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FM REO MOSUL
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INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
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RUEHMOS/REO MOSUL 0456

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSUL 000030 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  3/22/2016 
TAGS: PREL PINS PINT PGOV PHUM IZ MARR
SUBJECT: NINEWA: THE HERO OF TAL AFAR 
 
REF: MOSUL 23 
 
MOSUL 00000030  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Cameron  Munter, PRT Leader, Provincial 
Reconstruction Team Ninewa, State. 
REASON: 1.4 (a), (b), (d) 
 
 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  (C) Mayor of Tal Afar Najim Al Jubouri -- the hero of 
President Bush's March 20 speech in Cleveland -- is a rare 
leader in a country fraught with fear and uncertainty.  His 
strong leadership, both as chief of police and mayor, helped 
clean up this city of a quarter-million people in northwest Iraq 
when it was overrun by terrorists and suffering from a decrepit 
infrastructure.  He helped reform the police by making them more 
representative and accountable.  He worked diligently with 
Coalition Forces and Iraqi Security Forces on counterinsurgency 
efforts in September 2005.  However, he also fears what will 
become of him and his family once U.S. forces are drawn down in 
the country.  He doubts his countrymen are prepared enough to 
fully understand democracy, and he questions the sincerity of 
Iraq's political leadership.  He is afraid of sectarian and 
religious power in Baghdad, and believes that Iran has been 
behind ethnic tensions in the country.  We wonder just how 
sustainable his efforts in Tal Afar might be once Iraq is left 
to fend for itself.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) PRT PolOff met with Tal Afar Mayor Najim Abdullah Al 
Jubouri in Tal Afar on March 15. 
 
-------------------------- 
PROFILE OF A STRONG LEADER 
-------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Najim Al Jubouri prides himself on being a straight 
talker and risk taker.  He has a history of doing the right 
thing for his country, often at the expense of his own and his 
family's personal safety.  As chief of police for Tal Afar, Al 
Jubouri (known simply as "Najim") took an aggressive approach in 
reforming, training, and equipping the local police to better 
handle security in the area.  His actions did not go unnoticed. 
An assassination attempt against him was thwarted by a 
bulletproof vest that proudly hangs on his wall, perhaps as a 
testament to his convictions or as a reminder of what could have 
been.  Al Jubouri did not walk away from his job, but he did 
move his family to safety in Baghdad and later to the west 
Kurdish town of Dohuk.  In a city starving for leadership -- 
especially after its former chief of police, Ismael Faris, fled 
town leaving in his wake allegations of death and corruption -- 
Al Jubouri assumed the position of acting mayor in July 2005 
(reftel).  3ACR Commanding Officer, Col H.R. McMaster, instantly 
identified with Al Jubouri and the two began a partnership that 
would ultimately benefit the city of Tal Afar.  Al Jubouri 
presided over successful counterinsurgency efforts in September 
of last year, helping in planning and operations with Coalition 
(CF) and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). 
 
¶4.  (C) That today the dusty little city of Tal Afar has some of 
the highest levels of available electricity in Iraq and few 
shortages of potable water is Al Jubouri's work.  Al Jubouri is 
part vigilante, part maverick.  He believes he has to work in a 
system that does not appreciate the struggles of those living 
outside Iraq's larger cities.  He claimed Tal Afar needed strong 
leadership to battle insurgents that overran it.  He found that 
seeking help from what he saw as a feckless provincial 
government and a self-absorbed federal government was simply not 
an option.  He said Tal Afar stood in marked contrast to Mosul, 
since schools were open, kids were playing in the streets, and 
basic services were met.  According to Al Jubouri the central 
government was now controlled by "sectarians" and 
"opportunists," and for that reason he adamantly said he would 
rather report "directly to Washington."  He credited the U.S. 
Army for keeping him alive, for helping to rid Tal Afar of 
terrorists, and for working to provide everything he needed to 
run the city. 
 
----------------------------- 
MONUMENT TO U.S. INTERVENTION 
----------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Al Jubouri appears to have grown accustomed to his 
direct access to CF and the USG.  For this reason he said he was 
not preoccupied with issues that troubled other government 
officials, such as providing education, water, and electricity. 
 
MOSUL 00000030  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
Rather, he simply had bigger ideas for Tal Afar.  "I want to 
construct a high-rise building like Times Square," he said.  But 
if this were not possible a "large hospital would be nice."  As 
a show of his respect and admiration for the USG he claimed his 
request should not be misunderstood: he just wanted to build 
something that Iraqis could look to as a monument of the U.S. 
contribution to the country.  Al Jubouri said he believed the 
city of Tal Afar should be made an example for Iraq with 
something uniquely American. 
 
------------------- 
SUNNI EXAGGERATIONS 
------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) When asked about Sunni and Shia relations in the city, 
Al Jubouri, a Sunni Arab, said he admitted some Shia Iraqi 
Police (IP) officers were bad.  However, he bitterly accused 
Sunnis of being "hypocrites" who "exaggerated" events to their 
advantage.  He said that when the Golden Mosque in Samarra was 
bombed on February 22, Shias attacked mosques for a few days and 
then calmed down.  He said, however, that if Shias had actually 
bombed an important Sunni shrine, like the Tomb of Abdel Qudir 
Qadelawi, there would have been "blood on the streets."  Al 
Jubouri accused the predominantly Sunni, Iraqi Islamic Party 
(IIP), of contributing to tensions between Sunnis and Shias.  He 
claimed the IIP did not call for calm after the Samarra bombing, 
and instead "falsely" announced that three Sunni mosques had 
been bombed in Tal Afar instead. 
 
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"KILLER MISTAKES" 
----------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Although Al Jubouri is clearly a friend of the U.S., he 
saved his harshest criticism for the USG and its actions in 
Iraq.  "The Americans made a few killer mistakes," he said, and 
the U.S. "should have never listened" to Ahmed Al Chalabi.  They 
also should not have allowed sectarian Islamic parties to 
participate in the new government and to help write the 
constitution, he said.  He claimed religious political party 
involvement in the new constitution had brought Iraq "back 
hundreds of years."  Al Jubouri accused hard-line "religious" 
parties of being "more dangerous than Saddam Hussein."  Since 
the U.S. was supporting all groups in Iraq, he said, it left the 
country vulnerable to a sectarian takeover.  He claimed "Imams" 
were dictating politics and "destroying women's rights" by 
forcing them to "wear tents on their heads."  He did not rule 
out what he claimed was the "strong influence of Iran" that had 
been contributing to tensions in Iraq.  He said the ISF was 
"built incorrectly," since the USG was "training militias" 
instead of an independent army.  As an example he said, "The IA 
in the north is supported by the Kurds."  Lambasting the 
international media, Al Jubouri called the U.S. press "weak" for 
not reporting enough on "good stories" in Iraq, especially the 
work done by CF and the USG.  "The U.S. spent a lot of money on 
schools," said Al Jubouri, "but most Iraqis believe the money 
came from the Iraqi Government."  He claimed Iraqis loved the 
U.S. but that, too, was "never reported." 
 
------------------------ 
A FUTURE WITHOUT THE USG 
------------------------ 
 
¶8.  (C) "I'll quit," Al Jubouri said immovably when questioned 
what he would do once CF troops were inevitably drawn down.  Al 
Jubouri said he believed the Iraqi public was not educated 
enough to understand the profoundly "positive work" that had 
been done in Tal Afar.  He even accused his fellow city 
councilmembers of being "more interested in helping themselves" 
than with caring about the city.  Al Jubouri frankly said, "If 
it was not for the Coalition Forces we would not have anything." 
 
 
------------------------- 
STILL TIME TO "SAVE IRAQ" 
------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) Despite his criticisms, Al Jubouri said he was holding 
out faith that all was not yet lost in the country.  He 
suggested that the USG still had the power to affect the outcome 
in Iraq, but that it would have to act with a "frozen heart." 
Al Jubouri recommended that only a "secularist," like Ayad 
Allawi, could lead the country.  He said he believed Allawi was 
the perfect candidate who would "work for everyone."  "If you 
fixed the head, the whole body would be okay.  But right now, 
things were lopsided," he claimed.  Al Jubouri said democracy 
was a foreign concept for Iraqis, and that the democratic 
 
MOSUL 00000030  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
process would take time to develop.  He claimed sectarian 
parties took advantage of people's religious and personal 
security fears.  He said in Basra before the election, for 
example, the Shia coalition (United Iraqi Coalition #555) was 
marching through the streets carrying empty caskets, declaring 
voters "would die" if they voted for Allawi. 
 
¶10.  (C) When asked whether the invasion was worth the effort, 
Al Jubouri said the U.S. "won the fight but was losing the war." 
 He compared the USG to a person standing in water up to his 
chest, looking in panic for a way out.  Al Jubouri said the same 
tactics that worked to free Tal Afar from terrorism should also 
be applied to "liberate Iraq."  He recommended the USG install a 
secular government under Allawi, change the constitution so that 
it "does not appear like the Koran," and prohibit religious 
parties from participating.  He claimed that these changes would 
correct the problems in Iraq "within months."  He asked that the 
USG free Iraq the way the Protestant Reformation liberated 
Europe.  He compared life in Iraq and the Middle East today to 
that of Europe in the 16th and 17th Centuries, where "religious 
leaders ruled and repressed the people."  Once the Europeans 
were freed, said Al Jubouri, the "whole world changed."  And the 
same could be done for Iraq. 
 
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COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶11.  (C) Najim Al Jubouri is without a doubt a rare and brave 
leader, and a hero to the people of Tal Afar and Iraq.  On a 
visit to a primary school with the mayor and members of 1/1AD, 
the students, teachers, and administrators received him with a 
welcome fit for a king.  He firmly believes in "one Iraq," and 
when he enters a classroom the first question he asks is whether 
the students are "Sunni or Shia."  The response, of course, is 
"We are Iraqis!"  Although Al Jubouri is a living legend and 
positive example of bold leadership in a country fraught with 
fear and uncertainty, it seems that deep down he is aware that 
his efforts might be all for naught.  This was confirmed when he 
repeatedly and firmly told us he would "quit" once CF left.  We 
wonder how sustainable his successes will prove if and when the 
U.S. troops in his area are redeployed. 
MUNTER