VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNC #0294/01 0601558
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 011558Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5632
INFO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 4557
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY 3515
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1134
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY 0423
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0472
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000294 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2021 
TAGS: PREL PGOV CY
SUBJECT: GREEK CYPRIOTS "FULLY SATISFIED" WITH PARIS TALKS 
AND THE NEW "BOTTOM UP" APPROACH; TURKISH CYPRIOTS SHOCKED 
AND ANGRY 
 
REF: NICOSIA 273 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher; Reason 1.4 (b) 
and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary:  The February 28 meeting between Cypriot 
President Papadopoulos and UN SYG Kofi Annan resulted in 
agreement on a "bottom up" approach to the Cyprus issue that 
would begin with technical-level talks aimed at preparing the 
ground for the resumption of negotiations on a comprehensive 
settlement.  Predictably, the Greek Cypriot side is stressing 
its "complete satisfaction" with the outcome of the meeting. 
The pro-government press in the south is presenting the joint 
statement as both an important step forward on the Cyprus 
issue and a clear win for the Greek Cypriot side.  In 
contrast, Turkish Cypriot contacts told us that they had been 
"shocked" by the content of the joint statement and the 
apparent endorsement of Greek Cypriot ideas on 
Famagusta/Varosha and demilitarization.  For the Turkish 
Cypriot side, these were fundamental issues that could only 
be addressed in the context of an overall settlement. 
UNFICYP COM Moller, who was present in Paris, told us that 
Papadopoulos had seemed "hell bent on moving forward." 
Moller understood that the Turkish Cypriots had some concerns 
about the statement and said he planned to reach out to key 
decision-makers in the north to smooth any ruffled feathers. 
Moller stressed that he had agreement in writing from the 
Turkish Cypriot side to pursue the idea of technical level 
talks.  Although Papadopoulos had asked for the SYG to 
appoint a new special envoy,  Moller told us that they SYG 
had pushed back hard.  There was a significant gap, Annan 
told Papadopoulos, between the Greek Cypriot side's words and 
its deeds.  UN U/S Gambari might visit the island after 
elections, but only if there had been real progress in the 
technical level talks.  While Talat would not relish the 
mantle of the intransigent party, there is risk he may end up 
trapped in that role by the competing demands of 
Papadopoulos, the UN and the Turkish army.  End Summary. 
 
Greek Cypriots Predictably Pleased 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Predictably, Cypriot President Tassos Papadopoulos' 
supporters have been waving the flag of victory following his 
February 28 meeting in Paris with UN SYG Kofi Annan.  House 
President and AKEL leader Demetris Christofias described the 
outcome of the meeting as "very positive" and stressed that 
the technical level talks agreed to in the Paris meeting 
would deal not only with CBMs but also with issues directly 
related to a settlement such as demilitarization and the 
development of a unified economy.  The pro-government press 
highlighted the communique negotiated in advance of the 
meeting, emphasizing that the joint statement was fully in 
line with the GOC position.  (Note:  the complete text of the 
statement follows below in paragraph 15.)  Local TV and radio 
emphasized the GOC's satisfaction with the Paris talks and 
predicted rapid and significant developments on the Cyprus 
issue in the months ahead.  Menelaos Menelaou from the 
President's Diplomatic Office told us on March 1 that the 
government was "completely satisfied" with both the 
communique and the outcome of the talks.  Menelaou expected 
that UNFICYP COM Moller would move quickly to reach agreement 
on an agenda and begin technical level talks between the two 
sides.  Menelaou confirmed for us that his boss, Tasos 
Tzionis, would likely be in charge of the Greek Cypriot 
side's participation. 
 
¶3.  (C) The opposition DISY party pointed out that the Greek 
Cypriot side had not achieved its primary objective for the 
meeting, the appointment of a new special envoy.  DISY leader 
Anastassiades called the joint statement a return to the past 
and the unsuccessful 1994 confidence building measures.  GOC 
spokesman Lillikas countered DISY's charge by stressing that 
UNFICYP COM Moller's role in the Cyprus process "will be 
upgraded," adding that the agreement with the SYG gave the 
Greek Cypriot side more than it had asked for. 
 
The MFA's Take 
-------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) In a briefing for the Diplomatic Corps on March 1, 
MFA PermSec Sotos Zakheos described the meeting as "very 
positive," "excellent in tone," and "enormously 
constructive."  He also stressed that there was "very good 
chemistry between the principals."  Zakheos reported that a 
decision had been made to establish a mechanism consisting of 
 
 
UNFICYP COM Moller, a representative of President 
Papadopoulos and a representative of Talat to work on a 
"bottom up" approach to the Cyprus issue.  This umbrella 
mechanism would then agree on a number of sub-committees to 
work on a range of technical issues.  Each side, Zakheos 
explained, had its own ideas about what issues to focus on. 
The Greek Cypriot side, for example, would push for progress 
on demining, the demilitarization of sensitive sites, 
land-use issues, etc.  Zakheous was particularly pleased that 
the joint statement included a specific reference to the 
GOC's Famagusta/Varosha proposal.  The concept of engagement 
went beyond CBMs.  The idea was not simply to normalize or 
ameliorate various aspects of the current situation, but 
rather to prepare the ground for the earliest possible 
resumption of meaningful negotiations.  According to 
Zakheous, Papadopoulos told the SYG that Gul's proposal's on 
the simultaneous easing of restrictions "could not be 
implemented" and Annan acknowledged that the GOT's customs 
union obligations were unconditional. 
 
¶5. (C) Zakheous noted that neither side used the phrase 
"Annan Plan" in the course of the conversation.  In Paris, 
Papadopoulos also gave his approval to the nomination of a 
new third (UN) member to serve on the Committee on Missing 
Persons.  Talat's illness had prevented him from approving 
the name, which was why the appointment had not yet been 
announced.  (Note:  We have since learned from CMP sources 
that the presumptive third member is Christophe Girod, a 
Swiss national and long-time ICRC official). 
 
From The Horse's Mouth 
---------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) UNFICYP COM and SRSG Michael Moller, who was present 
in the meeting, told us that he and the SYG were both pleased 
with the substance and tone of the talks.  According to 
Moller, Papadopoulos was "hell bent on moving forward" and 
was ready to meet with Talat (albeit only within the context 
of the CMP).  Papadopoulos stressed his personal commitment 
to a Cyprus settlement and underscored his "wounded feelings" 
at being portrayed as the new Dr. No.  Moller understood that 
the Turkish Cypriots had some reservations about the joint 
statement and he intended to speak with Talat's advisor, 
Rasit Pertev, to try and smooth the ruffled feathers.  Moller 
had agreement from Pertev in writing to the concept of a 
"bottom up" technical process.  The Turkish Cypriot side had 
agreed to a list of issues for discussion that included 
health, the environment, water, crime, and similar concerns. 
The Turkish Cypriots were clearly unhappy that the joint 
statement made specific reference to Greek Cypriot issues 
such as demilitarization and Famagusta.  Moller himself had 
insisted on including the word "also" in the statement as a 
way addressing the anticipated Turkish Cypriot concerns. 
Moller noted that he would meet Friday morning with Pertev 
and Tzionis to discuss the way forward.  After that meeting, 
Moller intended to travel to Ankara for meetings.  He 
stressed the important role the United States could play in 
encouraging Ankara to be supportive of the technical 
committees and to give Talat the negotiating room he needed 
to reach agreements.  This would be particularly important on 
the issue of demilitarization and unmanning in the old city. 
 
¶7.  (C) Moller told us that -- as expected -- Papadopoulos 
had pressed for the SYG to appoint a special envoy for 
Cyprus.  Annan had pushed back quite hard on this, observing 
that there was still a significant gap between the Greek 
Cypriot side's words and its deeds.  Annan indicated that UN 
U/S Gambari "might" visit Cyprus after the May elections, but 
only if there had been real progress in the technical 
committees. 
 
 
Joint Statement "Shocks" Turkish Cypriots 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) The Turkish Cypriot press has downplayed the 
Annan-Papapdopoulos meeting, suggesting it produced "no 
tangible results."  This reflects the widely held belief in 
the north that Papadopoulos had only sought the meeting to 
burnish his own image, and that Greek Cypriot talk of 
"preparing the ground" was only a ruse to camouflage their 
unwillingness to engage in serious negotiations directly with 
Talat.  Turkish Cypriots remain skeptical that talk about 
talks with the current Greek Cypriot administration will 
actually lead anywhere. 
 
 
 
¶9. (C) Turkish Cypriot officials, however, are aghast at the 
statement issued by Papadopoulos and Annan after the meeting. 
 Kudret Akay, political advisor to "FM" Serdar Denktash, 
expressed dismay that the SYG compromised his neutrality by 
agreeing to any joint statement with Papadopoulos.  He 
wondered if Annan had "suffered a blow to the head" before he 
co-signed the statement. 
 
¶10. (C) Talat's Private Secretary, Asim Akansoy, focused on 
the content of the statement.  Talat (who is still in the 
hospital) had been "shocked" when he read the Secretary 
General's apparent endorsement of the idea that progress on 
Famagusta (i.e., Varosha) and demilitarization were 
preconditions for successful talks.  These were fundamentally 
settlement-related issues, Akansoy said, that would mainly 
involve hard concessions from the Turkish Cypriot side -- and 
therefore could only be addressed in the context of 
"full-blown and comprehensive" talks between the two leaders. 
 Reclassifying such sensitive topics as preconditions for 
talks or "technical confidence building measures" would "turn 
the clock back" to before the Annan Plan. 
 
¶11. (C) According to Akansoy, the Turkish Cypriots had 
already called UNFICYP Chief Michael Moller to express their 
dismay at the content of the joint declaration.  The 
"Presidency" had not decided if it would issue public 
statement reflecting their concerns; "first, we have pick 
ourselves up off the floor," Akansoy said.  The only bright 
spot, from the Turkish Cypriot perspective, was Deputy 
Spokesman Ereli's statement that as far as the U.S. was 
concerned, the Annan Plan remained the basis for further 
talks. 
 
Turkish Cypriots "Fear a Trap" 
------------------------------ 
 
¶12. (C) While the Turkish Cypriots have repeatedly stated 
their willingness to open a bicommunal dialogue under UN 
auspices, they are likely to very wary of the sort of 
technical talks suggested in the joint declaration.  In a 
discussion with us just prior to the Annan-Papadopoulos 
meeting, Talat's U/S Rasit Pertev expressed fears that 
UN-brokered technical talks on confidence building measures, 
could represent another "Luxembourg trap."  (COMMENT: Pertev 
was referring to the fact that the Turkish Cypriots' 
willingness to discuss Varosha and other settlement-related 
issues in an EU framework last year had gotten them "nothing 
but grief."  It had, he said, led to an EU declaration 
implying linkage between further help from Europe and Turkish 
Cypriot concessions on the settlement questions of Varosha 
and property (reftel). END COMMENT.) 
 
¶13. (C) Putting issues of vital interest on the table during 
the Luxembourg talks had not resulted in a good dialogue or 
fair exchange, Pertev stressed, but had simply allowed 
Papadopoulos to play up the idea that the Turkish Cypriots 
were the intransigent side.  Talat might agree to talks on 
"purely technical issues," Pertev said, such as bird flu, 
HIV, or maybe the Committee on Missing Persons.  These were 
issues of common interest that the two sides would "have to 
discuss anyway," even if there was never a solution.  But 
there was a "fine line" the Turkish Cypriots would "not 
cross."  Talat, he suggested, would only consent to 
discussion of settlement-related issues in the context of 
comprehensive face-to-face talks between leaders. 
Papadopoulos could not be allowed to say that he supported 
UN-brokered dialogue on one hand, but then refuse to meet his 
Turkish Cypriot counterpart. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶14. (C) The Turkish Cypriots consider the SYG's joint 
statement with Papadopoulos to be a poke in the eye, made all 
the worse in light of a declaration made by the EU when it 
approved its aid measure earlier in the week.  The Turkish 
Cypriots are clearly worried that "technical talks" on 
confidence building measures could involve hard choices and 
compromises on issues they consider vital -- without any 
guarantee that Papadopoulos will make tough concessions of 
his own, or even agree to meet Talat.  Indeed, because 
Varosha and demilitarization touch squarely on Turkish 
military equities, Talat probably has very little flexibility 
on these issues outside the context of comprehensive 
settlement negotiations fully endorsed by Ankara.  It remains 
to be seen if the Turkish Cypriots' initial willingness to 
engage in "technical talks" will translate into an actual 
dialogue.  Although Talat does not relish being the 
intransigent party, he may end up trapped in this role by the 
competing demands of Tassos Papadopoulos, the UN, and the 
Turkish army. 
 
 
TEXT OF JOINT STATEMENT 
----------------------- 
 
¶15.  (U) Begin Text of the Statement issued following the 
February 28 meeting between SYG Annan and President 
Papadopoulos: 
 
United Nation's Secretary-General Mr. Kofi Annan and 
President Tassos Papadopoulos met in Paris today to review 
the situation in Cyprus and examine modalities for moving 
forward on the process leading to the reunification of the 
island. 
 
They agreed, as they have in the past, that the resumption of 
the negotiating process within the framework of the 
Secretary-General's Good Offices must be timely and based on 
 
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careful preparation.  To that end, the Secretary-General was 
pleased to note that the leaders of both communities have 
agreed that bi-communal discussion on a series of issues, 
agreement on which are needed for the benefit of all 
Cypriots, will be undertaken at the technical level.  The 
Secretary-General and President Papadopoulos expressed their 
 
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common hope that these discussions would help restore trust 
between the two communities as well as prepare the way for 
the earliest full resumption of the negotiating process.  The 
Secretary-General noted that he had received assurances from 
 
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the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, Mr. Talat, that 
he shared the same aspirations. 
 
The Secretary-General and Mr. Papadopoulos also agreed that 
it would be beneficial for all concerned, and would greatly 
improve the atmosphere for further talks, if progress could 
be achieved on further disengagement of forces and 
demilitarization on the island, on the complete de-mining of 
Cyprus, and on the issue of Famagusta.  They took note of the 
recent decision by the European Union to release the much 
awaited funds for the benefit of the Turkish Cypriot 
community.  In this context, they expressed their warm wishes 
for the full and speedy recovery of Mr. Talat. 
 
The Secretary-General and President Papadopoulos agreed to 
continue their ongoing dialogue with the expressed aim at 
accelerating the search for a comprehensive, fair and 
mutually acceptable solution to the Cyprus problem. 
 
End Text. 
SCHLICHER