VZCZCXRO7488
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHFR #1370/01 0621917
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 031917Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4798
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES  PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 001370 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/20/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM AG MO TU WS FR
SUBJECT: NEA/MAG DIRECTOR JORDAN REVIEWS MAGHREB ISSUES 
WITH FRENCH MFA 
 
REF: A. PARIS 282 
 
     ¶B. 05 PARIS 7777 
 
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: NEA/MAG Director William Jordan's February 
27 meetings with MFA counterparts addressed the Western 
Sahara conflict, Moroccan-Algerian relations, human rights 
issues in Tunisia, and Libya.  On Western Sahara, MFA 
officials agreed with Jordan on the need for Morocco to be 
more forward-leaning on automony, but suggested Algeria was 
more to blame than Rabat for increased inflexibility.  MFA 
officials advocated preserving MINURSO, but offered differing 
responses on prospects for joint action by France, Spain, and 
the U.S., with FM Douste-Blazy's cabinet advisor on the 
Maghreb more forward-leaning on the latter issue.  MFA 
officials, while expressing uncertainty and concern on 
post-Bouteflika Algeria, expressed greater worry about 
Morocco's future stability over the next five to ten years, 
particularly given growing Islamist influence.  On Tunisia, 
MFA officials concurred with U.S. human rights concerns and 
emphasized discreet GoF efforts to address the issue, 
asserting that public pressure on the GOT tends to be 
counterproductive.  On Libya, MFA officials concurred on the 
need for speedy release of the Bulgarian/Palestinian medical 
personnel, and confirmed that five HIV-infected Libyan 
children (out of an expected total of 150) had arrived in 
France for treatment.  End summary. 
 
WESTERN SAHARA, MOROCCO AND ALGERIA 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶2.  (C) MFA DAS-equivalent Christian Testot shared Jordan's 
distress at the rigidity of Morocco, Algeria, and POLISARIO 
in their positions on the Western Sahara dispute, and agreed 
that the food shortages in Sahrawi camps required 
international attention.  Deploying the traditional argument 
that Western Sahara is a "survival issue" for Morocco but not 
Algeria, Testot described the Algerian government as having 
the upper hand over Morocco, due to booming oil prices, 
Algeria's increased leadership role in the Arab world, 
improved relations with the West, and Morocco's concurrent 
economic difficulties and weak leadership.  This elevated GOA 
confidence, in Testot's view, prompted a more rigid GOA 
stance on Western Sahara, which in turn reinforced the 
POLISARIO's refusal to accept anything less than 
self-determination (to include the possibility of 
independence). 
 
¶3. (C) When asked prospects for joint efforts by the U.S., 
France, and Spain, Testot voiced reluctance, citing Algerian 
unreceptivity to hearing any messages on Western Sahara from 
France, given its perception that France was totally biased 
in Morocco's favor.  He also observed that although the 
French and Spanish positions were not far apart, Western 
Sahara remained an internal issue for Spain, which was not 
the case for France.  In the GoF view, the key to progress on 
the Western Sahara remained dialogue between Algiers and 
Rabat, beginning with bilateral issues other than the Western 
Sahara, such as opening the border.  Testot stressed that the 
U.S. could play an important role in encouraging Algiers to 
be more open to dialogue with Rabat, commending U.S. success 
in securing GOA cooperation with the POLISARIO's 2005 release 
of Moroccan POWs.  For its part, the GoF had encouraged the 
Moroccan government to enlarge its concept of autonomy and 
not to present an offer in April which would be rejected out 
of hand by the POLISARIO.  Further on UNSC consideration of 
MINURSO renewal in April, Testot stressed the need to 
preserve MINURSO and avoid "electro-shock" measures which 
could endanger the fragile cease-fire between the parties. 
 
¶4. (C) In a separate discussion, MFA Cabinet Advisor for the 
Maghreb/Arabian Gulf Francois Touazi stressed the threat 
posed by the Western Sahara conflict to the stability of the 
Maghreb region.  Like Testot, Touazi stressed the 
intractability of the Algerian position on Western Sahara, 
noting he had attended recent GoF discussions with the GOA 
and was taken aback by Algerian vehemence in refusing to 
discuss the issue with Rabat.  Touazi speculated that the 
expected visit to Algiers by UNSYG Personal Envoy for Western 
Sahara Peter Van Walsum would be very difficult, and 
expressed his personal view that Van Walsum had little chance 
of success unless France, Spain, and the U.S. considered 
joint initiatives to support his efforts. 
 
¶5. (C) Touazi echoed Testot's view that the solution to the 
Western Sahara remained in direct dialogue between Rabat and 
Algiers.  He differed from Testot, however, in concluding 
that it may be easier to solicit constructive gestures from 
Rabat than Algiers, given the high confidence and increased 
 
PARIS 00001370  002 OF 002 
 
 
intractability of the GOA.  Touazi described Morocco as in an 
increasingly weak position vis-a-vis an ascendant Algiers, 
and fearful of both U.S. and French efforts to "court" 
Algeria.  Morocco's 2007 elections and rising Islamist 
influence also weakened the GOM's position, making it 
impossible for the GOM to go too far on concessions on the 
Western Sahara.  Touazi nonetheless suggested informal 
U.S.-French-Spanish brainstorming to consider ways to 
encourage Rabat to pursue "creative" formulas on autonomy 
which fall within its red-lines.  Touazi also called for 
further reflection on what incentives could be offered to 
push Algiers towards accepting dialogue with Rabat.  Jordan 
agreed to consider possibilities for further informal 
coordination between the U.S., Spain, and France at the 
working-level, without making further commitments. 
 
¶6. (C) Comparing the internal situations in Algeria and 
Morocco, Touazi concluded that he was more worried about 
prospects for instability in Morocco in the next five to ten 
years, particularly due to the lack of capacity of the 
government and rising Islamic extremism.  While the GoF 
remained concerned about Bouteflika's health, Touazi observed 
that the Algerian president seemed to have retaken the reins 
of power after his hospitalization and was continuing to 
consolidate his power base within the GOA.  Touazi declined 
to speculate on who might succeed Bouteflika, noting the 
total "opacity" of the Algerian system.  He speculated that 
possible instability after Bouteflika's demise would more 
likely result from tensions within different spheres of power 
in the government, rather than the "Islamist contagion," 
which had been contained by the GOA.  Touazi also expressed 
concern about the GOA's continued failure to address 
socio-economic inequalities in the wake of booming oil prices 
and a population prone to violence. 
 
 
TUNISIA HUMAN RIGHTS 
-------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Both Testot and Touazi agreed with NEA/MAG Director 
Jordan that Tunisia's continued political repression was in 
direct contradiction with the country's socio-economic 
advances and threatened the longterm stability of the 
country, particularly in the post-Ben Ali phase.  Testot and 
Touazi described the GoF as becoming more outspoken on human 
rights in Tunisia, noting that FM Douste-Blazy, during an 
October 2005 visit to Tunis, declared human rights to be an 
important part of bilateral dialogue -- the first time a 
French minister had made such a declaration.  (As reported 
ref b Douste-Blazy also met with Tunisian League of Human 
Rights members during that visit, another first for a French 
FM.)  The GoF had also increased its private entreaties to 
the GOT, expressing concern about the deteriorating human 
rights situation.  While conceding that GoF efforts have 
brought no tangible results, Testot counseled against public 
pressure on the GoT.  Direct confrontation, he argued, would 
be counterproductive, causing Tunisia to turn inward and 
possibly increasive repressive measures. 
 
LIBYA 
----- 
 
¶8.  (C) Testot and Touazi concurred with Jordan on the need 
for a speedy release of the Bulgarian nurses and Palestinian 
doctor and stressed that FM Douste-Blazy, who is a physician 
and former minister of health, has a strong personal interest 
in the issue.  Touazi described his efforts, on the FM's 
behalf, to initiate contacts with the families of the some 
400 children in Benghazi infected with HIV/AIDS. (Ref a 
reports on Douste-Blazy's January 2006 trip to Libya, which 
focused on the imprisoned medics issue.)  Touazi confirmed 
the GoF offer to treat some 150 of the children in France, 
the first five of whom arrived in Paris February 27.  While 
Testot sought additional information on U.S.-UK efforts to 
launch an international foundation to treat the Libyan 
children, he reiterated that the GoF did not intend to make a 
financial contribution to the foundation. 
 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
 
Stapleton