VZCZCXYZ0066
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNC #0455/01 0871546
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 281546Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5759
INFO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 4595
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY 3540
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1153
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY 0439
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0503
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000455 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2021 
TAGS: PREL PGOV EUN CY
SUBJECT: PAPADOPOULOS CONFIDENT THAT UN PROCESS, TURKISH EU 
ACCESSION, LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS ALL GOING HIS WAY 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher; Reason 1.4 (b) 
and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  In one-on-one Sunday lunch, Ambassador 
Schlicher and President Papadopoulos discussed prospects for 
moving forward with "technical talks" between representatives 
of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities, as well 
as Turkey's EU accession process and domestic political 
jockeying in advance of the May 21 Parliamentary elections. 
Although he seemed somewhat tired, Papadopoulos exuded the 
confident air of a politician who senses that the game is 
moving in his direction.  Papadopoulos agreed with the 
Ambassador that the technical committees should begin work as 
soon as possible, but stressed that issues of substance would 
also have to be addressed.  Papadopoulos expressed generic 
support for Turkey's EU agenda, but warned that he would 
defend Cyprus' national interests in the accession process 
and would not allow Ankara to slough off its obligations. 
The Ambassador emphasized the need for Cyprus to exercise 
extreme caution in handling this issue as a derailment of 
Turkey's EU accession negotiations would almost certainly 
have immediate and adverse reflections on the Cyprus problem. 
 Papadopoulos noted that there were a number of options 
available short of killing the process altogether.  On 
elections, Papadopoulos predicted that his own DIKO would 
improve its position and AKEL would likely retain the title 
as the single largest party.  End Summary. 
 
Technical Talks Are Not Enough 
------------------------------ 
 
¶2.  (C)  In a private lunch on March 26 hosted by President 
Papadopoulos, Ambassador Schlicher stressed the importance of 
allowing the UN-led "technical committees" to begin their 
work without conditioning this on an agreement for handling 
the so-called political issues.  We had been giving this same 
message to the Turkish Cypriot side and the Ambassador noted 
that he would reinforce this in his March 27 meeting with 
Talat (septel).  Papadopoulos replied that he saw no reason 
why the technical committees should not start work in those 
areas where there was clear agreement, but, "as I repeatedly 
told Annan," he added, "the issues of substance must also be 
addressed.  The Ambassador stressed that the USG also 
recognized the need for a political track, and the sooner the 
parties engaged with Moeller and let the technical committees 
get to work the sooner we would all see how to flesh out such 
 
a track. 
 
¶3.  (C) Papadopoulos asked, in a largely rhetorical fashion, 
why the Turkish Cypriots and Ankara had reacted so badly to 
the Paris meeting when "if they actually read the statement, 
they would find things in it that Annan intended for them." 
The Ambassador noted that the Turkish Cypriots seemed to be 
responding to the government spokesman's spin rather than to 
the actual communique.  Papadopoulos replied that a few days 
post-Paris he and his government had consciously toned down 
their reactions.  The government's response to the Gambari 
letter to Talat would be equally circumspect.  "There are 
things in the letter that we do not like and do not consider 
especially accurate," the President said, adding that this 
was acceptable if it helped get the parties to the table.  It 
was possible, Papadopoulos mused, that the Turkish Cypriots 
and Turkey would try to freeze the technical committees until 
after the parliamentary elections in May in the hope of 
damaging the President's party.  "This would mean," however, 
"that they don't understand the politics on this side." 
 
EU/Turkey "Club" 
---------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) The President then turned to the issue of Turkey's EU 
accession process and expressed considerable surprise that 
Ankara "not even making a pretense that would help in the 
fall's review."  Alluding to a putative statement by 
Assistant Secretary Fried to Foreign Minister Iacovou that 
the United States "will not let" Cyprus obstruct Turkey's EU 
track, Papadopoulos said that "the real question for your 
government should be whether you are going to allow the 
Turkish military to obstruct Erdogan."  The Ambassador 
stressed the need for Cyprus to exercise extreme caution in 
handling this issue since a derailment in Turkey's EU 
accession process -- in addition to the strategic stakes 
involved -- would almost certainly have immediate and adverse 
reflections on the Cyprus problem.  Papadopoulos agreed, but 
noted that, firstly, no one should expect him to compromise 
on Cyprus' national interests for the sake of facilitating 
movement in Turkey's negotiations with the EU when Ankara was 
trying to slough off its obligations.  Secondly, Papadopoulos 
maintained that several EU states -- not only Cyprus -- would 
be making an anti-Turkey case in the review process.  The 
Ambassador reiterated his warning about the dangers for 
Cyprus of a breakdown in Turkey's EU accession process. 
Papadopoulos again agreed, but Turkey had to decide whether 
it wanted to join the EU "club" or not.  The President 
further mused that there were various potential options short 
of killing the accession process, including:  suspension, 
postponement, and identifying specific "benchmarks" that 
could re-start a stalled process. 
 
Kids Just Don't Listen 
---------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C)  The Ambassador asked Papadopoulos for his views on 
the May 21 parliamentary elections.  Papadopoulos noted that 
he had instructed his ministers to keep their involvement in 
the campaigning to an absolute minimum, since things said in 
the heat of political combat could have a negative impact on 
the post-election task of governing.  He believed his DIKO 
party could improve its position by as many as 5-8 percentage 
points.  AKEL and DISY would both be slightly down.  The race 
between them for the first position would be extremely close, 
but Papadopoulos felt AKEL would probably retain that 
distinction.  The President believed that his son, Nicholas, 
a DIKO candidate in Nicosia, was doing reasonably well so 
far.  He claimed, however, to have counseled the 34-year-old 
that he was moving into electoral politics too quickly. 
Papadopoulos would have preferred that Nicholas spend more 
time securing his position in the family law firm before 
running for office.  His political life could now put him at 
a relative disadvantage vis-a-vis the children of other 
senior partners in the firm.  Papadopoulos suspected that 
Nicholas' substantial trust fund from his mother's side of 
the family had undercut his commitment to the law firm. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶6. (C)  Although Papadopoulos seemed tired and somewhat 
haggard through the conversation, he exuded the air of a 
politician who sensed the game was going in his direction. 
Moreover, it seemed clear that -- whether or not the 
technical talks process ultimately takes off -- the President 
believes his domestic interests are covered as long as it is 
the Turkish Cypriot side that is seen as doing the 
foot-dragging.  END COMMENT. 
 
SCHLICHER