VZCZCXRO1680
PP RUEHMR
DE RUEHMR #0124/01 0670626
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P R 080626Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY MASERU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1931
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RUEHMR/AMEMBASSY MASERU 2194

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MASERU 000124 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/S, PRETORIA FOR DATT AND REGIONAL POL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  3/6/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR LY LT
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH FOMIN 
 
REF: (A) MASERU 120  (B) MASERU 89  (C) MASERU 85  (D) MASERU 64 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: JUNE CARTER PERRY, AMBASSADOR, EXEC, STATE. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: JUNE CARTER PERRY, AMBASSADOR, EXEC, STATE. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
¶1.  (U) This is an action message.  See para 7. 
 
----------------- 
SUMMARY 
----------------- 
 
¶2.  (S) Following Foreign Minister Moleleki's return from his 
constituency, Ambassador met with him March 6 to review recent 
developments including the on-going review of the January 29 
shooting at his home; the need for a continued peaceful approach 
to Lesotho's 2007 national elections; and progress on an Article 
98 agreement.  As in his meeting with the CAI (Ref C), the FOMIN 
stated his conviction that the attack on him was politically 
motivated and orchestrated by Communications Minister Tom 
Thabane who, like Moleleki, had been considered a contender for 
succeeding Prime Minister Mosisili.  In addition, Moleleki 
alleged the Libyan Government was financing Thabane and the 
Police Commissioner was dragging her feet on the investigation 
due to allegiance to Thabane.  Ambassador observed that Lesotho 
had held peaceful "model" local and national elections over the 
past several years.  She urged continued democratic progress and 
peaceful transitions of power at all levels.  Moleleki concurred 
and said the ruling Lesotho Congress of Democracy (LCD) party 
leaders were committed to the same goals.  Regarding Article 98, 
Moleleki welcomed Ambassador's comments (based on Ambassador's 
Washington discussions with AF, L and PM), and suggested 
U.S./GOL meetings over the next two weeks to develop agreed-upon 
text to be signed by FOMIN and Ambassador.  (Post requests 
Department's recommended language for final paragraphs.)  We 
cannot substantiate Moleleki's claims about Thabane, but the 
sense of the diplomatic community is that the attack on the 
FOMIN was politically motivated.  We and other donors are 
reinforcing peaceful resolution of any issues and continued 
electoral progress.   There will be on-going dialogue toward an 
Article 98 agreed text; post is pressing for completion soon 
despite MFA's travel over the next several weeks.  End Summary 
 
¶3.  (S) Minister Moleleki, when asked about follow up to the 
assault on him at his home, stated that there had been no 
arrests and no real investigation by the Commissioner of Police 
Evelyn Letooane.  He said that in his view, the assailants were 
hired by Communications Minister Thabane who had opposed 
Moleleki in a race for the ruling parties Executive Committee. 
(Note:  Moleleki had not previously specifically named Thabane 
as the behind the scenes perpetrator of this attack.)  However, 
during our meeting, Moleleki was not hesitant in pointing the 
finger at Thabane, recalling that this aging political figure 
has served in every government since independence and has played 
a major role in Lesotho's political development.  The FOMIN 
re-hashed the Party Congress meetings of January 27 through the 
early hours of January 29, re-emphasizing his 700 vote margin 
victory over Thabane during a fractious LCD conference, and he 
emphasized the general political support he had among members of 
the party.  According to Moleleki, he had a "middle of the 
night" meeting with the deputy of the Libyan Embassy who 
confirmed that the Libyan Ambassador had been funneling monies 
not only to Thabane, but to Thabane's wife who resides in 
Johannesburg and reportedly travels internationally on a 
frequent basis to many countries including Libya.  We cannot 
confirm that Thabane has received these funds although the 
Libyan Government has purchased large ads in the Maseru press 
asserting Ghaddafi's loyalty to the country and his support of 
large relief efforts by Libya to the people of Lesotho. 
 
¶4.  (C) In response to the AMB's question about filing a police 
report, Moleleki emphatically stated that the Commissioner of 
Police had not really led an investigation and had only 
"requested a statement" from him 4 weeks after the incident 
following direct orders from the Deputy Prime Minister to do so. 
 He then alleged that the Commissioner of Police is, in fact, a 
supporter of Minister Thabane and is working hand-in-hand with 
him; therefore it is not surprising, in the Foreign Minister's 
opinion, that no real investigation has taken place.  Per FOMIN, 
to counter the lack of police action, the Government of Lesotho 
is setting up, under the Deputy Prime Minister's oversight, its 
own independent investigating committee, which is expected to 
convene within about a week.  The composition of this 
investigative body would comprise government and independent 
members who would not hesitate to come forward with exhibits he 
claims they have in hand which will point to Thabane as the 
 
MASERU 00000124  002 OF 002 
 
 
mastermind behind this attack. 
 
------------------------------------ 
The Democratic Process 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶5.  (C) The Ambassador emphasized the importance of peace and 
security in light of the upcoming 2007 national elections in 
Lesotho.  The country had successfully held municipal elections 
in 2005 under peaceful, non-violent conditions and it was 
important that this model be followed in the next electoral 
period.  We noted that Lesotho had set an example in its 
strengthening of democracy.  Moleleki concurred and said that 
was certainly the view of the Prime Minister and of the ruling 
party; they want to move forward in a non-violent and democratic 
manner.   We also discussed the peaceful progress of elections 
in South Africa and the Ambassador reinforced the importance of 
this tradition being upheld in the SADC countries as well as in 
Lesotho itself.  Moleleki advised that the GOL has decided to 
hold both national and local elections together in 2007.  (Note: 
 This has not yet been announced publicly.)  Also, the PM has 
asked for extension of the Independent Electoral Commission 
(IEC) members' terms, i.e., to delay the 2006 rotation of 
experienced commission members until after the national 
elections.  (A number of the commissioners were set to rotate in 
April under existing regulations.) 
 
¶6.  (C)  We continued the discussion of the importance of 
security, and Moleleki stated that he considered the United 
States an important partner in the fight against terrorism and 
even individual cases of violence, such as the one in which he 
was recently attacked, should be considered in that context.  We 
agreed that as democratic partners, we had a responsibility to 
take on the counter-terrorism fight regionally as well as 
globally.  (Note:  In this regard, we delivered the points on 
the U.S.-India Initiative on March 3.) (Ref A) 
 
-------------- 
Article 98 
-------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Moving on to broader security matters, the Ambassador 
thanked the Foreign Minister for the Government of Lesotho's 
willingness to proceed with an Article 98 agreement and reviewed 
with him areas of concurrence on a draft text and brought to his 
attention the areas where revisions for a final text would be 
necessary.  For example, U.S. law is sufficient and it would be 
inappropriate in such an agreement as suggested by the 
Government of Lesotho to amend its criminal law.  The Ambassador 
pressed Moleleki for a completion date in April.  He agreed that 
a near term date was desirable, that it was important to get 
this done as soon as possible and that the Ambassador and FOMIN 
would sign in Maseru.  We discussed further review we would 
undertake with MFA and the GOL (Attorney General's office) on 
specific points.  Moleleki was interested in a U.S. legal team's 
visit to Lesotho if possible.  Post requests Department provide 
suggested language for relevant paragraphs. 
 
-------------- 
Comment 
-------------- 
 
¶8.  (C)  Moleleki's allegations against Minister Thabane have 
also been heard by other members of the diplomatic corps. 
Reportedly, Thabane has denied any involvement but there has 
been no public statement to this effect.  Some in the diplomatic 
community have questioned why a statement from the Prime 
Minister himself has not been forthcoming, although the Deputy 
Prime Minister (DPM) did recognize in Parliament that the 
assault had taken place and there would be an investigation. 
Interestingly, Minister of Trade Malie, now Secretary General of 
the ruling party, made a public announcement that the incident 
was criminal in nature and not political.  The international 
community as a whole believes that the attack was politically 
motivated and that it comes from within the ranks of the LCD. 
The Foreign Minister has made his case in a dramatic manner to 
envoys, but independent verification of exactly what happened by 
whom remains absent.  In our conversations with government 
officials, the importance of peaceful transfer of power, 
non-violent and peaceful elections and adherence to the 
democratic process have been emphasized.  Other diplomats are 
making the same points.   We intend to work as in previous 
elections with U.S. and international organizations as well as 
the Government of Lesotho to provide pre-electoral training and 
observers. 
 
¶9.  (C) We are following up with MFA to continue work on Article 
¶98.  Post believes provision of suggested language will be the 
most effective route to follow.  (Minister Moleleki will be 
traveling to Libya for AU and bilateral meetings over the coming 
weeks and also intends to travel to Dubai.)  End Comment. 
PERRY