheduled talks. 
 
¶2.  (C) Despite the apparent setback, South Korean officials 
were optimistic that the talks would resume in April. 
Director Kim Hyung Suk of MOU's Policy Agenda Management Team 
told poloff on March 13 that that the tone of the message was 
more respectful than in the past and that the DPRK delivered 
the message weeks in advance, rather than on the day of the 
scheduled talks.  The reference to a specific point in time 
was also a departure from the previous five instances when 
Pyongyang had unilaterally stalled the talks with vague 
indications that it would resume "when the ROK no longer 
displayed hostilities."  Recalling that the DPRK had 
counter-proposed late March for scheduling the talks in 
response to the ROK's proposal for mid-March during the 
previous ministerial in December, Kim opined that the DPRK 
had, in essence, demonstrated that it would continue 
inter-Korean dialogue regardless of U.S.-ROK exercises since 
it obviously knew the exercises would be announced then. 
 
¶3.  (C) Kim Sungbae, Senior Advisor to the Minister of 
Unification, likewise told POL M/C on March 14 that Pyongyang 
would probably return to the talks sometime in April.  He 
seconded Kim Hyung Suk's analysis that Pyongyang's message 
was softer and more specific than in the past and opined that 
DPRK officials in charge of inter-Korean affairs likely felt 
pressured to alter the date of the talks given that the 
original dates were too close to the dates of the exercises. 
Given the DPRK's "military-first policy" and the central role 
played by the National Defense Commission, it was unrealistic 
to expect those officials to be able to persuade the military. 
VERSHBOW