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PP RUEHPA RUEHROV
DE RUEHFR #2067/01 0891313
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 301313Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5785
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 PARIS 002067 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2016 
TAGS: PREL MARR SU CD IV BN LI NI FR
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENTIAL 
ADVISOR BONNECORSE:  SUDAN, CHAD, COTE D'IVOIRE, BENIN, 
CHARLES TAYLOR 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR CRAIG STAPLETON, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B/D). 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  Deputy Secretary Zoellick on March 10 
discussed Sudan, Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, Benin, and the possible 
transfer of Charles Taylor from Nigeria to the Netherlands 
via Sierra Leone, with the French Presidency's Africa 
advisor, Michel de Bonnecorse.  On Sudan, the two sides 
expressed general agreement on the need to encourage progress 
in the Abuja talks, create a UN mission for Sudan, and 
support AMIS in the interim.  Bonnecorse notably did not 
engage in a NATO-EU theological discussion of the roles of 
the two organizations.  He related French efforts to lobby 
others to accept a UN operation, noting the possible need to 
use non-Western peacekeepers, but with Western support for 
planning and logistics.  On Chad, both sides agreed on the 
need to consult closely in order to support stability and to 
plan for ways to ensure a peaceful transition to a post-Deby 
Chad.  The two sides agreed on the need to strengthen PM 
Banny in Cote d'Ivoire.  Bonnecorse also suggested increasing 
the UN presence in Cote d'Ivoire (but did not push this point 
aggressively); the Deputy Secretary said that a drawdown of 
UNMEE could provide resources to do so.  He suggested P-3 
talks on Cote d'Ivoire. 
 
¶2.  (C)  SUMMARY CONT'D:  Bonnecorse expressed concern about 
the possibility that those in President Kerekou's circle 
might try to derail the ongoing election process in Benin and 
thereby allow Kerekou to remain in power.  The Deputy 
Secretary noted the leverage the U.S. enjoys through the 
 
SIPDIS 
Millennium Challenge Account with Benin and that we would use 
it if necessary.  Bonnecorse noted an agreement between 
Liberian President Johnson-Sirleaf and Nigerian President 
Obasanjo for Charles Taylor to be transferred to the Hague, 
via Sierra Leone, for prosecution.  Bonnecorse urged rapid 
UNSC approval of this plan and the need to prohibit Taylor 
from spending too much time in Sierra Leone because of the 
possibility his supporters might try to free him.  The Deputy 
Secretary agreed on the need for quick action.  END SUMMARY. 
 
SIPDIS 
 
¶3.  (C)  Deputy Secretary Robert Zoellick met on March 10 for 
over an hour with Michel de Bonnecorse, Africa advisor to 
President Chirac.  MFA A/S-equivalent Bruno Joubert, a 
notetaker, and an interpreter attended on the French side; 
Ambassador Stapleton, Khartoum Charge Hume, AF DAS 
Ranneberger, D Chief of Staff Padilla, D Special Assistant 
Smith, and an Embassy notetaker accompanied the Deputy 
Secretary. 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SUDAN:  U.S. ASSESSMENT 
 
¶4.  (C)  The Deputy Secretary reviewed his talks on Sudan in 
Brussels earlier in the week.  The EU's Solana succeeded well 
in framing the issues, which centered on:  (1) recognition 
that all parties needed to advance the Abuja peace talks; (2) 
recognition of the need to strengthen AMIS (although 
modalities for doing so were not clear); and (2) moving 
forward with creating a UN operation, which the AU was to 
discuss on March 10.  The Deputy Secretary said that, 
concerning Abuja, he would have a better sense of 
developments following his meeting later in the day with AU 
Special Envoy Salim Salim. 
 
¶5.  (C)  The Deputy Secretary reported that the Government of 
National Unity (GNU) appeared to be drawing closer to a 
common position, a useful step.  This would include the 
National Congress Party and the SPLM, with First 
Vice-President Salva Kiir also involved.  The main issues 
were:  (1) power sharing, (2) the distribution of wealth, and 
(3) security.  There appeared to be elements on the first two 
issues in play but the security issue was more complicated, 
with several challenges in terms of sequencing and 
operational effectiveness.  A certain amount of pressure, and 
a way to channel such pressure to make it productive, might 
be necessary to effect progress.  Salim seemed to express 
some weariness with the process.  He had mentioned a possible 
"enhanced cease-fire," which, the Deputy Secretary said, the 
U.S. supported, but an enhanced cease-fire might not be more 
effective than the cease-fire that is ostensibly already in 
place, which is not widely respected.  However, if this could 
form the basis of further security discussions, the U.S. 
could offer its encouragement.  The Deputy Secretary noted 
his earlier meeting on March 20 with EU Special 
Representative for Sudan Pekka Haavisto, who also mentioned 
Salim's interest in going forward in this manner. 
 
¶6.  (C)  The Deputy Secretary commented that progress in 
Abuja would help in many respects.  He noted, however, that 
divisions on the rebel side persisted, and that it was 
 
PARIS 00002067  002.2 OF 006 
 
 
difficult to reach an agreement when one side continued to be 
divided.  It would be important, if Salim finds a reasonable 
solution and is able to bring the GNU along, to press the 
rebel side.  However, one could not be confident the rebels 
would be in a position to negotiate.  Progress by Salim would 
increase the need for rebel leaders to go to Abuja.  The 
rebels and government were both part of the process.  Another 
factor to consider were the tribes/clans in Darfur.  Progress 
on security would have to complement reconciliation in 
Darfur.  If not, the process could be manipulated by the 
Sudanese government. 
 
¶7.  (C)  On AMIS, the Deputy Secretary envisioned support 
from NATO and the EU.  He had discussed the issue with NATO 
Secretary-General de Hoop Scheffer.  The most likely option 
 
SIPDIS 
seemed to be robust planning support.  Recent assessments of 
AMIS showed a shortage of personnel, limited access to 
intelligence, and logistical and operational planning 
shortfalls.  The Deputy Secretary said the U.S. was looking 
for contributions from NATO and the EU and was not 
"theological" on how that could be obtained.  However, we 
would need an AU or UN .  Without support from NATO and the 
EU, it was difficult to see how AMIS could be strengthened -- 
who would provide forces?  Who would provide additional 
funding? 
 
¶8.  (C)  On the UN issue, the Deputy Secretary noted Sudan's 
continued opposition to a UN mission.  Solana in Brussels had 
prodded Sudan Second Vice-President Taha, commenting that in 
BBC news footage, many of those protesting UN involvement 
resembled soldiers and not students.  Solana effectively made 
the point that attacking the UN was not sensible and that "we 
are all members."  At the Sudan Consortium Conference the 
previous day, the Deputy Secretary noted his expression of 
outrage to Taha and Salva Kiir that some were calling for the 
deaths of UN Special Representative Pronk and U.S. Charge 
Hume.  We needed to push harder in explaining that this was 
completely unacceptable, he emphasized.  AU Commission 
Chairman Konare seemed willing to be supportive regarding a 
UN operation, as were other AU PSC members, but this had to 
be balanced against Khartoum's pressure to avoid a UN 
mission.  The Deputy Secretary had received mixed reports on 
what the AU might decide on March 10.  One option, the Deputy 
Secretary continued, would be to emphasize the shared goal of 
 
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achieving successful results at Abuja and to link UN 
participation to Abuja.  The Deputy Secretary noted that as 
he was leaving Brussels, Taha seemed to indicate that he was 
not against the UN, and had even said this to the press, but 
that some in Khartoum were taking a harder line. 
 
¶9.  (C)  On the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), the 
Deputy Secretary said that it was appropriate to acknowledge 
progress, but the CPA was a complicated document.  We needed 
to exert pressure to build momentum.  There was also a need 
to develop financial controls, to ensure that we know how 
funds we provide are used.  Within the CPA context, we needed 
to push on security issues as well, to encourage North-South 
progress, which could have a positive effect on Darfur. 
 
¶10.  (C)  The Deputy Secretary noted his first meeting with 
Salva Kiir and the huge challenges he faced.  He has proved 
to be an intelligent individual coping well with the 
pressures he faces on many sides -- from Khartoum, the South 
(including Mrs. Garang, Bonnecorse interjected).  All things 
considered, the Deputy Secretary said that Salva Kiir had 
done relatively well.  We needed to support and strengthen 
him.  It was easy to criticize him, but that would only 
weaken him.  The Deputy Secretary believed that Salva Kiir 
was capable of a larger role, and noted his efforts to help 
with the Darfur problem.  Salva Kiir should also be 
associated with any progress on the Abuja talks as well. 
 
SUDAN:  BONNECORSE 
 
¶11.  (C)  Bonnecorse thanked the Deputy Secretary for his 
analysis.  He said the Brussels meetings had been useful and 
that there had been a good climate at the Consortium 
Conference on March 9.  Concerning the AU PSC and UN issue, 
Bonnecorse said that he did not believe the PSC would decide 
on an outright "no."  However, the PSC might instead express 
an "OK, but . . ."  Bonnecorse said that there should be a 
strong link between progress at Abuja and the move to a UN 
mission, and, at the same time, strong continued support for 
AMIS.  He said there were problems involving timing and the 
pressure the international community could bring to bear. 
Progress might be achieved in Abuja within three or four 
months, with pressure from the international community on 
African states, Khartoum, and on the Sudanese rebels.  He 
 
PARIS 00002067  003 OF 006 
 
 
said it was nearing time to "put a gun to their heads" to 
reach agreement in Abuja.  Bonnecorse also suggested the need 
for a cease-fire agreement enforced by AMIS and a framework 
agreement on power sharing and the distribution of wealth. 
This framework agreement was something that could perhaps be 
considered or implemented once the UN mission is operating. 
 
¶12.  (C)  Bonnecorse said that the GOF had discussed Sudan 
and the UN issue with a number of countries.  He noted 
President Chirac's discussion with Egyptian President 
Mubarak.  Chirac called a number of African heads of state 
after speaking with President Bush.  The "reasonable" leaders 
understood the need to go to the UN.  However, one message 
the French had received was that the UN mission should not be 
composed primarily of peacekeepers from Western countries. 
He added that concerning operational planning and logistical 
support, there was likely to be no objection to Western 
leadership.  He advised that respecting these factors could 
make it easier to obtain support for a UN mission. 
 
¶13.  (C)  Bonnecorse said the EU and France did not have 
extensive influence over the rebels and encouraged the U.S. 
to use its leverage.  Mentioning Salim's negotiations, 
Bonnecorse said that the rebels should be brought together 
and encouraged to develop a common political outlook, which 
he said they now lacked.  He repeated that France continued 
to lobby its African contacts, which included those at the 
AU, such as Commission Chairman Konare. 
 
¶14.  (C)  The Deputy Secretary said he agreed with 
Bonnecorse's analysis, but said that U.S. ties with the 
rebels were also limited.  He said the U.S. would try to 
influence them.  He suggested that the EU and U.S. both 
attempt to do so together.  The rebels had started their 
rebellion with no political agenda.  Salim's process could 
identify an outcome that we should persuade the rebels to 
accept. 
 
¶15.  (C)  The Deputy Secretary expressed concern that the 
situation in Darfur would deteriorate.  Violence could 
escalate at any point such that NGOs and the UN would have to 
leave.  Calamity would ensue, with over a million people 
unfed and left to fend for themselves.  He repeated the need 
to push for progress at Abuja, strengthen AMIS, and establish 
the UN mission.  The UN process could take time, and delays 
could complicate existing problems.  The Deputy Secretary 
said that President Bush raised UN peacekeeping during his 
recent visits to India and Pakistan and that we would do so 
with the Egyptian Defense Minister during his Washington 
visit. 
 
¶16.  (C) MFA A/S-equivalent for Africa Joubert said that, 
regarding a UN mission in Sudan, we needed to study carefully 
what its role and mandate would be.  He noted Sudan's 
concerns about such a mission being "too heavy."  The Deputy 
Secretary said that he and Solana discussed this with Taha in 
 
SIPDIS 
Brussels.  The Deputy Secretary emphasized that having a UN 
presence was in Sudan's interest.  Khartoum would be better 
off with the UN present, if only to deflect some of the blame 
for the Darfur situation.  Khartoum would no longer be held 
completely responsible.  The UN mission's mandate could 
depend on the Abuja talks.  It would be important to create 
an environment where refugees and displaced persons were 
confident they could return home safely, without the risk of 
being attacked by the Janjaweed or other groups.  The UN 
mission presented several worries for Khartoum, including 
loss of sovereignty, which would be complicated if there is 
no progress in Abuja.  The Deputy Secretary again noted that 
one challenge was to make Khartoum understand that the UN 
option was in its own interest. 
 
¶17.  (C)  Turning to Joubert's point on the UN mission's 
mandate, The Deputy Secretary said the mission would require 
a robust one.  A lightly armed force would face the same 
difficulties as AMIS in dealing with relatively well-armed 
hostile forces.  He stressed the needed for an environment 
conducive to a return home by those displaced.  We would have 
to keep discussing with the Sudanese.  Successful talks in 
Abuja would make this easier. 
 
CHAD 
 
¶18.  (C)  During the discussion of Sudan, the Deputy 
Secretary asked about Libya's interests.  Bonnecorse said 
 
SIPDIS 
Libya was now engaging France in regional issues such as 
Sudan, whereas for 30 years it wanted to have nothing to do 
with France in the region, and he offered French assistance 
engaging the Libyans.  The Deputy Secretary and Bonnecorse 
 
PARIS 00002067  004 OF 006 
 
 
then focused on Chad.  Regarding the recent meeting in 
Tripoli, Bonnecorse said that one negative point was that 
trust between Chad and Sudan had not been re-established in 
Tripoli.  One positive development was that support by one 
side for the other side's rebels had diminished somewhat.  He 
said that France "knew" that Chad was helping Sudanese rebels 
in Darfur politically and militarily, and that rebels in Chad 
opposed to Deby were being helped by Sudan.  He did not know 
the extent to which Sudanese help was attributable to Bashir 
himself or came from local factions.  He said there were some 
7,000 armed Chadians, supplied by Sudan, in the border areas 
and that their objective was to march on Ndjamena. 
Bonnecorse said that in addition to his fears of being 
overthrown, Deby and many others in Chad were concerned about 
the "ethnic cleansing" taking place in Darfur and the 
possibility that it could spread to Chad. 
 
¶19.  (C)  The Deputy Secretary noted recent discussions 
between the French and U.S. ambassadors in Ndjamena on the 
succession issue and contingencies.  He said the U.S. 
welcomed these exchanges and would like the U.S. and France 
to continue consulting on these matters.  The U.S. shared 
France's concern over developments in Chad.  We would prefer 
that Deby not be destabilized, but at the same time, were 
worried about his strength and ability to continue.  Deby 
seemed to be moving forward to the May elections, but had not 
instituted UNDP reforms.  If he went forward with elections, 
would there be a risk of instability?  Would these elections 
be accepted?  Even if elections were successfully held and he 
retained power, how much longer would he last?  Could an 
election victory followed a year later by stepping down from 
power lead to a peaceful transition?  These were some of the 
things that we needed consider but for which there were no 
easy answers, the Deputy Secretary said. 
 
¶20.  (C)  Bonnecorse agreed that discussions between the two 
ambassadors in Chad were useful and thought they should 
continue.  He said it would be difficult for France to 
support the notion of Chad's not going forward with 
elections, as some have suggested.  Bonnecorse thought Deby 
would implement some of the UNDP's suggested reforms and do 
something for the opposition before the elections. 
Bonnecorse noted that everyone assumed it would be "easy" for 
Deby to win, but France had always said that if the 
opposition united behind one candidate, it would have a 
chance of winning.  The opposition, however, refused to do 
so.  They will run five or six candidates, thus making it 
easy for Deby to win.  Bonnecorse predicted Deby would make 
some political gesture at opening up, but it was difficult to 
say whether the opposition would be receptive to such a 
gesture.  When asked about Deby's health, Bonnecorse said he 
had recently received treatment at the American Hospital in 
Paris.  He "looks better," Bonnecorse remarked. 
 
¶21.  (C)  The Deputy Secretary asked whether holding 
elections and making overtures to the opposition risked 
encouraging instability.  Joubert believed that given current 
conditions, the risk for turmoil was not high.  On the other 
hand, Joubert said Deby also feared being overthrown by 
members of his own clan.  This would create a void.  Deby has 
made clear that he has always defended the rights of his 
Zaghawa ethnic group.  The Deputy Secretary commented that 
elections could help identify a successor to Deby.  But he 
acknowledged that there was no identifiable successor at 
present.  Joubert agreed, saying that France had been 
advising Deby to broaden his appeal and create a more 
multi-ethnic base of support.  Bonnecorse agreed on the 
difficulty of identifying a successor to Deby.  He lamented 
that Chad in many ways was not really a state but rather a 
collection of warlords.  Despite this, for the past 15 years, 
Chad has been relatively stable, the first such period it has 
had since independence.  All agreed that another 15 years of 
stability would be most welcome. 
 
¶22.  (C)  Bonnecorse referred to a ministerial meeting on 
March 8 in Tripoli, a follow-up to the previous meeting 
involving the same countries.  Foreign Ministers from Chad 
and Sudan were present.  He understood that there was an 
agreement to develop concrete measures on joint border 
patrols.  France had indicated that it could help with air 
monitoring, if the parties requested French assistance. 
 
¶23.  (C)  Discussion returned to Libya and its motives and 
objectives regarding Sudan and Chad.  Bonnecorse noted the 
complex relations between the three countries, as well as 
previous attempts to create multilateral arrangements in the 
region that had not succeeded (e.g., Sudan/Chad/CAR border 
patrolling).  Bonnecorse referred to Qadhafi's megalomania 
 
PARIS 00002067  005 OF 006 
 
 
and desire to be the first president of the "United States of 
Africa." 
 
¶24.  (C)  The Deputy Secretary and Bonnecorse agreed on the 
need for continued consultations on Chad and the succession 
issue. 
 
COTE D'IVOIRE 
 
¶25.  (C)  Bonnecorse thanked the U.S. for its attention to 
Cote d'Ivoire and its willingness to have senior-level 
participation in the International Working Group (IWG).  This 
was an important signal to illustrate the seriousness of U.S. 
engagement.  On the current situation, Bonnecorse said that 
more and more African leaders were telling the French there 
would be no solution as long as the incumbent (e.g., Gbagbo) 
stayed in power.  Bonnecorse said France also preferred a 
stronger international presence in Cote d'Ivoire, including a 
stronger UNOCI, mentioning 1,500 additional forces.  He 
predicted that elections in Cote d'Ivoire would not take 
place in October as scheduled. 
 
¶26.  (C)  The Deputy Secretary said that Banny's appointment 
as Prime Minister was a positive step (with which Bonnecorse 
agreed).  He reiterated U.S. support for the IWG and 
indicated that Washington officials would attend some of its 
meetings, in combination with the U.S. ambassador in Abidjan. 
 He noted the poor security situation in the north and west 
of Cote d'Ivoire. 
 
¶27.  (C)  As for strengthening UNOCI, the Deputy Secretary 
said France seemed to understand the U.S. desire not to risk 
destabilizing Liberia.  However, UNMEE in Ethiopia and 
Eritrea would perhaps wind down soon, freeing up resources 
for use in Cote d'Ivoire.  He understood that France would 
like more police forces rather than soldiers in Cote d'Ivoire 
(which Bonnecorse confirmed).  The Deputy Secretary suggested 
P-3 discussions on how to proceed in Cote d'Ivoire.  We 
should also work to strengthen PM Banny. 
 
¶28.  (C)  Bonnecorse agreed with the Deputy Secretary's 
analysis.  France supported PM Banny as well -- "the only 
good news we've had in 3 and 1/2 years."  Bonnecorse said 
that two ways to strengthen him were the IWG process and an 
enhanced UN presence to counteract the extremists in the 
Gbagbo camp.  Joubert said that any new mandate put in place 
if UNOCI enlarges should allow for UN forces to exert greater 
control over Cote d'Ivoire's radio and television 
broadcasting facility, which the pro-Gbagbo mob always seizes 
to use for propaganda purpose whenever trouble erupts. 
(COMMENT:  Bonnecorse's suggestion that UNOCI be enhanced was 
expressed in very moderate, unaggressive terms.  END COMMENT.) 
 
BENIN 
 
¶29.  (C)  Bonnecorse then raised concerns about democracy in 
Benin.  He noted that the first round of elections had taken 
place on March 5, with the second round scheduled for April. 
President Kerekou had not changed the 1990 constitution and 
by its terms was not able to seek re-election.  However, 
Bonnecorse said that members of Kerekou's entourage wanted 
him to run again.  Bonnecorse understood that they had a plan 
to cancel the results of the March 5 election on the basis of 
some invented subterfuge, and then declare that Kerekou must 
stay in power until "proper" elections could be held. 
 
¶30.  (C)  Bonnecorse said that if this "coup" happened, the 
international community would need to condemn it swiftly and 
strongly. Two-thirds of Benin's population had stated their 
desire for a change in leadership, he observed. 
 
¶31.  (C)  The Deputy Secretary noted the recently concluded 
Millennium Challenge Account with Benin, which was based 
partly on democracy and good governance principles.  He said 
the U.S. would use its MCA leverage if necessary in response 
to problems that might arise in Benin along the lines 
Bonnecorse mentioned.  The two sides agreed to remain in 
contact on events in Benin. 
 
CHARLES TAYLOR 
 
¶32.  (C)  Bonnecorse said that France understood that 
Liberia's President Johnson-Sirleaf had met with Nigerian 
President Obasanjo within the past few days and had agreed on 
a plan to transfer Charles Taylor first to Freetown, and then 
to the Hague, for prosecution.  Bonnecorse said the UN 
Security Council would likely have to approve this course of 
action. 
 
PARIS 00002067  006 OF 006 
 
 
 
¶33.  (C)  The Deputy Secretary said his knowledge of the 
situation was similar to Bonnecorse's.  Bonnecorse said 
France had "general" information that a member of the UNSC 
might not agree to UNSC authorization of Taylor's transfer. 
He said that the agreement so far was backed only by 
Johnson-Sirleaf and Obasanjo -- he was not aware that any 
other African leaders had taken a position.  Bonnecorse said 
he hoped that the UNSC could act quickly on this matter. 
France very much wanted to avoid having Taylor spend any 
significant time in Sierra Leone, given the risk that his 
supporters might try to free him from confinement.  D Special 
Assistant Smith noted that the Dutch seemed opposed to a 
Chapter VII UNSC resolution on Taylor; Joubert said France 
was aware of and did not support the Dutch position. 
 
¶34.  (C)  The Deputy Secretary agreed to study the issue 
further.  He thought problems with China in the UNSC could be 
avoided, as long as the Chinese were consulted early and the 
issue was presented in a way consistent with China's 
interests.  China had not been a problem regarding Sudan and 
the AU/UN issue, he noted. 
 
¶35.  (C)  The meeting concluded with the Deputy Secretary 
telling Bonnecorse that he would keep in touch on the issues 
they had discussed, and would inform him of anything 
noteworthy from his talks later in the day with Salim 
concerning Sudan. 
 
¶36.  (U)  The Deputy Secretary's office has cleared this 
message. 
 
 
 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
 
Stapleton