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DE RUEHNC #0352/01 0681042
ZNY CCCCC ZZH (TAO)
O 091042Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5659
INFO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 4576
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY 3522
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1142
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY 0428
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0486
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 00352 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/08/2021 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UN CY
SUBJECT: WHAT NEXT AFTER PARIS? 
 
REF: NICOSIA 294 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher; Reason 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (U) Action requested in para 11. 
 
¶2.  (C) Summary:  One week after the Papadopoulos -Annan 
meeting in Paris, it is clear that the UN and UNFICYP have 
considerable fence-mending to do with Ankara and the Turkish 
Cypriots.  The Turkish Cypriots -- still angry over the 
communique that seemed to indicate they had agreed to discuss 
the status of Varosha, demilitarization, and similar 
hot-button issues in "technical talks" with the Greek 
Cypriots -- have suspended all communication with the UN 
until "President" Talat returns from his hospitalization in 
Istanbul.  There is a risk that this freeze on communications 
could seriously set back UN efforts to appoint a new third 
member to the Committee on Missing Persons (CMP).  Meanwhile, 
the Turkish Cypriot leadership is increasingly open in its 
suspicion of UN SRSG Michael Moller, whom they see as 
reflexively sympathetic to the Greek Cypriot side.  UNFICYP 
is frustrated with what it sees as unwarranted Greek Cypriot 
triumphalism and irritated that the Turkish Cypriots are 
taking their cues from the Greek Cypriot press spin rather 
than from the UN.  In developing our own position on the 
technical talks, it is quite possible that our interest in 
supporting the UN and our interest in supporting Ankara's 
EU-accession process will conflict.  Our recommendation in 
discussing the next steps with UNFICYP and others would be to 
offer strong support for the talks as long as they are 
limited to the ten topics agreed to by the Turkish Cypriot 
side.  In terms of the bigger picture, we are concerned that 
Ankara has lost the initiative on the Cyprus issue and FM 
Gul's January proposal seems unlikely to relieve Turkey of 
its Cyprus obligations.  We may want to have a frank 
conversation with Ankara about putting a more serious Cyprus 
package on the table and thus putting the burden back on 
Tassos Papadopoulos.  End Summary. 
 
What Did They Agree To? 
----------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Turkish Cypriot sources have told us that they -- and 
Ankara -- are still quite angry about the communique that 
emerged from the February 28 Paris talks.  So far, the UN has 
been unable to mollify them.  FM Gul pointedly refused to see 
SRSG Michael Moller on his recent visit to Turkey, pawning 
him off on lower-level officials and speaking directly with 
the UNSYG by phone to voice his disconQnt with the results 
of the Paris meeting.  Moller's request to meet with Talat in 
his Istanbul hospital room was similarly rebuffed.  Meanwhile 
-- back on Cyprus -- the Turkish Cypriot authorities are 
increasingly vocal in their suspicion and hostility towards 
Moller.  The Turkish Cypriots are well aware that Moller 
spent a part of his childhood in Greece and speaks decent 
Greek.  In and of itself, this warrants enough evidence for 
the Turkish Cypriots to suspect Moller of being reflexively 
sympathetic to Greek Cypriot positions.  "Presidential 
Undersecretary" Rasit Pertev, who would likely head up 
Turkish Cypriot participation in any technical level 
dialogue, has been particularly vociferous in his criticism 
of the SRSG.  Our British colleagues told us that in their 
last meeting Pertev had exclaimed, "I trust him (Moller) less 
than I trust Papadopoulos." 
 
¶4.  (C)  The Turkish Cypriots still seem somewhat uncertain 
about how to respond to the challenge posed by the Paris 
communique and the triumphalist Greek Cypriot spin.  The 
anticipated March 3 meeting to discuss the agenda for the 
proposed technical-level talks never materialized and Pertev 
told the UN that the Turkish Cypriots were freezing 
communications with UNFICYP until Talat returned to the 
island.  The head of civil affairs at UNFICYP, Susan Allee, 
expressed considerable frustration over the inclination of 
the Turkish Cypriots to take their cues from the Greek 
Cypriot press rather than the first-hand UN reporting on the 
Paris talks.  Allee told us that she and Moller had both been 
taken aback by the Greek Cypriots aggressive spinning of the 
Paris talks.  An objective reading of the communique would 
make clear that demilitarization, demining and 
Famagusta/Varosha were not included as agreed agenda items in 
the technical talks.  The UN did not agree with the Greek 
Cypriot interpretation of the communique, but was still 
considering how best to respond. 
 
¶5.  (C) The Greek Cypriots, meanwhile, continue to muddy the 
waters.  In his most recent statements, President 
Papadopoulos helpfully "explained" that "there are two 
parallel procedures; one concerned with the preparation of 
talks on substantial aspects of the Cyprus problem and the 
other the creation of a better climate.  One course depends 
on the progress of the other and it is neither proper nor 
accurate to say that what was agreed in Paris concerned only 
measures that would make the operation of the Turkish Cypriot 
regime easier."  This interpretation of the Paris talks seems 
wildly fanciful and does not track at all with the readout we 
have from Moller (reftel). 
 
What Were They Thinking? 
------------------------ 
 
¶6.  (C) The Paris meeting represents a significant 
pre-electoral gift to Tassos Papadopoulos, even though it was 
likely intended as a vehicle for putting pressure on the 
Greek Cypriot leader.  Michael Moller is smart, experienced, 
and capable, but he is also eager and ambitious to acquire 
more turf.  The Greek Cypriot leadership senses this 
eagerness, and Papadopoulos seems clearly to have 
out-negotiated the UN in preparing the text of the 
communique.  Holding technical-level talks is not a bad idea 
(nor a new one), but the clumsy handling of the Paris meeting 
puts the process at an immediate disadvantage.  The Turkish 
Cypriots feel like they have been victimized by some kind of 
bait-and-switch, further undermining the already dim 
prospects for these talks to produce much in the way of value 
and substance.  Ankara has also reportedly been sending 
unambiguous signals to the Turkish Cypriots to toughen up 
their position on EU aid.  Turkish Cypriot Chamber of 
Industries head Salih Tunar told us that on a recent trip to 
Ankara, Turkish officials told him and Turkish Cypriot 
Chamber of Commerce head Erdil Nami to be firm in rejecting 
any attempt by the EU to impose conditions on the assistance. 
 
 
 
¶7.  (C) The Turkish Cypriot freeze on communication with the 
UN threatens to undo the hard work that has gone into 
identifying a new third member for the Committee on Missing 
Persons (CMP).  The Greek Cypriot side has already approved 
the SYG's choice -- a Swiss national with considerable ICRC 
experience named Christophe Girod -- but the UN is still 
waiting for Talat's approval.  There is a real risk of losing 
Girod to another opportunity if the UN is unable to make him 
a firm offer soon.  That would be a serious setback to 
efforts to reinforce and strengthen the work of the CMP to 
the point where it can finally begin resolving outstanding 
cases. 
 
What Are We Going To Do About It? 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Questions of the UN's handling of the Paris talks 
aside, we do need to decide how activist we want to be in 
supporting the technical talks.  Here there is a real risk 
that our impulse to support the SYG and his role and our 
desire to support Ankara will conflict.  The Greek Cypriots 
are already crowing that the Paris communique has supplanted 
the Gul proposal from January linking Cypriot access to 
Turkish ports to progress in easing Turkish Cypriot 
isolation.  So far, the UK has been considerably more 
forward-leaning than we have in welcoming the "agreement" on 
technical level talks.  The UN will naturally be looking to 
us for support, both in terms of defending Moller's 
objectivity and professionalism with the Turkish Cypriots and 
with the talks themselves.  UNFICYP has already indicated an 
interest in what our ACT program could do to support the work 
of the various committees envisioned in the agreement.  We 
should think carefully about how we are going to respond. 
 
¶9.  (C)  Our recommendation would be to offer complete and 
unequivocal support for the technical level talks as they 
were originally agreed by the Turkish Cypriots.  This would 
mean an agenda limited to the ten topics outlined in the 
letters exchanged between Moller and Talat before the Paris 
meeting:  health, environment, water management, waste 
management, money laundering, crime prevention, road safety, 
immigration and trafficking, crisis management and 
humanitarian issues.  As Pertev explained to us, these are 
areas where the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots will need 
to work out modalities of cooperation "even if Cyprus remains 
divided forever."  Our further recommendation is that, when 
asked about Famagusta/Varosha in the context of the 
technical-level talks, we say that these talks cannot be a 
substitute for a political-level process aimed at resolving 
fundamental security, property, and other issues; we will 
support the efforts of the UN and the parties to make quick 
progress on all these fronts. 
 
¶10.  (C) At the same time, we believe it is important to have 
a serious discussion with Turkey about the risks attendant to 
losing the initiative on the Cyprus issue.  Papadopoulos has 
been relatively successful -- largely because of the EU 
timetable -- in putting the ball back in Turkey's court 
without having had to actually return serve.  Gul's January 
proposal has generated little sustained interest and it seems 
unlikely to relieve Ankara of the burden of the Cyprus issue. 
 We may want to suggest to Ankara the possibility of 
regaining the initiative in a way that serves its 
EU-accession interests by putting a serious Cyprus package on 
the table that would involve painful concessions on the part 
of all concerned.  This should be presented as parallel to 
the technical talks, rather than a substitute.  Both we and 
Turkey want to maintain the centrality of the UN's role on 
the Cyprus issue. Our own ideas in this regard would involve 
something along the following lines: 
 
Turkey agrees to: 
 
-- Open its ports and airports to Cypriot traffic; 
-- Return Varosha to Greek Cypriot control; and, 
-- Stop blackballing Cyprus in international organizations. 
 
The ROC agrees to: 
 
-- Direct trade through the port of Famagusta under the 
auspices of the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce and/or of 
the EU; 
-- Direct flights out of Ercan airport, with the airport to 
be under temporary EU administration; and, 
-- Easing up on the restrictions imposed on the use of EU 
assistance to the Turkish Cypriots. 
 
This is a serious package that would be well received in 
Europe.  It is also highly unlikely that the Greek Cypriot 
side would agree to this, or any other proposal that would 
include legitimizing flights to and from Ercan airport. 
Putting a set of ideas like this on the table, in addition to 
creating a serious political debate in the Greek Cypriot 
community, would allow Ankara to reclaim the initiative and 
reduce the building pressure from the EU for Turkey to meet 
its customs union obligations without the expectation of 
further sweeteners. 
 
¶11.  (C) Post requests guidance from the Department to use 
with UNFICYP and others in discussing next steps in the 
technical committees. 
SCHLICHER