VZCZCXRO0481
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHNC #0447/01 0831052
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 241052Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5747
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0497

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NICOSIA 000447 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL EUN TU CY
SUBJECT: TALAT'S ILLNESS LEAVES TURKISH CYPRIOTS RUDDERLESS 
 
REF: A. LIBBY-INGMANSON EMAIL (2/27/06) 
 
     ¶B. NICOSIA 294 
     ¶C. NICOSIA SIPRNET DAILY REPORT (3/16/06) 
     ¶D. NICOSIA SIPRNET DAILY REPORT (3/21/06) 
     ¶E. NICOSIA 273 
 
Classified By: Ambassador R. Schlicher, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY.  The Turkish Cypriots have been foundering in 
a political vacuum since "TRNC President" Mehmet Ali Talat's 
February bypass surgery.  Subsequent political developments 
with regard to EU aid and UN-brokered talks have caught the 
Turkish Cypriots flatfooted, prompting muddled responses from 
a rudderless "TRNC" that has been left in the hands of 
bickering political rivals.  As Talat gradually gets back to 
work over the next month, the Turkish Cypriots will likely 
adopt a more decisive, coherent political approach to the 
outside world -- with all the positives and negatives this 
entails.  Ambassador Schlicher is to see Talat on March 27. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
TALAT OUT OF COMMISSION 
----------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat has been 
temporarily removed from the political scene since his 
unexpected coronary bypass surgery on February 27 (ref a). 
Talat's extended convalescence started with a 2-week 
hospitalization in Turkey, and has been followed by several 
weeks of bed rest at home in Kyrenia.  According to Talat's 
private secretary, "the President" will remain away from the 
office for another ten days, and may not be back to work full 
time until April or even May. 
 
¶3. (C) Talat's illness has left a serious vacuum at the heart 
of Turkish Cypriot politics.  Although the "TRNC" continued 
to function with "Parliament" Speaker Fatma Ekenoglu taking 
on the role of "acting president," Talat's absence was 
nonetheless keenly felt.  As the directly elected leader of 
the Turkish Cypriot community, Talat enjoys a legitimacy 
abroad -- and therefore authority at home and with Turkey -- 
not shared by any other officials of the unrecognized "TRNC." 
 Although members of his inner circle acknowledge that he 
takes decisions in consultation with his close friends and 
allies on the powerful Central Committee of the ruling CTP, 
Talat's public stature is nonetheless unmatched.  Whatever 
sway the CTP's Central Committee enjoys behind the scenes, it 
cannot match the "presidential" bully pulpit in terms of 
credibility. 
 
¶4. (C) Furthermore, Talat plays a unique balancing role in 
the antagonistic relationship between "PM" Ferdi Soyer 
(Talat's long-time CTP political ally) and his junior 
coalition partner "DPM/FM" Serdar Denktash (a nationalist 
wing-nut who nonetheless considers Talat a close friend). 
Without frequent refereeing from Talat, Ferdi and Serdar can 
each be counted on to assert themselves on the political 
stage -- in opposite directions, to destructive effect. 
 
BALLS DROPPED, SIGNALS MIXED 
---------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Several important events have taken place since 
Talat's hospitalization -- events to which the politically 
rudderless Turkish Cypriots have responded with muddled 
confusion.  The most noteworthy of these was the February 28 
Annan-Papadopoulos meeting in Paris, which produced a joint 
declaration on bicommunal technical talks, as well as an 
"unacceptable" (from the Turkish Cypriot perspective) 
reference to the politically charged issues of Varosha and 
demilitarization (ref b).  The Turkish Cypriots and Turkey 
personally blame the UN's man on Cyprus, Michael Moeller, for 
the "disastrous" communique.  But since Talat was "doped up 
at the time" (according to his private secretary), he could 
not take charge of -- or seek to moderate -- Turkish Cypriot 
reactions to the Paris meeting.  First off the blocks, 
therefore, was "FM" Serdar (no doubt egged on by Ankara), who 
issued a prickly letter demanding "clarification" from the 
UN.  Meanwhile lower-level employees of the "presidency" led 
by U/S Rasit Pertev sought to outflank Serdar -- whom they 
felt was horning in on the Boss's territory -- by making it 
clear that the Turkish Cypriots took umbrage at Moeller, and 
"freezing communication" with the SRSG. 
 
¶6. (C) The Turkish Cypriots similarly bungled a March 6 visit 
by the European Parliament's "Contact Group" for northern 
Cyprus.  The visit was dominated by a headline-grabbing, 
egg-throwing protest (again, led by Serdar) over the group's 
stated purpose of visiting "Cypriots in the north." ("We're 
Turks!" cried Serdar.)  Political lightweight Ekenoglu and 
the CTP second-stringers, who saw the group in Talat's place, 
were unable to outshout Serdar.  According to one close Talat 
 
NICOSIA 00000447  002 OF 002 
 
 
advisor, the visit should have celebrated the Turkish 
Cypriots' evolving links with Europe, but devolved instead 
into an ugly shouting match since nobody of authority could 
set the proper tone.  "I wonder if they'll ever come back," 
he sighed to us. 
 
CRAWLING BACK TO HIS DESK 
------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Talat is clearly aware that his absence is causing 
problems, and he is slowly trying to reassert himself as his 
health allows.  He has agreed to see Ambassador Schlicher 
(the first foreigner to visit Talat post-op) March 27 to 
discuss the way ahead on UN-brokered talks.  Meanwhile, 
"Presidency" insiders report Talat was behind the decision to 
delay the "TRNC" census (ref c), ordering changes to how the 
survey would handle the potentially explosive question of 
Turkish settlers.  Talat also intervened in a spat between 
Ferdi and Serdar over whether or not to "accept" EU aid (refs 
d and e), inviting the two leaders to a bury-the-hatchet 
session at his bedside and reasserting the policy Talat had 
decided before his operation -- that the "TRNC" would consult 
with the EU on aid, but would not block project 
implementation at this time. 
 
¶8. (C) COMMENT.  Turkish Cypriot "foreign policy" seems 
likely to regain coherence gradually as Talat climbs back 
into the saddle.  But this is no guarantee that the Turkish 
Cypriots will suddenly strike a more reasonable tone, for 
example, in their dealings with the UN.  Talat is a clever 
politician, but sometimes lets his anger get the better of 
him -- leading to counterproductive (albeit coherent) 
policies.  Still, once Talat is back at work full time, there 
will at last be a single interlocutor for the UN and, when 
needed, a clear address for friends like us and the UK to 
lobby for better behavior. 
 
¶9. (C) It is particularly important that the Turkish Cypriots 
re-establish a positive coherence soon, since their 
mishandling of events in Talat's absence, added to a lack of 
positive reinforcement from Ankara in the same time-frame, 
have let Papadopoulos score significant PR points at home and 
elsewhere.  It is very much in the interests of the Turkish 
Cypriots and Ankara to shift the mantle of nay-sayer back 
onto the shoulders of Tassos Papadopoulos.  END COMMENT. 
SCHLICHER