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RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0688

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 001919 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2016 
TAGS: PREL KDEM PGOV PREF PINR TO FR
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH GILCHRIST OLYMPIO:  "I'M READY TO 
ENGAGE IN DIALOGUE, BUT THE LOME SIDE IS BLOCKING" 
 
REF: A. LOME 332 
     ¶B. GALINDO/DUNN/KANEDA E-MAILS 
 
PARIS 00001919  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By:  Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reason 
1.4 (b/d). 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  Gilchrist Olympio, Paris-based UFC chief 
and opposition leader, told us March 23 that he was prepared 
to engage in national dialogue with the Faure regime but 
asserted that the regime was blocking the dialogue by not 
agreeing on the naming of a mediator/facilitator of the 
talks.  The GOT had caused UN Special Advisor Brahimi, who 
was ready to assume that role, to step away when the GOT 
proposed that Brahimi accept a deputy for the talks nominated 
by the GOT with, Olympio claimed, connections to the Faure 
regime.  Burkina Faso President Campaore went to Lome this 
week to try to resolve this issue.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C)  Per refs A and B, we called on Gilchrist Olympio on 
March 23 and discussed for over an hour events in Togo, 
including the issue of a national dialogue.  Isaac Tchiakpe, 
the Counselor for Communication of Olympio's UFC (Union des 
Force de Changement), also participated. 
 
AFTER EYADEMA'S DEATH AND THROUGH 2005 
 
¶3.  (C)  Olympio began by describing the meetings and 
discussions that took place after former president Eyadema's 
death early in 2005.  He noted the manner in which Nigerian 
President Obasanjo, in his role as AU Chairman, had gotten 
involved in Togo soon after Eyadema's death.  Olympio 
indicated that Obasanjo's early engagement was a mixed 
blessing.  On the one hand, the succession issue in Togo 
deserved the attention of a statesman of Obasanjo's stature. 
On the other, however, the impression that Obasanjo was 
taking control of the issue may have lulled observers into a 
false sense of security, which contributed, in Olympio's 
view, to the noticeable decrease in criticism by the 
international community of the way that Faure succeeded his 
father. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Olympio discussed the meetings that took place 
during 2005, some under the aegis of Obasanjo's leadership or 
in conjunction with Sant'Egidio, and some which both Olympio 
and Faure attended.  At several points UN Secretary-General 
Annan had also expressed his interest in Togo and the efforts 
to promote discussion between Faure and Olympio.  Olympio 
said he quickly concluded that Faure (whom he consistently 
called "le garcon" or "le fils" during our meeting) had not 
changed and would not change, although he was better at 
projecting a positive image than his father had been.  (NOTE: 
 Olympio's description of these different meetings and talks 
was at times difficult to follow as he did not discuss them 
in chronological order or provide much context.  END NOTE.) 
 
¶5.  (C)  The series of meetings in 2005 were not productive, 
Olympio said, owing to an excessive focus on establishing 
agendas and modalities.  He blamed the Faure regime for the 
lack of progress.  At one point he said that Faure did not 
want to talk because discussions might be the first step in a 
long process that might eventually lead to the end of the 
Gnassingbe dynasty.  Olympio said that Faure would thus block 
and impede where possible and at the same time do his utmost 
to make it look like others, such as Olympio, were the 
obstacles to progress and reconciliation. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Even the temptation of making peace with the EU by 
meeting its 22 conditions, and thereby allow EU assistance to 
flow to Togo, was not strong enough for Faure to change, 
Olympio suggested.  He and Tchiakpe noted the regime's many 
criminal activities (e.g., drug and arms trafficking) that 
would always supply sufficient income for the Faure regime to 
meet at least its immediate needs, if not provide a life of 
luxury for a chosen few. 
 
¶7.  (C)  Olympio said that in the early days of the Faure 
regime, when a slight possibility of change existed, he was 
very concerned about the legal obstacles Eyadema had enacted 
towards the end of his life, which Olympio believed were 
designed to impede specifically Olympio's political 
ambitions.  These were laws on residency, one's ancestors, 
financial situation, and the like that made it difficult for 
Olympio to run for office in compliance with Togolese law. 
 
¶8.  (C)  These issues became of lesser concern as time passed 
and the likelihood of Olympio's running for office dimmed. 
In later talks with Obasanjo, Campaore, and others, Olympio 
said that the issues he was most concerned about, and which 
 
PARIS 00001919  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
could form the main agenda topics in discussions with Faure, 
were the Togolese army, political prisoners, Togolese 
refugees, and an transparent electoral framework.  These 
subjects were passed to Faure but, Olympio said, there had 
never been a clear response. 
 
CURRENT STATE OF PLAY 
 
¶9.  (C)  Tchiakpe said that Elysee Africa Advisor Michel de 
Bonnecorse was responsible for bringing Burkina Faso 
President Campaore into current efforts to promote dialogue, 
and that Bonnecorse's efforts regarding Campaore began on 
February 1, 2006.  Olympio said that he had no objection to 
Campaore's playing an oversight role in any talks between 
Olympio and Faure, but he preferred having an on-site 
mediator/facilitator who would attend and "referee" the talks 
in a neutral manner.  Olympio indicated that at some point UN 
Secretary-General Annan suggested his Special Advisor, 
 
SIPDIS 
Lakhdar Brahimi, for this role.  Olympio said that Brahimi, 
with his vast experience and excellent reputation, was a 
perfect choice.  It would not be a bad idea, Olympio 
continued, if the U.S. and EU sent observers to attend the 
talks, if for no other reason than to counter whatever spin 
the GOT might employ when providing press briefings on the 
discussions. 
 
¶10.  (C)  However, according to Olympio, Faure proceeded to 
deliberately derail the process.  He did so by proposing that 
Brahimi take on as his deputy someone (whom Olympio did not 
name or otherwise clearly identify) that Olympio considered 
to be close to the Faure regime.  According to Olympio, 
Brahimi balked at this suggestion and said that when he 
accepted an assignment, he carried out the work his way and 
with a staff, if any, he chose.  He then said he would not 
serve so long as Togo kept on the table the idea of Brahimi's 
having to accept a deputy, especially one not of his choosing. 
 
¶11.  (C)  Olympio said that it was thus Lome's fault that 
there was no national dialogue.  He said several times:  "I 
am ready to talk with them anytime -- tomorrow -- if only 
they would agree to Brahimi (or someone of equal experience 
and stature) as a mediator or facilitator, and cease making 
their demands about a 'deputy.'"  He cautioned:  "Faure and 
his people will always -- ALWAYS -- do whatever they think is 
necessary to present themselves in a positive light and to 
make it look like the opposition is stalling." 
 
¶12.  (C)  Asked several times about his willingness to talk 
and what might entice him to engage in dialogue, Olympio 
said:  "It's simple.  All they have to do is agree on the 
mediator issue.  Then we can talk.  Of course, they are 
capable of coming up with other obstacles if we overcome this 
one." 
 
¶13.  (C)  Olympio said he traveled to Ouagadougou to discuss 
all of these matters with Campaore, and they met for three 
hours during the evening of March 17.  Olympio said he 
stressed the Brahimi problem and asked that Campaore, if he 
were to meet with the other side, try to resolve this 
problem.  Olympio said that Campaore understood the issue and 
that it was one of the main topics he intended to raise in 
Lome during his visit there during the week of March 20. 
 
VIEWS OF THE FRENCH 
 
¶14.  (C)  Throughout the conversation, Olympio and Tchiakpe 
expressed disappointment with France.  First, the issue of 
Eyadema's "friendship" with President Chirac was a very sore 
point.  They both commented on France's tendency to seek 
stability in its former colonies.  If a "strong man" was the 
best way of achieving stability, France had no qualms about 
supporting the "strong man."  It had done so in Togo for 
decades.  There was a hint of sadness in Olympio's voice when 
he continued, "and they are doing the same thing now with the 
boy."  He expressed bitterness at what he termed France's 
perfunctory condemnation of Faure's accession to power and 
its quick return to "business as usual." 
 
¶15.  (C)  NOTE:  We discussed Togo and Olympio very briefly 
in a March 21 meeting on Chad with MFA DAS-equivalent for 
West Africa Bruno Foucher, commenting, without being more 
specific, that there was a perception that Olympio was not 
doing enough to engage in national dialogue with the GOT, 
thus impeding progress on the EU's 22 conditions.  Foucher 
responded curtly, saying that the GOF had very little to do 
with Olympio directly.  Echoing earlier comments, Foucher 
said that Olympio really needed to do his part to get the 
national dialogue going.  END NOTE. 
 
PARIS 00001919  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
U.S. AND TOGO 
 
¶16.  (C)  Olympio offered brief comments when asked what the 
U.S. might do regarding Togo.  He said the U.S. should 
increase its attention.  He noted that "you are very involved 
in Cote d'Ivoire in the IWG.  Perhaps you could play a 
stronger leadership role in Togo."  He also said that the 
U.S. should remain vigilant in terms of Faure's constant 
efforts to present himself as reasonable and the opposition 
as disorganized, unfocused, and ineffective.  He noted that 
U.S. pressure could often be a powerful force for change, and 
that pressure was something the Faure regime understood. 
 
¶17.  (C)  COMMENT:  Olympio was an engaging interlocutor, 
quick to identify the thrust and implication of our 
questions.  His discourse, however, was at times difficult to 
follow because of its lack of precision and chronology and 
his tendency to speak elliptically.  There was a slight air 
of fatigue and resignation as well, which seemed a product of 
having seen Eyadema's passing without, so far, being able to 
profit from it.  He was careful at all times to blame the 
Faure regime for the failure to engage in national dialogue. 
 
¶18.  (C) COMMENT CONT'D:  It was also evident that Olympio 
considers himself the only true opposition figure of 
importance, and he was not shy about name dropping or 
suggesting that someone like Obasanjo views him as an equal. 
In his few references to other opposition elements, he tended 
to dismiss them as inconsequential, not in a mean-spirited 
manner but rather, in his view, as a matter of fact.  END 
COMMENT. 
 
 
 
 
 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
 
Stapleton