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Viewing cable 06ROME725, ITALY: POLLSTERS GIVE EDGE TO PRODI BUT DON'T

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ROME725 2006-03-09 06:13 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Rome
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 000725 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2016 
TAGS: PGOV IT ITALY NATIONAL ELECTIONS
SUBJECT: ITALY: POLLSTERS GIVE EDGE TO PRODI BUT DON'T 
DISCOUNT BERLUSCONI 
 
REF: A. ROME 141 
     B. ROME 466 
     C. ROME 276 
 
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor David D. Pearce for reasons 
 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY:  A collection of five Milan-based pollsters 
agreed that PM Berlusconi's effective campaign had closed 
much of the gap with opposition leader Romano Prodi, even if 
they were split over whether this momentum would carry 
Berlusconi to victory on election day.  Recent polls give 
Prodi a lead ranging from one to five percentage points. 
Berlusconi's hope is pinned on remotivating his base of 
support, disillusioned by five years of a stagnant economy. 
In fact, Italy's poor economy is Berlusconi's chief handicap 
and foreign policy appears to count little.  Many Italian 
voters remain undecided how they will vote, but this includes 
many who will simply not vote and others who know which 
coalition they plan to support but not which party within 
that coalition.  This makes it difficult to predict what a 
future government would look like regardless who wins, but 
especially if the center left forms the next government.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
2. (SBU) Poloff and Milan's Acting Pol/Econ chief met March 
2-3 with five Milan-based polling organizations.  In separate 
meetings, three predicted a very close victory for 
center-left Union coalition candidate Romano Prodi, and two 
gave the advantage to Prodi but said that PM Berlusconi's 
well-focused campaign had made the race a dead heat.  All 
agreed that Berlusconi was running a very effective campaign 
and that Prodi's lackluster performance and divided coalition 
had hurt him.  The consensus view is that longer term 
political, social and especially economic trends were working 
against Berlusconi. 
 
------------------------------- 
WHAT DO THE POLLS ACTUALLY SAY? 
------------------------------- 
 
3. (SBU) Late February and early March polls show the 
center-left's (CL) lead over the center-right (CR) ranging 
from one percentage point to five percentage points.  The 
Berlusconi-financed Euromedia poll conducted on February 24 
shows the one percentage point difference.  The most recently 
published poll, conducted by the relatively bipartisan 
Eurisko gives the CL a 51.4 percent to 46.4 percent lead in 
the Chamber of Deputies and a 50.5 percent to 47.0 percent 
lead in the Senate. (Note: As a result of electoral reform in 
late 2005 (REF A, B), votes are tabulated differently in the 
Chamber and the Senate, which has resulted in parties running 
in slightly different groupings in the two chambers.  This 
explains the different results.  End Note.) 
 
4. (C) Paolo Natale, lead pollster for Polimetro, conducted a 
survey on March 1.  His still unpublished survey asked 
respondents to predict who they thought would win the 
elections.  The results in percent were: CL (45.2), CR 
(34.5), uncertain (20.3).  This is a slight improvement for 
the CL compared to late February results but much lower than 
results from polls conducted last year.  When asked March 1 
if they planned to vote CL or CR, the results were: CL 
(43.6), CR (35.8), uncertain (20.6).  The trend mirrors that 
shown for the previous question.  Given Italy's recent 
electoral reform, however, this is no longer the relevant 
question since electors do not vote for the coalition but for 
an individual political parties (REF B).  This large 
"branding gap" between the CL and the CR is one of the 
reasons why Berlusconi changed the electoral law. 
 
5. (C) Polimetro also asked voters to indicate for which 
party they would vote in the Chamber and in the Senate, which 
is the actual decision voters will face on election day.  Of 
those expressing a preference, the CL leads the CR by 51.1 
percent to 47.9 percent in the Chamber and by 50.9 percent to 
47.8 percent in the Senate.  The trend shows that the CR 
gained substantial territory through mid-February but that 
the race more-or-less stabilized in the last two weeks of 
February.  Polimetro shows 34.8 percent of potential electors 
remain undecided and predicts that roughly half of those will 
abstain on election day.  It predicts the majority of the 
remaining lean toward the CL.  Other polls show undecideds 
representing between 25 and 30 percent of the electorate. 
 
----------- 
PREDICTIONS 
----------- 
 
6. (C) Euromedia's Alessandra Ghisleri was the most positive 
regarding the CR's chances for victory.  She admitted that 
Berlusconi still trailed but said momentum favored the CR. 
She also reminded Poloff that governments are formed in 
parliament and not at the ballot box and said that the binds 
that hold together a coalition disappear after the election 
passes.  She predicted that a split result, one in which the 
Chamber and Senate each go to different coalitions, favors 
Berlusconi forming the next government (REF A).  Giacomo 
Sani, whose most recent results give the CL a scant 2 
percentage point advantage, argued that the race is too close 
to call and concurred that momentum favors Berlusconi.  The 
question is whether that momentum is sufficient to bring him 
the votes he needs. 
 
7. (C) Stefano Draghi, who is also a Senate candidate for the 
Democrats of the Left (DS), was most strident in his 
prediction of a CL victory.  He cited long-term trends and 
dissatisfaction with the economy as insurmountable barriers 
for Berlusconi's admittedly superior campaign to overcome, 
but provided no data to support his claim.  Nicola Piepoli, 
who works for the Council of Ministers but not for Berlusconi 
the candidate, provided similar reasons to predict a CL 
victory.  Forza Italia's Lazio party coordinator who works 
closely with Piepoli in Palazzo Chigi told Poloff that 
Piepoli is a guru with an excellent instinct for Italian 
politics.  Polimetro uses a mathematical model that combines 
the results of stated intentions to vote, historical 
comparisons of voting intentions with actual results, and 
perceptions of general voter sympathy to forecast results. 
Based on Polimetro's model, Natale predicted the CL would win 
in both houses.  With the majority premium in the Chamber, 
the CL would have a comfortable advantage of 340 to 277 
seats.  He also predicted the CL would win in the Senate, 
despite probable CR victories in the important swing states 
of Friuli Venezia Giulia, Lazio and Puglia.  The CL would win 
the remaining swing state, Piedmont.  Given his prediction 
that the CL would win big in Toscany and Emilia Romagna, he 
forecasts the CL would have a 160 to 149 seat advantage in 
the Senate.  His results do not include the results for 
members of parliament voted abroad or the seven Senators for 
life. 
 
8. (SBU) Twelve members of the Chamber and six members in the 
Senate will be voted by Italians abroad (REF B).  The 
pollsters said they have no idea what to expect since this is 
the first time such elections will be held.  However, the 
consensus is that results will favor the CR, who gave 
Italians abroad the right to vote.  Some explained that the 
fact most Italians abroad emigrated from Southern Italy also 
favors the CR.  Italy's seven Senators for life generally 
favor the CL. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
CAMPAIGN FOR THE UNDECIDED VOTER/MOTIVATING THE BASE 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
9. (C) Polls show that between 25 and 35 percent of Italian 
voters remain undecided.  At least half will abstain and the 
other four pollsters shared Natale's view that the majority 
of the remainder leans to the left.  Draghi pointed out that 
many undecided voters know if they plan to vote CL or CR but 
are unsure which party within the coalition they will 
support.  He claimed the strong preference expressed for the 
CL, in general, augurs well for Prodi's coalition.  Piepoli 
explained that the Italian voter, who historically chose 
between a large Communist party and the Christian Democrast 
is generally more sympathetic to the left than to the right. 
He said a major reason Berlusconi defeated Francesco Rutelli 
in 2001 was because Berlusconi had induced the Northern 
League to rejoin his coalition whereas Rutelli did not 
attract the Communist Renewal (RC) party.  This year, Prodi 
has reached out to the far corners of the left for support 
and does not face that problem.  Draghi also noted that the 
"political trend" has been working against Berlusconi and 
cited a poor economy as a primary factor. 
 
10. (C) The five pollsters generally agreed that Berlusconi 
was running a better campaign than Prodi, who is hampered by 
a divided coalition and poor communication skills.  They said 
Berlusconi is fighting to motivate his base of support, which 
includes many voters disillusioned by Italy's poor economic 
performance over the past five years.  Berlusconi's campaign 
slogans rhetorically ask Italians if they want more illegal 
immigration, higher taxes, communists and no-globals in the 
government and a return to instability.  With his visit to 
Washington, Berlusconi has trumpeted his important role on 
the world stage versus Italian Communist Party (PdCI) leader 
Oliviero Diliberto's support for Hamas and burning of the 
U.S. and Israeli flag.  The pollsters say Berlusconi is 
trying to scare the disillusioned voter into returning to the 
voting booth instead of staying home.  Ghisleri and Sani 
thought this might work.  The others agreed it was a good 
tactic, but insufficient to win. 
 
-------------------------------- 
WHAT MOTIVATES THE ITALIAN VOTER 
-------------------------------- 
 
11. (C) Draghi and Ghisleri distinguished the Northern and 
Southern voters.  They said the Northern voter is generally 
more ideological and faithful to the party tradition. 
Southern Italy is still heavily influenced by clientelism, 
where electoral "tour operators" frequently deliver votes to 
one or another party based on perceived benefits.  This type 
of voter is more susceptible to the bandwagon effect since 
the goal is to deliver votes to the winner who will be able 
to provide the most benefit.  Clemente Mastella's UDEUR 
Party, which has its base in Campagna is the paramount 
example. 
 
12. (C) More concretely, all the pollsters agreed that many 
Italians are proud of Italy's new role on the world stage, 
but that foreign policy has little to no effect on the voter. 
 Natale said the CL is winning because of concern for the 
economy, the precarious nature of the job market and the 
energy crisis.  Piepoli cited a deep-seated jealousy against 
Berlusconi as a strong motivation for CL voters.  Many 
Catholic voters are concerned about values and vote for 
parties favored by the Vatican.  Ghiseli said many DS voters 
have abandoned the DS because of the BNL banking scandal, but 
they probably remained within the CL coalition.  The 
pollsters were divided on whether the flap over former 
Minister Calderoli's printing of t-shirts emblazoned with the 
controversial comics of the Prophet Mohammed had affected 
voter preferences.  Natale, however, showed that support for 
the Northern League had dropped from 4.3 to 3.6 percent since 
the event went public.  He says a corresponding increase in 
support for Forza Italia means those voters did not leave the 
CR. 
 
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INSIDE THE CENTER LEFT 
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13. (C) The relative strength of the parties inside the two 
coalitions will determine the importance of the CL's more 
radical wing in a potential future government.  Whereas some 
polls had given RC eight percent of the vote, Polimetro and 
Euromedia show it has slipped to below seven percent.  PdCI, 
the Greens, UDEUR, the Rose in the Fist and di Pietro's 
Values Party also face possible exclusion from parliament if 
they do not overcome the two percent hurdle for entering 
parliament.  Ghiseli cited evidence that many voters who are 
disillusioned with the DS have migrated to the Rose in the 
Fist, a combination of Radicals and a Socialist splinter 
group. In any case, with so many CL voters still undecided, 
it remains unclear who among the small parties would have 
influence in a possible Union government. 
 
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COMMENT 
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14. (C) COMMENT: With national elections only five weeks 
away, the race has tightened considerably.  Prodi still holds 
the edge, but momentum appears to be in Berlusconi's favor, 
and a large number of voters remain undecided.  Even more 
unpredictable is what a CL government would look like if it 
were to win.  END COMMENT. 
 
15. (U) This cable was coordinated with ConGen Milan. 
SPOGLI