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RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 0118
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 3888
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RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 2440
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RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
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RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHMFISS/HQ USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 001572 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2015 
TAGS: PREL PHUM PREF IN NP BT
SUBJECT: RGOB REMAINS COMMITTED TO REFUGEE RETURNS 
 
REF: A. NEW DELHI 736 
 
     ¶B. REED-PITOTTI EMAIL 2-16-06 
 
Classified By: PolCouns Geoff Pyatt for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: In contrast to Bhutanese Ambassador 
Tshering's comments in Ref A that the RGOB my not repatriate 
 
SIPDIS 
any refugees, in a February 15 meeting with Poloff, Bhutanese 
Second Secretary Karma Thinley (Strictly Protect) stated that 
Thimphu remains committed to repatriating those in Category 1 
and 4.  However, he noted that Bhutan is concerned about 
security and wary of allowing Maoist sympathizers into the 
country.  Thinley also expressed concern over where refugees 
in other categories would end up.  In a February 16 meeting, 
representatives from the Netherlands, UK and Japan stated 
that while their governments would likely be interested in a 
joint visit to Thimphu to raise the refugee issue with the 
King, they would first need to obtain approval from their 
ministries.  The Norwegian DCM argued on February 23 that 
only India has the leverage to entice Bhutan to resolve the 
refugee situation, but is not likely to force its neighbor to 
act.  End Summary. 
 
Bhutanese Ambassador Speaks for Himself 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Bhutanese Second Secretary Karma Thinley told Poloff 
on February 15 that Ambassador Tshering may not have "clearly 
stated Bhutan's position" regarding refugee returns (Ref A). 
Thinley stated that, in contrast to Tshering's comments, the 
RGOB position on accepting Category 1 and 4 refugees has not 
changed, but security concerns remain.  Thinley, citing a 
conversation with officials in Thimphu, Bhutanese DCM Thinley 
Dorji and the Bhutanese DCM in New York, noted that 
Ambassador Tshering is a very senior member of the government 
and, holding such authority, often expresses his personal 
views without fear of reprimand from Thimphu.  Thinley 
proffered that the Ambassador's suggestion that the RGOB was 
reconsidering the repatriation of any refugees is not 
Thimphu's official position. 
 
¶3.  (C) Thinley reiterated that the RGOB remains concerned 
about security and Maoist infiltration into Bhutan.  Bhutan 
does not favor allowing refugees with radical beliefs into 
the country during the transition to democracy.  Thinley 
highlighted the fear that the advent of political parties 
could allow radical groups easily to spread their extremist 
views, and the government would be powerless to stop them. 
 
¶4.  (C) Regarding the repatriation/resettlement of refugees, 
Karma expressed RGOB interest in the USG's willingness to 
accept voluntary resettlement of the "people in the camps." 
He inquired about next steps after the agreed-upon 
repatriation of Category 1 and 4 refugees, specifically 
referring to Category 2 and 3 refugees who do not choose 
resettlement or local integration.  Poloff remarked that the 
international community has indicated a willingness to 
provide financial support for the integration of these people 
into Bhutan, however, a majority may opt for resettlement, if 
it is an option. 
 
New Delhi "Bhutan Watchers" Agree Pressure is Needed 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶5.  (C) PolOff met with representatives from the British High 
 
NEW DELHI 00001572  002 OF 003 
 
 
Commission, Embassy of the Netherlands and Japanese Embassy 
on February 16 to discuss possible next steps regarding the 
Bhutanese refugee problem.  (Note: Representatives from the 
Danish High Commission, Norwegian Embassy, and Austrian 
Embassy could not attend.  End Note.) PolOff outlined PRM's 
six month strategy, stressing the need for Bhutan to deliver 
acceptable terms and conditions for return and for Nepal to 
allow UNHCR to begin surveying the camps, and expressed hope 
that other interested governments would support the 
initiative.  Second Secretary Josephine Frantzen from the 
Netherlands indicated her government would likely support the 
plan and a joint trip to Thimphu to impress upon the RGOB the 
need for action.  Indicating that no single government, with 
the exception of India, has leverage to force Bhutan to begin 
repatriations, she remarked that a visit to Thimphu by 
high-level representatives from the expanded Core Working 
Group would be a good idea. 
 
¶6.  (C) British Third Secretary Caroline Wilson indicated 
that the UK is currently not highly engaged in the Bhutanese 
refugee issue, although it would likely support the PRM 
strategy in whatever way it could.  Acknowledging that her 
government has a "minuscule" aid package in Bhutan of roughly 
12,000 Pounds, she commented that the UK has very little 
leverage in Bhutan.  Japanese First Secretary Yuki Sakai 
reported that her government also has a very small aid 
program in Bhutan, which is shrinking, along with Japanese 
aid programs worldwide.  However, she indicated that the 
Government of Japan is interested in helping the 
international community engage Bhutan to find a solution to 
the problem.  (Note: Bhutanese Ambassador Tshering is also 
credentialed to Tokyo, giving the Japanese here greater 
access to the RGOB than they might admit.  End Note.) 
 
¶7.  (C) All attendees agreed that Bhutan is unlikely to move 
quickly towards a durable solution without pressure from the 
international community, and a joint front would be more 
effective in spurring Bhutanese action.  Frantzen argued that 
the main donor countries would all have to agree to make aid 
conditional on the resolution of the refugee problem, in 
order for the RGOB to take notice.  Sakai initially indicated 
that she thought that Nepal was responsible for the next 
overture, mirroring the GOJ message in Ref B, but later 
agreed with PolOff that Bhutan still must deliver clear 
conditions for return. 
 
Norway: No Movement Without India 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Norwegian DCM Lasse Johannessen told Poloff on 
February 23 that without stronger engagement by the GOI, 
pressure from other state players is unlikely to succeed in 
getting the Bhutanese to take action.  He doubted that the 
GOI would be willing to act against Bhutan, commenting "if 
New Delhi has not taken action in Nepal regarding the Maoist 
insurgency, do we really expect the Indians actually to do 
anything on the refugee issue?"  Poloff noted there might be 
interest in a joint donors' visit to Bhutan, and Johannessen 
indicated he would inquire as to whether Norway would 
participate.  He also asked if there was a plan to send a 
joint delegation to Nepal to press Kathmandu to allow the 
UNHCR survey to begin. 
 
¶9.  (C) Reporting on the visit of Bhutanese Foreign Minister 
Wangchuk to Oslo, Johannessen remarked that the RGOB sounded 
 
NEW DELHI 00001572  003 OF 003 
 
 
cooperative and maintained its willingness to repatriate 
Category 1 and 4 refugees.  However, he stated that the RGOB 
reiterated the demand that the GON agree in writing to the 
plan and on modalities to deliver the information to camp 
residents. 
 
Comment: Take it to the King 
---------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C)  The Bhutanese refugee problem continues its slow 
march to an uncertain end.  While meetings with our European 
colleagues are useful to develop a joint strategy, it is 
unlikely that a solution will be found in the near future 
without a direct appeal to King Wangchuck.  Post suggests a 
senior level visit to Thimphu and in partnership with other 
interested government, requesting that Bhutan submit to the 
GON clear and acceptable conditions of return and agree to 
the repatriation of Category 1 and 4 refugees and urging the 
King to devote himself personally to the solution of this 
impasse. 
 
¶11. (U) Visit New Delhi's Classified Website: 
(http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/sa/newdelhi/) 
MULFORD