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DE RUEHMU #0578/01 0732252
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P 142252Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5590
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0581
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 000578 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2016 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM SOCI NU
SUBJECT: NICARAGUAN ELECTIONS REGIONAL REPORTING: MADRIZ 
 
REF: MANAGUA 511 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR PAUL TRIVELLI. REASONS 1.4 (B,D). 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  Meetings with political, economic, and 
civil society leaders in the department of Madriz suggest 
that the department's Liberal roots remain strong, and that 
the FSLN can be beaten there, despite the fact that it 
currently controls most municipalities and enjoys 
considerable support and funding from European NGOs.  Of the 
main emerging political movements, only that of Eduardo 
Montealegre appears to have made significant inroads in 
Madriz, co-opting much of the traditional PLC structure and 
forcing the PLC to recruit new, less experienced 
representatives.  As in other departments, representatives of 
the various Liberal camps proclaimed a strong desire for 
unity to defeat the FSLN in November, and urged the USG to 
pressure all of the party leaders in Managua to come to 
terms.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (U) On March 8-9, poloff and political FSN traveled to 
the northwestern department of Madriz on the Honduran border, 
and met local leaders to discuss the political and economic 
situation in the department eight months ahead of November 
national elections.  Among our interlocutors were 
representatives of the "Vamos con Eduardo"/National Liberal 
Alliance (ALN), the Alliance for the Republic (APRE) and 
"Amigos de Alvarado", the Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC), 
"Movimiento Herty 2006", the Supreme Electoral Council (CSE), 
Etica y Transparencia, the Catholic Church, and the PLC mayor 
 
of the small municipality of Totogalpa.  Post will report on 
social and economic issues septel.  Since 1990, Madriz has 
generally been a strong department for the PLC, illustrated 
by the results of the 2000 municipal elections when the party 
took seven of nine municipalities.  However, when the PLC ran 
a weak campaign in 2004 and the non-FSLN vote was sharply 
divided, the Sandinistas reversed the balance, taking seven 
towns.  Nonetheless, even that year, the combined 
"democratic" vote would have been enough to win every 
municipality in the department except the capital of Somoto, 
where the FSLN defeated all other parties combined. 
 
¶3.  (C) Madriz is unquestionably one of the poorest and most 
neglected departments in Nicaragua.  Other than maintaining 
one good road running through the department, there is very 
little that the GON or National Assembly has visibly done to 
develop infrastructure and promote economic growth in the 
department in recent years.  As an example of "Managua's" 
lack of interest in the department, numerous interlocutors 
pointed out that Arnoldo Aleman's daughter, Maria Dolores, 
nominally represents Madriz as a regional deputy in the 
National Assembly, despite the fact that she has never once 
visited the department or shown the slightest interest in it. 
 (Maria Dolores was the subsitute deputy for Elvin Rene 
Pineda, who represented Madriz, and she replaced him after 
his December 2004 death.)  There is little doubt that the 
FSLN will try to capitalize on such feelings of neglect by 
the PLC and three successive democratic governments. 
 
FSLN HISTORICALLY WEAK IN MADRIZ, BUT BOOSTED BY 2004 
ELECTIONS AND EUROPEAN LARGESSE 
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¶4.  (C) All interlocutors agreed that while the FSLN has been 
historically weak in Madriz, its seven mayors elected in 2004 
have exploited their positions to make inroads for the party. 
 According to everyone we met, numerous European (mainly 
Spanish) NGOs have brought large amounts of money into the 
department in the last two years.  They allege that the FSLN 
has carefully used these funds for patronage and vote buying, 
implementing infrastructure projects in Sandinista 
neighborhoods and building houses for FSLN voters, while 
blatantly neglecting those that do not vote FSLN. 
Representatives of all the non-Sandinista parties (including 
supporters of Herty Lewites) fear that the FSLN will leverage 
this European largesse to buy significant numbers of votes on 
election day.  PLC department head Indalecio Gonzalez took 
the widespread complaints about "Spanish" activities one step 
farther, claiming that individuals with connections to the 
ETA terrorist group had found refuge in Madriz and were 
supporting the FSLN there.  Emboffs asked Gonzalez to provide 
specific names or details, but he was unable to do so. 
(Note: Post will request details on the NGOs and their 
leadership.  If we verify the veracity of these allegations, 
the Ambassador will engage his Spanish counterpart on the 
matter.) 
¶5.  (C)  Other alleged factors favoring the FSLN in Madriz 
include direct financing of the party's campaign by foreign 
governments (including the Government of Venezuela), and the 
claim that a number of Cuban television stations can be 
received in the department (perhaps via a cable system), 
reportedly transmitting a constant stream of propaganda for 
Castro, Chavez, and Ortega.  However, numerous observers also 
described the FSLN elite in Madriz as the "new rich" who live 
off properties and businesses confiscated during the 1980s, 
and opined that the party lacked any strong, visible 
departmental leader.  Daniel Ortega was actually in the 
capital of Somoto on March 8 and reportedly held a poorly 
attended rally; emboffs saw no evidence of any large public 
FSLN activity.  Despite the specific FSLN advantages listed 
above, everyone described the party as eminently beatable in 
Madriz in November. 
 
PLC REPRESENTATIVES LARGELY PRAGMATIC AND CALL FOR BROAD 
LIBERAL ALLIANCE 
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¶6.  (C) PLC representatives in Madriz were among the most 
pragmatic PLC politicians emboffs have met thus far.  Carlos 
Rafael Olivas, the PLC Vice Mayor of Totogalpa, one of the 
two Madriz municipalities to remain in PLC hands after the 
debacle of 2004, shared with emboffs that he and other local 
party activists favor a broad Liberal alliance including Jose 
Antonio Alvarado and Eduardo Montealegre.  He argued that 
because the PLC is the largest Liberal political force, 
Alvarado and Montealegre must approach the PLC.  Olivas 
admitted that the PLC had made mistakes and driven away 
people and groups that should be its allies, but he insisted 
that the PLC convention in April will be democratic and not 
simply a rubber stamp for Aleman.  He named Jose Rizo, Ramiro 
Sacasa, and Francisco Aguirre Sacasa as the best PLC 
"pre-candidates."  Olivas suggested that the USG should 
convene all the Liberal political leaders in Managua and 
pressure them to join forces.  He ventured that authentic, 
inclusive primaries would be a good way to resolve 
differences and select leaders. 
 
¶7.  (C) Emboffs met the PLC department head for Madriz, 
Indalecio Gonzalez, at his residence for a private meeting. 
Gonzalez is relatively young and new in his party office, as 
his two most recent predecessors both died in the last two 
years.  Perhaps reflecting his newness in his job and the 
fact that he had no PLC audience to play to, Gonzalez was 
more open with emboffs than his counterparts have been in 
other departments visited so far.  He complained about GON 
and media attacks on the PLC, but proclaimed a desire to work 
closely with the USG and admitted that the Aleman-Ortega pact 
had done severe damage to his party.  While other PLC 
officials usually loudly deny that Aleman ever stole a cent 
from the Nicaraguan state, Gonzalez remained silent when 
emboffs stated that the evidence of Aleman's guilt was 
overwhelming.  At the end of the meeting Gonzalez even 
admitted that he had nothing against Montealegre's ALN, but 
had aligned with the PLC because he believes his chances of 
being elected to the National Assembly are better with it 
than with Montealegre. 
 
ALN HAS SOLID STRUCTURE, HAS MADE INROADS, AND BELIEVES IT 
COULD WIN MADRIZ ALONE IF NECESSARY 
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¶8.  (C)  The ALN department head for Madriz, obstetrician 
Jose Armando Herrera, told emboffs that he formerly held the 
same post for the PLC until he was sacked by Arnoldo Aleman 
for protesting Aleman's corruption and pact with Daniel 
Ortega.  Herrera stated that when he left the PLC, he took 
the bulk of the party's departmental structure with him and 
that eighty percent of the PLC's experienced departmental 
leaders are now with the ALN.  Herrera insisted that 
Montealegre is unquestionably the most popular candidate in 
Madriz, enjoying widespread support amongst Nicaraguans 
living across the Honduran border who will return to the 
department to vote on election day.  Herrera described Madriz 
as one of Montealegre's strongest departments and stated that 
his polling numbers will be much higher in Madriz than their 
(already fairly high) national average. 
 
¶9.  (C)  Herrera shared that liberal voters in impoverished 
Madriz are outraged with Aleman's theft of tens of millions 
of dollars from the state treasury, and they will not vote 
PLC as long as Aleman remains in charge of the party. 
Herrera urged the USG to "twist Aleman's arm" to remove him 
from politics and make possible Liberal unity, but he 
asserted that the ALN could win alone in Madriz if it were 
ultimately forced to run alone.  As long as Aleman remains a 
factor, Herrera does not believe that the PLC will ever 
participate in real primaries.  With the exception of the 
PLC, everyone else we spoke to agreed that Montealegre has 
campaigned more actively in Madriz than any other candidate 
and seems to have established himself as a viable third 
option in the department. 
 
APRE PROPPED UP BY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS; SUPPORT FOR ALVARADO 
QUESTIONABLE 
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¶10.  (C) Unlike in most departments that emboffs have 
visited, the departmental heads of APRE and "Amigos de 
Alvarado" are not one and the same in Madriz.  Emboffs met 
APRE head Ramona Centeno in her Somoto government office 
where she works for the Directorate of Taxation.  Centeno 
claimed that APRE enjoys a solid departmental structure, but 
she admitted that it received virtually no guidance or 
financial support from Managua.  She argued that Alvarado 
attracts the support of teachers and medical workers in 
Madriz because of his previous ministerial career.  However, 
Centeno also largely conformed to the stereotype of the 
government bureaucrat supporting APRE purely in an effort to 
protect and advance her government career, as virtually every 
comment she made about APRE or Alvarado somehow linked back 
to her personal interests and activities. 
 
¶11.  (C) Dagoberto Bermudez, the Madriz head of "Amigos de 
Alvarado" is another government official, working as the 
Ministry of Health's departmental hospitals director. 
However, he was much more candid than Centeno.  Bermudez 
admitted that APRE is a weak vehicle for Alvarado because it 
is widely seen as a "government party" that forced GON 
employees to support it.  However, Bermudez insisted that 
Alvarado enjoys more popularity than his party vehicle. 
Bermudez argued that the "radical" PLC bases will never vote 
for Montealegre, but they would vote for Alvarado, and 
claimed that Alvarado could even take some votes from the 
FSLN.  Bermudez opined that Jose Rizo, Montealegre, and 
Alvarado must unify their forces immediately for the sake of 
Nicaragua.  Other than Alvarado's supporters, no one emboffs 
met in Madriz reported that Alvarado has campaigned seriously 
in Madriz or has any structure other than government 
officials supporting him or his party.  ALN representative 
Herrera claimed that most of the nominal APRE members in 
Madriz really support Montealegre and the ALN. 
 
HERTY WIDELY DISTRUSTED IN MADRIZ AND POPULAR SUPPORT 
QUESTIONABLE 
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¶12.  (C) Emboffs met a half-dozen supporters of Herty Lewites 
in the candidate's Somoto campaign office, which had the 
words "Siempre Sandinista" (Always Sandinista) painted in 
large letters on the walls outside.  Despite the need to use 
such rhetoric to maintain his credentials with left-leaning 
voters, Lewites' supporters insisted that their candidate 
will never return to the "Danielista" FSLN.  They dismissed 
the poor showing of Lewites' alliance in the Atlantic Coast 
elections (reftel), attributing it to the fact that the 
movement only had two months to organize there.  They also 
noted that during the Atlantic Coast campaign, the FSLN 
focused most of its attacks on Herty, rather than on the PLC. 
 The Lewites followers claimed he enjoys a solid organization 
and urban and rural support throughout Madriz.  They 
recounted that spreading knowledge about the Aleman-Ortega 
pact is one of their most effective campaign tools. 
 
¶13.  (C) In a mirror image of the fears that are usually 
expressed on the right (and that emboffs heard throughout 
Madriz) about Lewites going back to the FSLN, Lewites' 
supporters in Madriz fear that Montealegre and Alvarado might 
rejoin Aleman's PLC, possibly under pressure from the USG. 
Most people on the right in Madriz claimed that the entire 
Herty campaign is a ruse designed to make the right think 
that it can safely enter the elections divided since the left 
is divided as well.  Even those who did not regard the Herty 
campaign as a trap doubted whether he would have much impact 
on the FSLN vote in Madriz and feared that in a four way 
presidential race, Daniel Ortega could win in the first round. 
 
PLC OFFICIAL IN CHARGE OF LOCAL CSE OFFICE IS ASLEEP AT THE 
WHEEL AND FSLN IS REALLY RUNNING THINGS 
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¶14.  (C) The departmental head of the CSE, Rodolfo Jose 
Alfaro Garcia, is a PLC appointee, but all interlocutors 
described him to emboffs as a "weak" administrator and stated 
that FSLN bureaucrats working under him really run the CSE 
departmental office, employing all the familiar Sandinista 
tactics to prevent non-FSLN voters from obtaining voter 
identification documents (cedulas) and casting their ballots 
on election day.  Everyone, including the PLC departmental 
head and the PLC Vice Mayor of Totogalpa, stated that they 
had no confidence whatsoever in Alfaro and feared that the 
FSLN might try every tactic in the book to steal the vote in 
November. 
 
¶15.  (C) When emboffs met Alfaro in his office, he lived up 
to his reputation, turning on a baseball game and rarely 
taking his eyes off the television while emboffs tried to 
discuss the local electoral process with him.  Alfaro offered 
nothing more than vague statements that the CSE is "doing its 
job" in Madriz, and that while the voting register is filled 
with dead people and some citizens in rural areas have 
trouble obtaining cedulas, everything will "somehow work out" 
on election day.  Unfortunately, Movimiento Por Nicaragua, 
which might be able to apply pressure on the local CSE office 
and assist citizens in obtaining cedulas, appears to have 
little or no presence in Madriz.  No one emboffs met was 
aware of any Movimiento activity in the department and Juan 
Carlos Espinoza, the group's nominal organizer in Madriz, 
failed to show up for a meeting he had previously confirmed. 
 
MADRIZ: DEMOGRAPHICS AND VOTING PROFILE 
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¶16.  (U) 
 
Total Population (2003 est.):       133,974 
Total Urban Population:                    37,898 
Total Rural Population:                    96,076 
 
Votes Received by Party, 2004 Municipal Elections 
 
PLC:  25,490 
FSLN: 29,571 
APRE:  1,196 
CCN:     196 
PLI:      91 
AC:      211 
PLN:      80 
PRN:   1,067 
MSL:     100 
 
COMMENT: LIBERAL CAMP SHOULD WIN IN MADRIZ, BUT NOTHING IS 
CERTAIN AS LONG AS DIVISIONS REMAIN 
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¶17.  (C) Madriz is a department that the Liberal camp should 
win in November, whether because the ALN succeeds in 
co-opting enough of the PLC structure and base or because 
leaders in Managua see reason and form a broad alliance. 
Given their fears of the FSLN returning to power, non-FSLN 
voters in Madriz are likely to gravitate to whatever force 
seems most likely to defeat the Sandinistas.  However, while 
the ALN might be able to win alone if enough voters flock to 
it, a continuing Liberal division clearly creates 
opportunities for the FSLN that it will not have if the 
Liberal camp is unified.  Unfortunately, local political 
leaders seem unwilling or unable to convey this message to 
Managua, and they continue to abdicate responsibility for 
marginalizing Arnoldo Aleman and bringing about Liberal unity 
to the USG. 
TRIVELLI