VZCZCXRO1216
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHMOS #0034/01 0831709
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 241709Z MAR 06
FM REO MOSUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0446
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHLU/AMEMBASSY LUANDA 0040
RUEHMOS/REO MOSUL 0465

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSUL 000034 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  3/24/2016 
TAGS: PREL PINS PINT PGOV PHUM IZ
SUBJECT: NINEWA: PUK NATIONAL ASSEMBLY DELEGATE HAS AN OPTIMISTIC 
TAKE ON GOVERNMENT FORMATION IN BAGHDAD 
 
MOSUL 00000034  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Cameron  Munter, PRT Leader, Provincial 
Reconstruction Team Ninewa, State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (C) Although national assembly delegates met for the first 
time last week to take an oath of office, Ninewa PUK deputy 
director and national assembly delegate Abdelbari Al Zebari 
believes that talks will not resume until the second week of 
April.  He claims the pause is deliberate yet necessary to allow 
the parties to continue putting pressure on the Shia coalition 
over its choice of Ibrahim Al Ja'afari for prime minister.  Al 
Zebari believes the outcome will determine how government 
coalitions are formed.  If the Shia continue to insist on Al 
Ja'afari, claims Al Zebari, then all other sides would work 
against them.  He also believes that civil war is not imminent 
since "too much is at stake."  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) PRT PolOff met with Ninewa Patriotic Union of 
Kurdistan (PUK) deputy director and national assembly delegate 
Abdelbari Al Zebari in Mosul on March 22. 
 
---------------------------- 
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT FORMATION 
---------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Since the bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra on 
February 22, the formation of the new government has been 
delayed.  National assembly delegates met on March 16 in Baghdad 
for the first time in a shortened session to take the oath of 
office.  "The session lasted for only 30 minutes," said Al 
Zebari, "with the plan to reconvene around the second week of 
April."  He said the parliament was technically still in session 
but that no one was "officially" meeting.  The parties were 
"waiting on purpose," he said, to see if the Shia coalition 
would "rethink" the nomination of Ibrahim Al Ja'afari for prime 
minister, a candidate viewed by many as divisive and 
ineffective.  "Ja'afari is too harsh and he does not have a 
record of bringing people together," said Al Zebari.  Further 
complicating matters was future interpretation of Article 58 and 
what the Kurds perceived as Al Ja'afari's unwillingness to 
settle the "Kirkuk issue" in their favor.  Al Zebari does not 
believe that Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution of Iraq 
(SCIRI) nominee, Dr. Abdul Al Mahdi, would have been a better 
choice.  "He's weak and indecisive," said Al Zebari, "but that, 
too, could have worked better for us."  He saw Al Mahdi as 
"malleable," but not a strong enough candidate to bring all 
parties together. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
COALITION FORMATION DEPENDS ON AL JA'AFARI NOMINATION 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶4.  (C) Al Zebari remained optimistic even though he admitted 
such sentiments were not popular right now.  When asked about 
how coalitions might shape up in the new government, Al Zebari 
said the Kurdish coalition was in "serious talks" with the Iraqi 
Islamic Party (IIP)-backed Tawafoq Iraqi Front, SCIRI leader 
Abdul Aziz Al Hakim, and former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi's 
secular National Iraq List.  He claimed the Shia coalition's 
choice of Al Ja'afari was helping to bring together such 
dissimilar groups in opposition to the selection of the prime 
minister.  However, said Al Zebari, this coalition, too, would 
collapse if the Shia simply changed their nominee.  If that 
occurred Al Zebari was not sure how a future coalition would be 
shaped.  Al Zebari believed nuclear scientist Hussein Sharastani 
(also a member of the Shia coalition) was the best choice.  He 
hoped the Shia coalition would reconsider Al Ja'afari and choose 
Sharastani to head the new government.  Then, quite possibly, 
the Kurds might join with the Shia. 
 
--------------------- 
NO CIVIL WAR IMMINENT 
--------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Al Zebari believed that recent public statements by Al 
Hakim of SCIRI regarding civil war were nothing more than a 
bluff.  "He's playing his yellow card," said Al Zebari drawing a 
soccer analogy of when a player commits his first foul during a 
match.  Al Hakim was only trying to pressure disparate groups 
into forming the new government, he said, not start a civil war. 
 The bottom line, according to Al Zebari, was that civil war was 
"not on the agenda."  Too much was at stake, he said, and 
 
MOSUL 00000034  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
tensions between Sunnis and Shia would have to come to an end 
sooner rather than later.  On the brighter side, however, the 
prospect of civil war only made the Kurds that much more 
attractive to the rest of the world, claimed Al Zebari.  It was 
"good for the Kurds public image," he said.  And also allowed 
the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to set an example by 
moving ahead with its own government formation. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶6.  (C) Al Zebari, a very reliable contact, is reassuring, even 
though his statements appear to contradict local popular opinion 
and the international media.  We can only hope that his 
colleagues in the national assembly throughout the rest of the 
country feel as he does.  Moreover, if his beliefs on the how 
the rest of the world might view Iraqi Kurds -- as the most 
civil of Iraq's ethnic groups -- then he has every reason to 
remain optimistic about their future. 
MUNTER