This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000445 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MLS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/13/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV BM MY
SUBJECT: BURMESE DON'T BUDGE FOR ASEAN 
 
REF: KUALA LUMPUR 8 
 
Classified By: P/E Chief W. Patrick Murphy for Reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  Malaysian Foreign Minister Syed Hamid made a 
brief March 23-24 visit to Burma on behalf of ASEAN, but 
could only gain access to second-tier regime officials who 
recited the standard party line on the SPDC's road map to 
democracy.  The Malaysian Embassy tells us that Hamid 
appealed to the regime to allow him access to all 
"stakeholders" (e.g. ASSK and other political opposition 
leaders) in order to get a full picture of the situation and 
to allow ASEAN to engage key partners in a more informed 
manner.  GOB officials rejected Hamid's request, urging him 
not to dwell on "specific personalities."  Hamid surprised 
his own Embassy and GOB officials by abruptly returning to 
Malaysia a day prior to his scheduled departure.  The 
National League for Democracy expressed regret and 
disappointment that Hamid did not meet with the party or 
other political opposition groups during his trip.  End 
Summary. 
 
THE USUAL GANG 
-------------- 
 
¶2. (U) Malaysian Foreign Minister Syed Hamid Albar made a 
short-notice and brief 24-hour visit to Rangoon March 23-24. 
The official Burmese press described Hamid as the head of a 
"Malaysian delegation" that came to Burma at the invitation 
of the GOB to "pay a goodwill visit."  He held discussions 
with Foreign Minister Nyan Win (who also hosted a dinner in 
Hamid's honor) and made a courtesy call on Prime Minister 
General Soe Win.  Hamid also met separately with Agriculture 
Minister Major General Htay Oo, in his capacity as Secretary 
General of regime's mass-member Union Solidarity Development 
Association (USDA), and Chief Justice U Aung Toe, in his 
capacity as Vice Chairman of the National Convention 
Convening Committee. 
 
¶3. (C) While the Malaysian Embassy in Rangoon was elusive 
prior to the visit, on March 30 Malaysian DCM Rizany Irwan 
Bin Muhamad Mazlan shared views more openly.  Rizany told us 
that FM Hamid emphasized at every meeting that his visit was 
not a bilateral one, but was in his capacity as Chair of the 
ASEAN Standing Committee.  He underscored to the GOB that he 
had an ASEAN mandate to fulfill and that his intention was to 
gather information, not to investigate, evaluate, assess, or 
interfere. 
 
SAME OLD SONG AND DANCE 
----------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Hamid appealed for transparency, noting to GOB 
officials that ASEAN members and others in the international 
community were "very interested" in the Burma situation. 
Hamid, said Rizany, cited ASEAN's need to be well informed in 
order to engage its key partners and that he therefore hoped 
to get a full picture of the situation in Burma.  Hamid 
specifically appealed to the GOB to allow him to "see all of 
the stakeholders," who Rizany characterized as Aung San Suu 
Kyi and other National League for Democracy officials, as 
well as ethnic leaders and delegates to the National 
Convention. 
 
¶5. (C) Rizany said that GOB officials fully acknowledged 
Hamid's role as an ASEAN envoy but rejected out of hand his 
requests to see members of the political opposition. 
According to Rizany, each of the four senior GOB officials 
with whom Hamid met told the Malaysian FM that he should not 
dwell on specific personalities (i.e. ASSK), but should 
rather focus on the "broader interests of the nation." 
 
¶6. (C) Rizany said that Hamid's discussions with Nyan Win 
were the most substantive of his talks in Rangoon, although 
the FM merely rehashed the regime's party line on its "road 
map to democracy."  The meeting with PM Soe Win was "a 
disappointing 15-minute courtesy call," during which the PM 
focused solely on bilateral Burma-Malaysia issues in general 
terms.  Rizany added that the Malaysians also requested 
meetings with senior regime leaders, including Than Shwe and 
Maung Aye, but the GOB responded that PM Soe Win "was senior 
enough" for Hamid.  Rizany surmised that had Hamid visited as 
Malaysian Foreign Minister and not ASEAN envoy, he would 
likely have been granted direct access to Than Shwe. 
 
¶7. (C) Hamid's meetings with Maj Gen Htay Oo and U Aung Toe 
were additional opportunities for the SPDC to extol its 
self-perceived progress on its road map and sundry other 
accomplishments of the military.  Rizany described the USDA 
and National Convention briefs as lectures that the regime 
has delivered previously to many diplomats and other 
visitors.  The USDA also trotted out a video on its 
development activities, which Rizany said caused Hamid to 
roll his eyes and check his watch repeatedly. 
 
ENOUGH IS ENOUGH 
---------------- 
 
¶8. (C) According to Rizany, Hamid announced his immediate 
return to Kuala Lumpur without warning at lunch on March 24, 
a surprise to both Malaysian Embassy officers and GOB 
officials.  The Embassy quickly canceled a dinner the 
Ambassador planned to host for Hamid that evening and 
scrambled to find the Malaysian flight crew, who were 
shopping at a local market.  Hamid had arrived on a military 
aircraft for the trip, apparently to allow him schedule 
flexibility and to return in time for a Saturday political 
event in his home province.  With no substantive meetings 
left on his Rangoon itinerary on Friday afternoon, Hamid told 
Malaysian Embassy officers that he desired to return and 
spend time with his family before the weekend. 
 
¶9. (C) Rizany described Hamid as "satisfied" with his visit 
to Burma, but not "happy."  Hamid, he said, was concerned 
that the trip had not been as comprehensive as he had 
desired.  Despite the limitations the regime placed on the 
visit, Rizany said, Hamid had felt compelled to "not miss the 
opportunity" to visit Rangoon before the  April 17-18 ASEAN 
Foreign Ministers retreat in Bali. 
 
WHY BOTHER? 
----------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) On March 25, the NLD issued a statement expressing 
regret that Hamid and his delegation had departed Burma 
without meeting either ASSK or other NLD leaders.  On March 
30, party leaders U Aung Shwe and U Lwin told us they were 
extremely disappointed that Hamid made no effort to see them 
or other opposition figures.  "We understand that Hamid was 
charged with making an assessment of democratic reform," said 
U Aung Swe, "Frankly, we don't know why he bothered to come." 
 
¶11. (C) Comment:  Hamid's visit was symbolic of the obstacles 
the regime imposes on any envoy with a pre-announced mandate. 
 The SPDC carefully denied Hamid access to the senior 
generals and a chance to meet the political opposition, both 
of which were Hamid's proposed objectives as well as 
prerequisites for a fully effective visit.  The generals may 
have hoped that by allowing Hamid to visit they could appease 
ASEAN concerns, but in controlling his itinerary they 
indicated no desire to modify their behavior.  The next test 
will be whether Hamid shares his frustrations with fellow 
ASEAN foreign ministers in Bali.  End Comment. 
STOLTZ