VZCZCXRO7113
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHMOS #0036/01 0891404
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 301404Z MAR 06
FM REO MOSUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0450
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHLU/AMEMBASSY LUANDA 0044
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0027
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0031
RUEHMOS/REO MOSUL 0469

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSUL 000036 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  3/30/2016 
TAGS: PREL PINS PINT PGOV PHUM IZ MARR
SUBJECT: KURDS IN NORTHERN IRAQ: PUK REP CLAIMS NINEWA "HANGS IN THE 
BALANCE" OF IRAQ STABILITY 
 
MOSUL 00000036  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Cameron  Munter, PRT Leader, Provincial 
Reconstruction Team Ninewa, State. 
REASON: 1.4 (a), (b), (d) 
 
 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (C) According to the Western Ninewa director of the 
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, Mustafa Khokhe, Ninewa province 
"hangs in the balance."  Ethnic tensions and the flow of 
terrorism from Iraq's neighbors are all contributing to a 
potentially combustible situation, he claims.  He says Tal Afar, 
with its predominantly Shia and Sunni Turkoman, would collapse 
if Iraqi President Talabani and U.S. Ambassador Khalilzad did 
not personally intervene.  Khokhe asks that U.S. and Coalition 
Forces not draw down since insurgents led by former Baathists 
and Osama bin Laden are waiting to "take over" the country.  If 
problems could be corrected in Ninewa, he says, it would have a 
positive impact on the rest of the country.  Khokhe believes, 
however, that only the U.S. can help.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) PRT PolOff met with Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) 
Western Ninewa Director Mustafa Khokhe in Mosul on March 27. 
 
------------------------ 
TERROR IN WESTERN NINEWA 
------------------------ 
 
¶3.  (C) After spending the past four months for the PUK in 
western Ninewa, Khokhe said he has seen what he believed was the 
real center of problems in Iraq.  Terrorists -- mainly from 
Saudi Arabia, Iran, Syria, and Turkey -- were freely moving 
across Ninewa's border with Syria, he claimed.  It was not just 
that the border patrol was weak on both sides, but also that 
Iraq has had to combat years of smuggling rings that have not 
ceased since the fall of the former regime.  "The same people 
are in charge," said Khokhe, naming the Shammar tribe and Al 
Yawar family (relatives of Vice President Sheikh Ghazi Al Yawar) 
of being behind the organized movement of contraband.  During 
the former regime, he claimed, the Al Yawar family was given 
free reign in the area, and for that reason tackling this 
problem would be "very complicated."  The solution, according to 
Khokhe, was to "seal the border" with Coalition Forces (CF) and 
Iraqi Army (IA). 
 
¶4.  (C) Problems at the border paled in comparison with what he 
claimed were the dire state of affairs in Tal Afar.  "There are 
still areas not under Coalition, Peshmerga, or Iraqi control," 
he said.  The reason why the dilemma in Tal Afar was more 
complex was the predominance of Turkoman there, divided into 
Sunni and Shia factions.  Also complicating matters was the 
presence of the Badr Army, and Turkish, Iranian, and Syrian 
intelligence.  The situation was "so tight and divisive" that he 
believed it called for the direct intervention of Iraqi 
President Jalal Talabani and U.S. Ambassador Khalilzad, he said. 
 "The top leaders need to be involved," said Khokhe, "because 
they understand Islam and can sit down with the tribal leaders." 
 According to Khokhe, there was an Islamic tradition were peace 
treaties were brought about by an intervening party that 
conducted a series of meetings over dinner, where "money" was 
exchanged to settle past scores.  He claimed this process was 
"very successful" in the past.  Talabani and Khalilzad were 
needed because, he said, "No one else has the resources to get 
[the warring sides] together."  The tribes in question were 
members of the Shia, Sunni, and Turkoman communities. 
 
¶5.  (C) Mosul, on the other hand, was still influenced by Sunni 
Baathists who were reluctant to let go of the city after the 
fall of the regime, he said.  He accused them of funding 
terrorists in the city.  Khokhe said the governor's public 
comments about Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) being in control in 
the city were false.  More Peshmerga and CF were needed to 
secure the western side of Mosul, claimed Khokhe, since it 
served as a "pathway" for terrorists to enter the city. 
Speaking on Iraqi Kurdistan, Khokhe claimed that the Syrian 
government also had operatives or double agents in the Kurdish 
ranks that did not want to see a viable and strong Kurdistan. 
The Syrians were intimately involved, he said, because they knew 
a protected Kurdish area would affect internal policies within 
their own country.  "This area will be the center of conflict 
for the next 100 years," said Khokhe when speaking about Kurdish 
attempts to build a state in the Middle East.  "It will cause 
regional problems in the future," he said. 
 
MOSUL 00000036  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
 
----------------------------------- 
USG IS THE ONLY FORCE THAT CAN HELP 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) Correcting these issues was of utmost importance to 
Khokhe because he believed if Ninewa contained the terrorist 
threat it would have a great impact on the situation in Iraq. 
The current situation in Tal Afar was "fertile ground for 
terror."  Baathists were paranoid because they were seeing their 
grip on power "slipping away."  And more importantly, Syria was 
doing everything within its power to thwart all U.S. efforts at 
democracy in Iraq because it was a real threat to that country's 
leadership.  Khokhe suggested that job opportunities be created 
with the ISF to make the forces more representative and allow 
for local buy-in from the people.  "They would feel they have 
something at stake in the future of Iraq," claimed Khokhe, "and 
they would be tied into the process."  Good people from all 
walks of life wanted to help but were discouraged by threats, 
intimidation, and general fear for their lives, he said. 
 
¶7.  (C) Khokhe pointedly asked that U.S. and CF forces "never be 
withdrawn" because he claimed the terrorists, led by Osama bin 
Laden, would be waiting to "take control" of Iraq as soon as the 
U.S. departed.  He said recent elections in Palestine where 
Hammas took control, and Islamic party victories in Iran and 
Turkey were all "interconnected."  Iraq waited in the balance, 
he said, and for this reason the U.S. could not "do anything 
foolish."  An Iraq controlled by terrorists, claimed Khokhe, was 
a "big threat on the global level."  The GOI was nothing more 
than "ink on paper," since politics was controlled by 
"corruption and bribes," he said.  After all, Saudi Wahabists 
bordered Iraq on one side and Iranian Shia on the other, and 
both were "united against" the U.S., he said.  For this reason 
it was up to the U.S. to take the lead to correct the issue. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Khokhe's words paint a very bleak picture of the state 
of stability in Ninewa and the country.  He is not the PUK's 
most authoritative voice, but he has a unique perspective: he 
has spent the better part of the last four months in Sinjar, Tal 
Afar, and Rabiya, and believes his sources of information (which 
span across ethnic and religious divides, he claims) are 
credible and accurate.  His request that U.S. and CF forces not 
be drawn down anytime soon reflects Kurdish concern if they are 
left to fend for themselves.  In previous conversations, Khokhe 
has repeatedly expressed apprehension over this issue, 
especially since as he noted before, that many of Iraq's 
neighbors would not prefer to see a Kurdish state -- whether 
part of Iraq or independent -- in the future.  Our view is less 
apocalyptic than Khokhe's, but we hear concerns such as his from 
other sources familiar with the borderlands. 
MUNTER