VZCZCXRO8353
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHNC #0380 0731546
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 141546Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5683
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0491

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000380 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL EUN UN TU CY
SUBJECT: TURKISH CYPRIOTS STILL STEWING OVER PARIS 
COMMUNIQUE 
 
REF: A. NICOSIA 294 
 
     ¶B. NICOSIA 273 
 
Classified By: Ambassador R. Schlicher, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) In a March 13 meeting with Ambassador Schlicher, "TRNC 
President" Talat's Under Secretary Rasit Pertev expressed 
continued bitterness over the joint communique issued after 
the Annan-Papadopoulos meeting in Paris on February 28 (ref 
a).  Pertev stressed that both he and "President" Talat felt 
personally betrayed by UNFICYP Chief/SYG Special 
Representative Michael Moller, whom they blamed for the 
inclusion of a "catastrophic" reference to the 
settlement-related issues of Varosha and demilitarization. 
 
¶2. (C) Pertev noted that the Turkish Cypriots had effectively 
frozen their contacts with the UN, partly because of their 
displeasure with Moller, and partly because Talat was not yet 
back to work after his March 12 return from coronary surgery 
in Turkey.  While Pertev noted the SYG would "never lose our 
confidence," he suggested Moller had lost his personal 
credibility as an honest broker by allowing himself to be 
co-opted by the Greek Cypriots.  Half in jest, he wondered if 
Moller was cozying up to the Papadopoulos administration in 
order to ensure his a pleasant, extended assignment on Cyprus. 
 
¶3. (C) In a March 14 meeting with the Ambassador, Turkish 
Ambassador to the "TRNC" Aydan Karahan echoed these 
sentiments.  Moller, who visited Turkey last week, had been 
asked by the GOT to provide clarification for the 
"problematic" references to Varosha and demilitarization in 
the communique.  But Moller's explanation, said Karahan, 
"clarified nothing."  Karahan hastened to add that the GOT 
fully supported the start of technical talks, however, as had 
been previously agreed by the Turkish Cypriot side. 
Acknowledging that the GOT and Turkish Cypriots were in 
"close contact," he reassured the Ambassador that Talat was 
nonetheless empowered to make his own decisions.  Indeed, 
Karahan said, Talat had gone against Turkey's advice by not 
rejecting the EU's recently announced aid package outright 
(ref b), but that Ankara had not objected.  Talat would have 
Ankara's support to engage in UN-brokered technical 
negotiations. 
 
¶4. (C) Ambassador Schlicher stressed to both Pertev and 
Karahan that the Turks and Turkish Cypriots should not allow 
anger over SRSG Moller's perceived role in the Paris 
communique to become an albatross on potentially useful 
technical talks.  Regardless of the spin the GOC has put on 
the Paris declaration, no item could be on the agenda of 
technical talks without the agreement of both sides.  Rather 
than focusing on items of contention, the two sides should 
get down to business by discussing those topics that had 
already been agreed.  The Ambassador also encouraged Pertev 
to move quickly on approving the UN's nominee for Third 
Member on the Committee on Missing Persons.  The Ambassador 
has encouraged both Moller and Pertev to meet with each other 
in the near future to clear the aid and find a way to start 
work in the technical committees.  Moller reported that, as 
of today, Pertev is still refusing to take his calls. 
 
¶5. (C) COMMENT: We will continue to press the Turkish 
Cypriots to overcome their anger at Moller and work with him 
to start technical talks on the list of agreed topics. 
Intellectually, the Turkish Cypriots appear to understand 
that unwillingness to deal with Moller would only play into 
the hands of those who want to portray them as the 
intransigent party.  At the same time, as they freely admit, 
the Turkish Cypriots are leading with their (bruised) 
emotions on this issue. 
 
¶6. (C) Their relationship with UNFICYP will probably not 
change until Talat himself decides to swallow his anger and 
seek a modus vivendi with Moller.  Assuming Talat does indeed 
have the backing of Ankara, he will probably do so eventually 
-- although his extended medical convalescence may mean that 
it will take additional time before the Turkish Cypriots 
engage fully with the UN's man here.  Pertev has neither the 
political strength nor bureaucratic standing to solve a 
problem for which some quarters might assign him, as Moller's 
interlocutor pre-Paris, a measure of blame.  We suggest that 
it would also be very useful to engage the GOT on this issue 
to help calm tensions and get the technical talks on track. 
If this problem is not overcome soon, the Turkish Cypriots 
and GOT run the risk of inheriting the mantle of 
intransigence from Papadopoulos and company.  END COMMENT. 
SCHLICHER