VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMU #0708/01 0872113
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 282113Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5768
RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
INFO RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 000708 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR D, DRL, G/IWI AND WHA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2036 
TAGS: PHUM PREL PGOV KDEM KCRM USOAS KWMN NU
SUBJECT: ZOILAMERICA NARVAEZ SEEKS USG HELP IN HER IACHR 
CASE AGAINST STEP-FATHER DANIEL ORTEGA 
 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR PAUL TRIVELLI. REASONS 1.4 (B,D). 
 
¶1.  (C) This cable includes an action request. See paragraph 
¶8. 
 
¶2.  SUMMARY: (C) On March 24, DRL PDAS Jonathan Farrar and 
poloffs met Zoilamerica Narvaez, the daughter of Rosario 
Murillo and the step-daughter of Daniel Ortega, to discuss 
Narvaez's ongoing complaint against the Nicaraguan state 
before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR). 
Her case centers on the failure of Nicaraguan institutions 
to provide due process in her complaint against her 
stepfather for sexual assault, sexual harassment and rape 
committed over a period of years.  Narvaez seeks USG 
cooperation to set up a support group in Nicaragua to help 
her deal with the inevitable Sandinista counterattack.  Aside 
from striking a powerful blow against impunity and corruption 
in Nicaragua, assisting Narvaez could do real damage to 
Daniel Ortega's political ambitions, both in this election 
year and thereafter.  END SUMMARY. 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE CASE--A STORY OF JUSTICE REPEATEDLY DENIED 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶3.  (U) The Zoilamerica Narvaez legal saga began in 1998 when 
Narvaez brought rape, sexual assault and sexual harassment 
charges against Ortega, and the FSLN leader subsequently used 
his immunity as a National Assembly deputy and his control of 
the courts to ensure that the case never went to trial. 
Having protected himself from judicial action, Ortega then 
actively sabotaged all efforts by the Nicaraguan government 
(GON) to provide justice to Narvaez via other means (such as 
an acknowledgment that state institutions had failed to 
protect her right of due process).  As another way of burying 
the allegations, the Sandinista leader also used his mother 
and Rosario Murillo in a public relations campaign to 
whitewash his image and to tar Narvaez as a liar.  With 
justice denied in Nicaragua, Narvaez took her case to the 
IACHR in 2000, and the Commission accepted it the following 
year. 
 
¶4.  (C) In 2002, the IACHR asked Narvaez and the then-new 
Bolanos administration to try to reach an "amicable solution" 
to settle the case.  Both sides agreed, and the IACHR put the 
case on hold in Washington to allow negotiations to take 
place in Nicaragua.  These negotiations nearly bore fruit--by 
the fall of 2002 the GON had agreed to issue a public 
statement admitting that the Nicaraguan state had failed to 
provide Narvaez justice and was prepared to pay an indemnity 
to the non-profit foundation for victims of sexual abuse that 
Narvaez and her husband founded.  The then-human rights 
ombudsman, Benjamin Perez, was also about to issue an 
official finding stating that the Nicaraguan state had 
violated Zoilamerica's right to due process. 
 
¶5.  (C) According to Narvaez, it was at this point politics 
intruded.  At a time when the Bolanos government was bringing 
corruption charges against ex-president Arnoldo Aleman and 
seeking to remove him from the National Assembly to face 
trial, it needed the support of the FSLN caucus in the 
Assembly.  At the last minute, Perez and his office were 
forced to abandon their plan to issue a finding in Narvaez's 
favor and the GON backed out of its agreement to settle the 
case with her.  Having thus been denied justice yet again, 
she subsequently sought to revive her case at the IACHR, but 
has lacked the financial resources and political support to 
restart the legal proceedings.  Narvaez has repeatedly 
requested USG help to connect her with people and 
organizations in the United States that could provide 
political, organizational and financial help. 
 
NARVAEZ MEETS PDAS FARRAR AND DISCUSSES HOW TO PROCEED 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶6.  (C) During their March 24 meeting, Narvaez told PDAS 
Farrar that she is anxious for movement in her case, but does 
not want any public exposure until she and her supporters 
have fashioned a coherent "winning" strategy to bring the 
case to conclusion.  Narvaez believes that her inability to 
obtain justice for the sexual and domestic violence she 
suffered has only worsened the already rampant impunity in 
Nicaragua for violence against women.  She fears that the 
spectacle of yet another public "defeat" would only convince 
Nicaraguan women that achieving justice for domestic and 
sexual violence is an impossible dream, increasing their 
already strong reluctance to report such crimes.  Narvaez 
also wants to ensure that the USG will continue to support 
her even after the November elections, whatever their 
outcome.  She feels that in the past, the USG has only 
actively promoted her case in the run up to national 
elections and has lost interest thereafter.  Narvaez fears 
being left alone to face the wrath of the formidable FSLN 
political, legal and propaganda machines, not to mention 
extra-legal dirty tricks and threats against her and her 
family. 
 
¶7.  (C) Narvaez presented PDAS Farrar and poloffs a list of 
individuals and organizations in Nicaragua familiar with the 
details of her case and that she believes would be willing to 
support her openly when the case is revived at the IACHR. 
These include officials at the Presidency, the Attorney 
General's office, the Nicaraguan Permanent Commission on 
Human Rights (CPDH) NGO, the local office of the 
International Republican Institute (IRI), the Women's NGO 
Network, a handful of women deputies in the National 
Assembly, and one key media outlet.  PDAS Farrar told her 
that we are committed to helping her and need to find the 
right mechanisms to do so.  Post will approach all of these 
individuals and institutions to sound them out on the case, 
and thereafter plans to convene a meeting of key players to 
establish a group to support Narvaez and discuss strategy. 
Although most Embassies in Managua are afraid to touch the 
case because of either its sensitivity and/or their 
sympathies for the FSLN, Narvaez stated that she will 
approach the Swedish Ambassador, who is both a woman and 
outspoken when it comes to matters of corruption in Nicaragua. 
 
¶8.  (C) ACTION REQUEST: Narvaez added that she plans to be in 
the Washington area during the second half of June, and she 
will provide post her itinerary when it is set.  Post 
believes that this trip would be an ideal opportunity to 
arrange meetings for Narvaez with key officials in the 
Department, the OAS, and other appropriate government and 
non-government organizations.  Post requests the assistance 
of the Department in developing a list of appropriate and 
interested contacts now and in scheduling appointments when 
the dates of Narvaez's travel are set.  END ACTION REQUEST. 
 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
 
¶9.  (C) Aside from the obvious merits of supporting Narvaez 
as a means of defending human rights and fighting the rampant 
impunity and corruption that are holding back Nicaragua's 
democratic and social development, any progress in her case 
(and associated publicity) could do real damage to Daniel 
Ortega and his perennial political ambitions.  The FSLN is 
well aware of this and can be expected to respond in a fierce 
and well-coordinated manner against Narvaez, the USG, and 
anyone else that promotes her case.  However, a sustained and 
effective effort to promote and publicize the case, 
particularly to young voters being actively courted by the 
FSLN, could go a long way to reinforce Ortega's poor public 
image and ensure his defeat in November.  Even if Ortega 
loses in November, supporting Narvaez in bringing her case to 
a successful conclusion could end Ortega's political career 
once and for all, rather than allowing him to rise from the 
ashes yet again in 2011. 
TRIVELLI