VZCZCXRO6097
PP RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHPA
DE RUEHNR #0950/01 0620105
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 030105Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0001
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA  PRIORITY
RUEAUSA/DEPT OF HHS WASHINGTON DC
RUEHPH/CDC ATLANTA GA 2538

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NAIROBI 000950 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: TBIO KFLU SENV ECON EAGR EAID PREL PGOV KE
SUBJECT:  KENYA AVIAN INFLUENZA PREPAREDNESS UPDATE 
 
REF:  A. 05 NAIROBI 4829 (NOTAL) 
 
      ¶B. 05 NAIROBI 5318 (NOTAL) 
 
¶1.  Summary:  To date, Kenya has no confirmed cases of 
H5N1 Avian Influenza, but suspect samples from flamingos, 
as well as poultry samples from Uganda, are being 
analyzed by CDC-Kenya.  Kenya does have a valuable 
interagency AI Task Force, and a cadre of well-trained 
technical officials who should respond well to possible 
AI outbreaks.  U.S. agencies in country, CDC, US Army 
Medical Research Unit - Kenya, and USAID, provide 
guidance and assistance to both the task force and 
technical agencies.  Kenya's preparedness plan addresses 
most critical needs, but high-level political support for 
both funding and response is lacking.  Also of concern 
are reports that commercial airlines are refusing to 
transport possible virus samples for testing.  End 
Summary. 
 
¶2.  This report updates ref A information on Kenya's 
preparedness to respond to any possible outbreak of Avian 
Influenza.  To date there has been no confirmed case of 
H5N1 virus in Kenya.  CDC-Kenya is currently testing 
samples from a small die-off of wild flamingos and is 
also testing samples from dead chickens from farms in 
Uganda near the Kenyan border. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
The National Avian Influenza Task Force 
--------------------------------------- 
¶3.  The Kenyan government has taken some positive steps 
in preparing for the possibility of an Avian Influenza 
(AI) outbreak in the country.  Kenya's National Avian 
Influenza Task Force (NAITF) was established in October 
¶2005.  It met for the first time on 26 October and has 
met 8 times since then.  The composition of the NAITF is 
inclusive of relevant ministries and has the active 
participation of GOK technical experts.  It is co-chaired 
by the Director of Medical Services (senior technical 
officer in Ministry of Health), the Director of 
Veterinary Services (similar in Ministry of Livestock and 
Fisheries Development), and the Director of the National 
Operations Center (Office of the President).  The Task 
Force includes representation from other GOK ministries, 
international organizations, research groups, civil 
society, and the private sector.  Mission representatives 
from CDC, DOD, and USAID regularly attend these meetings. 
 
¶4.  The NAITF has established six sub-committees: 
surveillance and epidemiology; communications and 
awareness; laboratory and research; infection prevention 
and control; case management; and coordination and 
resource mobilization.  All committees meet regularly and 
report to the Task Force 
 
------------------------- 
Kenya's Preparedness Plan 
------------------------- 
¶5.  The NAITF has completed a National Strategic 
Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan for Avian 
Influenza (EPP).  This includes goals and objectives of 
each component represented by the various subcommittees 
and fairly detailed short-term (6-month) workplans and 
budgets.  The Task Force is also working on medium-term 
(6 months to 2 years) and long-term (2-5 year) plans and 
budgets.  The plan was presented in Beijing at the 
January World Bank Pledging Conference on Avian and Human 
Pandemic Influenza and was identified by the World Bank 
as a model for Africa.  We are encouraging the GOK to 
create a public website with its AI preparations and 
other information, and to post their plan. 
 
---------------- 
Budgeting for AI 
---------------- 
¶6.  Kenya's Task Force has drafted a number of budgets, 
both long and short term. The long-term budget presented 
in Beijing was for $800 million, but included a worst- 
case human epidemic requiring massive treatment costs. 
The medium-term (about one year) budget presented on 23 
February 2006 is for about Ksh 250 million (about $3.5 
million).  A draft Cabinet memo identifies Ksh 39 million 
from the Ministry of Health budget and Ksh 35 million 
from the Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries Development 
budget that are available immediately.  While there is 
still discussion concerning specific budget lines this 
overall amount is probably appropriate. 
 
¶7.  The draft budget outlines funding from the following 
 
NAIROBI 00000950  002 OF 003 
 
 
sources: 
 
-- The GOK (MOH and MOLFD) has already reprogrammed about 
$1.1 million into avian influenza (see above); 
 
-- USAID/Kenya will have about $850,000 in FY06 funds. 
About $100,000 are available now, the rest should arrive 
by July; 
 
-- USAID/REDSO has additional funds for regional 
activities, several of which will be based in Kenya; 
 
-- additional funds are anticipated from CDC for regional 
activities, several of which may be based in Kenya; 
 
-- The World Bank will allow reprogramming of existing 
project funds and should have additional funds pending 
Board approval and a lifting of the freeze on Kenyan 
funding; 
 
-- The EU is including Kenya in a multi-country request; 
 
-- WHO may get funds from various donors pledged in 
Beijing; 
 
-- FAO has requested funding from its donors; 
 
-- The Kenyan Red Cross has contributed Ksh 1 million 
($14,000). 
 
----------------- 
Current Readiness 
----------------- 
¶8.  In many respects, Kenya is quite prepared to deal 
with the immediate response needs to news of a possible 
AI outbreak.  Among the country's strengths: 
 
-- a strong level of understanding and commitment from 
technical officials at key ministries and agencies; 
 
-- good experience in dealing with animal diseases, and 
significant numbers of veterinary staff currently in the 
field, including almost 400 Veterinary Officers; 
 
-- the likelihood of early disease detection, in part due 
to an early start awareness creation activities, 
especially in agriculture.  There have also been wider 
public education campaigns, including the publication of 
public call-in hotlines; 
 
-- the pre-positioning of staff and equipment for a quick 
response, including appropriate sampling, to bird die- 
offs; and 
 
-- a current ban on the importation of poultry and other 
birds. 
 
¶9.  Kenya does have a number of remaining weaknesses in 
its AI preparations, which need to be addressed quickly. 
These include: 
 
-- a clear commitment to making AI a policy priority at 
Minister level and above; 
 
-- the creation of detailed implementation plans in case 
of a serious outbreak, including undertaking simulation 
exercises; 
 
-- establishing a compensation policy and fund; 
 
-- verifying effective animal quarantine measures; and 
 
-- (while beyond the mandate of the Task Force), an 
action plan to deal with the economic and nutritional 
impact of an epidemic. 
 
------------- 
USG Resources 
------------- 
¶10.  This mission has an interagency task force that 
meets on a regular basis.  Thanks to the presence in 
Kenya of CDC, US Army Medical Research Unit - Kenya, and 
medical professionals at USAID's Office of Population and 
Health, the USG contribution to the NAITF is substantial. 
CDC/Kenya staff has traveled to Nigeria to help with that 
country's response to the AI outbreak and will be able to 
provide valuable insight to both the GOK and the Mission 
on developing an effective action plan.  We will modify 
our tripwires (Ref B) accordingly. 
 
NAIROBI 00000950  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶11.  CDC/Kenya also hosts one of the most sophisticated 
testing laboratories in Africa (Biosafety level 3), and 
has offered its services to other African countries that 
might need assistance in testing samples from possible AI 
outbreaks.  Over the years, CDC/Kenya's work with 
technical staff from a number of Kenyan ministries has 
also helped create a valuable cadre of health care 
professionals and technicians who we expect will provide 
an effective response to an AI outbreak. 
 
¶12.  Post's public affairs section is preparing our 
public website to include a page dedicated to useful 
information about AI, including hopefully a link to the 
GOK's preparedness plan.  Our Consular Affairs office is 
prepared to issue an appropriate warden message should 
H5N1 be confirmed in the country. 
 
-------------------------- 
Are the Airlines on Board? 
-------------------------- 
¶13.  We have heard that Kenya Airways is reluctant to 
transport samples from other African countries to Nairobi 
for testing at CDC and/or GOK labs.  It was also reported 
that British Airways and Emirates have also been 
reluctant to transport samples.  It is important to 
impress upon international airlines that if samples are 
packaged and labeled according to IATA regulations they 
have an obligation to transport these, as well as a moral 
duty to help control this epidemic.  It is clear that 
Kenya Airways, and likely other air carriers as well, 
have not thought about their role/responsibility in 
dealing with possible disease emergence, not to mention 
how they will respond to human cases. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
¶14.  Post is well prepared to deal with possible AI 
contingencies, and at the technical level, Kenyan 
agencies should respond well.  However, it is difficult 
to say how the highest levels of government will respond 
to a new crisis, should H5N1 land in Kenya.  The Kibaki 
administration is in disarray and is facing tremendous 
pressure from on-going corruption-related investigations. 
One role we have taken on is to encourage additional 
support from donors, who, to date, have not been engaged. 
We will continue to work with the highest-ranking, 
responsive, officials to encourage critical thinking and 
planning appropriate for the necessary disaster 
management mentality. 
 
BELLAMY