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FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
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INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
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RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 000632 
 
SIPDIS 
 
C O R R E C T E D COPY (ADDED TEXT TO PAR 6) 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN, NEA/I 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/21/2016 
TAGS: KDEM NU PGOV PINR PREL KCOR
SUBJECT: FSLN FOREIGN AFFAIRS CHIEF: "JUDGE US BY OUR 
DEEDS, NOT OUR RHETORIC" 
 
REF: MANAGUA 0579 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli. Reasons 1.4 (B,D). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: Sandinista (FSLN) foreign affairs advisor 
Samuel Santos holds up the FSLN's recent support for CAFTA 
implementation legislation as evidence of his party's 
interest in constructive relations with the United States. 
He suggests that the FSLN might also be willing to vote to 
destroy 651 MANPADS and eventually the remainder if such 
disarmament would lead to more benefits for the Nicaraguan 
military.  He continues to excuse Daniel Ortega's anti-USG 
public rhetoric, insisting that Ortega realizes he needs good 
relations with the United States if he is to successfully 
govern.  He fretted to polcouns and TDY poloff on March 16 
that USG influence in Nicaragua could cost Ortega the 
November national election and is particularly alarmed by our 
cordial relations with Sandinista-dissident Herty Lewites. 
End Summary. 
 
Strange Bedfellows Rally around CAFTA 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - 
 
¶2.  (C) In his March 16 meeting with polcouns and TDY poloff, 
analyst, FSLN foreign affairs advisor Samuel Santos held up 
the FSLN's recent support for CAFTA implementation 
legislation as evidence of the Sandinista party's interest in 
constructive relations with the United States (septel). 
Santos explained that in light of the Liberal Constitutional 
Party's (PLC) "no amnesty, no CAFTA" pledge, the Nicaraguan 
government negotiated with the bloc of 38 Sandinistas and 
Eduardo Montealegre's seven member ALN-PC caucus, plus a few 
lawmakers from smaller blocs, to muster  support for pending 
CAFTA reforms.  The Sandinistas agreed to the reforms in 
exchange for minor textual changes. 
 
¶3.  (C) Note/Comment: On March 16, this odd CAFTA "alliance" 
passed both the 29 articles associated with the copyright law 
reform and the six articles related to the law of satellite 
broadcast signals.  The remaining reforms, to be considered 
March 21, include the 26 articles of the trademark law, 15 
articles of the patent law, the Budapest Treaty and an 
anticorruption law.  We had an inkling that the Sandinistas 
might support the CAFTA-related votes after Santos told us on 
March 13 (Reftel) that the FSLN supports CAFTA in principle 
and would be willing, with assurances that help Nicaraguans 
better compete, to support implementing legislation.  End 
Note/Comment. 
 
MANPADS Next? 
- - - - - - - 
 
¶4.  (C) Taking advantage of the FSLN's support for CAFTA 
implementing legislation, polcouns raised the issue of 
MANPADS destruction, suggesting that a favorable vote on 
MANPADS would help demonstrate the FSLN's commitment to 
eliminating weapons that are of little use but to terrorists. 
 Santos explained that some three years ago he had discussed 
MANPADS destruction with Embassy officials, who suggested 
that perhaps in recognition for the destruction the USG would 
contribute helicopters or other items to the Nicaraguan 
military.  However, this initiative had fizzled.  Polcouns 
clarified that, although there is no agreement on the table 
that would directly link MANPADS destruction with the 
donation of specific items, clearly further MANPADS 
destruction would open the way for increased mil-mil 
engagement and assistance.  Santos replied that he will relay 
this message to his party leadership.  (Note: President 
Bolanos' senior political adviser, Frank Arana, told us March 
20 that he will also broach the subject wi 
th the Sandinistas.) 
 
"Pacts Are How We Do Politics" 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶5.  (C) Elaborating on the GON-FSLN CAFTA effort, Santos 
asserted that the GON-FSLN pact is more productive than the 
much maligned Ortega-Aleman pact.  "Pacts are how we do 
politics.  They help maintain governability," argued Santos. 
He confided that before Aleman offered to pact with Ortega in 
1997, the Sandinistas were floundering and flailing.  "We 
seized on Aleman's offer and turned it to our advantage," 
beamed Santos, who added that Aleman's blind personal hunger 
for power had made him vulnerable.  This was not the first or 
last pact, continued Santos, noting that early in President 
Bolanos' term, Bolanos had "pacted" with Ortega to remove 
Aleman's immunity.  The pact continued until Secretary Powell 
visited Managua in fall 2003 and "ordered" President Bolanos 
to break the pact, and was revitalized after the OAS brokered 
a new deal between Bolanos and Ortega in fall 2005 to restore 
governability, said Santos. 
 
"Watch What We Do, Not What We Say" 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶6.  (C) Santos resorted to his usual line of "heed our 
actions, not our rhetoric" to polcouns' query over Ortega's 
March 16 verbal assault on the United States when he accused 
the USG of infiltrating the Sandinista party with spies and 
of attempting to wrangle amnesty for PLC leader/convicted 
money launderer Arnoldo Aleman.  Santos cited Ambassador John 
Negroponte's recent statement that the U.S. must monitor 
Nicaragua as the reason for Ortega's allegation.  And, while 
Santos acknowledged that the U.S. is not seeking Aleman's 
amnesty, he argued that about three years ago the U.S. 
Ambassador had approached him on the idea.  (Note: The Ambassador 
at the time clarified that she never supported Aleman's amnesty and 
never approached Santos on the matter or anyone else).  At least the 
anti-U.S. lyrics are no longer in the Sandinista anthem, 
proffered Santos. Polcouns reiterated that Ortega's rhetoric is 
uncalled for and will certainly not lend to improving relations. 
 
Carter Is Our Friend and We Need U.S. Investment 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶7.  (C) Santos held up the Sandinistas' close friendship with 
former President Jimmy Carter as a model for bilateral 
relations.  He said the Sandinistas look forward to Carter's 
visit in July and hope that Carter will be present for the 
November election.  U.S. investment is also welcome, asserted 
Santos, who claimed that while the Bolanos government had 
supported Chinese investment in a canal project for 
Nicaragua, the Sandinistas oppose the project if the Chinese 
are the only foreign investors.  Instead, the FSLN believes 
any eventual canal project should also include U.S. and/or 
European investment. (Note: Ortega is touting an ambitious 
canal project as part of his campaign platform.) 
 
What's This about You and Herty? 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶8.  (C) Visibly perturbed over our association with Herty 
Lewites, Santos complained that Lewites adviser Victor Hugo 
Tinoco is granted generous access to U.S. officials in 
Washington, while he, Santos, does not even have a U.S. visa. 
 "Herty was a gun runner (for the Sandinistas) like me, but 
he seems to have no problem with his visa," grumbled Santos 
(Santos is ineligible for a U.S. non-immigrant visa under 212 
(a) (3) (B) - - terrorism).  Polcouns replied that we meet 
with political leaders from all parties, as evidenced by our 
meetings with him. (Comment: Santos' palpable consternation 
over our engagement with Lewites suggests that Herty does 
represent a real threat to Ortega and could draw enough votes 
from Sandinista sympathizers to prevent an Ortega victory. 
Indeed, the Borge/IRI poll suggests that, while sympathy for 
the FSLN as a party is 33 percent, only 25 percent of the 
respondents would vote for Ortega.  End comment.) 
 
Why Ortega? 
- - - - - - 
 
¶9.  (C) Santos rationalized Ortega's continued leadership of 
the FSLN to the fact that he is the only one who can counter 
the USG's efforts to dismantle the party.  When pressed, 
Santos could present no evidence of this accusation, nor 
could he prove, as Ortega asserts, that the USG is financing 
Ortega rival Lewites' campaign. (Note: According to the 
Borge/IRI mid-March poll, Alejandro Martinez Cuenca enjoys 
considerable internal Sandinista party support, with 27.7 
percent favoring Martinez Cuenca versus 29.2 percent 
supporting Ortega as the FSLN's presidential candidate.) 
 
Biodata 
- - - - 
 
¶10.  (C) Samuel SANTOS Lopez was born December 13, 1938.  His 
grandfather was Somoza's National Guard Chief of Operations 
and Intelligence.  During the Sandinista era, Santos served 
as chief of the FSLN Finance Department and was a member of 
the FSLN Assembly.  He also served as Mayor of Managua and 
Minister of Managua Reconstruction.  Santos helped divert GON 
funds to arm the FMLN in El Salvador.  Now an economist and 
wealthy businessman, Santos was a member of the failed 
Interbank and lost considerable money in the bank scandal. 
Santos owns a hotel in Managua and is the General Manager of 
Best Western, Nicaragua.  He is a major proponent of building 
a canal through Nicaragua and is a close business partner of 
Bayardo Arce's.  He has relatives in the United States, 
including a sister in Los Angeles and sons in San Francisco. 
 
Comment 
- - - - 
 
¶11.  (C) Santos once again sought our assurances that the 
U.S. will refrain from "unhelpful attacks" on Ortega and 
avoid meddling in Nicaragua's political deliberations.  He 
asserted that it is now the Sandinistas' turn for power, 
given that the Liberal governments have failed to deliver 
prosperity to the Nicaraguan people.  To Santos, an Ortega 
victory would close the circle on years of conflict and heal 
the nation.  Once again, we reiterated that the USG maintains 
its reservations over Ortega -- given his track record and 
his continuing anti-U.S. rhetoric -- and rejects any 
political option that is a product of the Ortega-Aleman pact. 
 An Ortega victory would likely spark a political spiral 
downward -- what Nicaragua needs is a leader who will break 
Nicaragua's vicious circle of caudillismo. 
 
TRIVELLI